

CALCIDIUS ON FATE

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HIS DOCTRINE AND SOURCES

PROEFSCHRIFT

TER VERKRIJGING VAN DE
GRAAD VAN DOCTOR IN DE LETTEREN
AAN DE RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT TE LEIDEN,
OP GEZAG VAN DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS DR. J. GOSLINGS,
HOOGLERAAR IN DE FACULTEIT DER GENEESKUNDE,
TEN OVERSTAAN VAN EEN COMMISSIE UIT DE SENAAT
TE VERDEDIGEN OP DONDERDAG 25 JUNI 1970
TE KLOKKE 16.15 UUR

DOOR

JAN DEN BOEFT

Geboren te Rotterdam in 1935



LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL

1970

Promotor

Prof. Dr. J. H. WASZINK

Aan mijn ouders

Aan mijn vrouw

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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

unde est haec, inquam, fatis auulsa uoluntas?
(Lucretius, *De rerum natura* II 257)

The problem of fate and fatality has greatly occupied the minds of the Ancients, philosophically as well as in other ways. Already in Homer we find this problem, centered in the μοῖρα, about whose puzzling and inescapable power Hector says:

μοῖραν δ' οὐ τίνα φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν,
οὐ κακόν, οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ἐπὴν τὰ πρῶτα γένηται. (Z 488/9)

In this sphere the μοῖρα has a special relation to the span of life allotted to man. Pre-Socratic philosophy, too, paid attention to fate. In Heraclitus' doctrine of the cosmic process fatality certainly plays an important part: πάντα δὲ γίνεσθαι καθ' εἰμαρμένην was what he taught, according to Diogenes Laertius IX 7 (= Diels-Kranz fr. A 1, pag. 141,10). The ἐκπύρωσις, too, is regulated by fate: ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τάξιν τινα καὶ χρόνον ὠρισμένον τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μεταβολῆς κατὰ τινα εἰμαρμένην ἀνάγκην (fr. A 5, pag. 145, 15-16). In the combination εἰμαρμένη ἀνάγκη we meet a second important term in this field. According to Empedocles (fr. B 115) the exile of the soul is due to 'Ανάγκη and Parmenides says about the immutability of Being:

κρατερὴ γὰρ 'Ανάγκη
πεῖρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἔέργει (fr. B 8, 30-31).

All these doctrines are first and foremost concerned with the physical world as a whole and with the cosmic order. When by the Sophists and Socrates man was placed in the centre of philosophy, the related question of human freedom, which, although hitherto not neglected, had not been treated thoroughly, came into prominence. Plato, however, did not give an explicit elucidation of the question. He uses the word εἰμαρμένη only sparingly and at times, so it seems, not wholeheartedly, cf. e.g. ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἄν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη (*Phaed.* 115 a 5) and πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἄν εἷς ἐκφύγοι. (*Gorgias* 512 e 3-4). A full-scale treatment of the relation of human freedom and fate can be found in the great myth of Er at the end of the *Politeia*

(614 b sqq.), where human responsibility is emphasized in the famous words αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος (617 e 4).

Aristotle uses the word εἰμαρμένη very rarely. But it is important that he is a champion of human freedom and responsibility; a very clear testimony of his standpoint can be found in *Ethica Nicomachea* Γ 5, e.g. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί (1113 b 6-8). Man is responsible for his moral state; even ignorance is no excuse, if this ignorance results from carelessness. This state of affairs has its consequences for punishment, blame, reward, law-giving etc. (cf. I. Düring, *Aristoteles*, Heidelberg 1966, pag. 461). An exhaustive treatment of the problem of fate was, however, not given by Aristotle; for this the Peripatos had to wait for the great commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. He wrote a fine polemical monograph *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*. Alexander's own view can be found in ch. 1-6. His conclusion is as follows: εἶναι ταῦτ' ὅν εἰμαρμένην τε καὶ φύσιν. τὸ τε γὰρ εἰμαρμένον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν εἰμαρμένον (pag. 169. 19-20 Bruns). For the rest Alexander fully agrees with Aristotle's views on human freedom. We shall have many occasions to return to Alexander's monograph in the course of this book.

The Stoa is the first philosophical system of antiquity which has given an elaborate doctrine of fate. Indeed the Stoics, with a variation on Quintilian's statement about Roman satire, might have said *doctrina de fato tota nostra est*. The Stoa tried to free this doctrine from any notion of fate as a blind and irrational force. They more or less identified εἰμαρμένη and πρόνοια, both of which were considered to be aspects of the Logos. "Als die vernunftgemäss gestaltende und erhaltende Kraft ist die Pronoia mit dem Logos und mit der Physis identisch. Sie ist die Gottheit, von einer bestimmten Seite her gesehen. Unter anderem Gesichtspunkt erscheint diese als Heimarmene." (Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* pag. 101). The εἰμαρμένη directs all things, even the smallest details. The truth of this is proved by divination and astrology. When we also bear in mind the Stoic doctrine of a periodical repetition of history, the ἀποκατάστασις, which extends to all details in the life of each individual, we can understand that the Stoa got into great difficulties concerning human freedom, both theoretically and logically and with respect to the ethical consequences. The latter were especially put in the forefront by the Sceptic philosopher Carneades, who was

a fierce adversary of the Stoa. Certainly Chrysippus, the second founder of the school, who wrote a treatise *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*, had done his utmost to save human freedom, but his arguments failed to impress his opponents. For a long time, however, the Stoa kept the initiative in this field, because the other schools did not so much develop their own doctrine as confine themselves to attacks on the Stoa. This state of affairs was of course somewhat unsatisfactory and in Middle-Platonism a Platonic theory of fate was developed, based on wholly different metaphysical presuppositions, which could challenge the Stoa much more fundamentally. This is the doctrine of fate as a law, working *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*, regulating consequences of free-chosen actions. At the moment we shall refrain from a full-scale description of this doctrine, because that would go beyond the bounds of this introduction. Besides, we shall have to pay considerable attention to these views in the course of our investigation, as Calcidius in his *tractatus de fato* sticks fully to the relevant traditions of Platonism.

In view of the fact that the Stoa had made fate one of the main subjects of philosophical speculation and that new life was breathed into the discussion by Middle-Platonism, it is not surprising to find such a large place in Calcidius' commentary allotted to the treatment of this subject. The mere expression *νόμους τε τοὺς εἰμαρμένους* (*Tim.* 41 e 2) was sufficient to start a profound examination of the doctrine of fate.

One thing should be emphasized. Although Calcidius' *tractatus* is many-sided and views the problem from more than one angle, his main concern is with human freedom.

The following investigation is based on Waszink's edition of Calcidius' *Commentarius* in the series *Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi* of the Warburg Institute (London-Leiden 1962). This edition provides a fine starting-point for further research by the many notes and parallel texts printed at the foot of each page. Even if I sometimes disagree with the contents of the notes, I must express the greatest respect for this very valuable collection of materials. Apart from the cases where this was indispensable I have not repeated the fully quoted parallel texts which were already inserted in the exegetical apparatus of the edition. For this reason I kindly ask the reader to consult that apparatus.

The *tractatus* has three main parts:

- A. The fundamentals of the Platonic doctrine of fate (ch. 143-159),
- B. Refutation of some Stoic arguments (ch. 160-175),
- C. Renewed exposition of the Platonic doctrine of fate (ch. 176-190).

A further division results in the following outline of the whole treatise:

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A paraphrase kept as close as possible—not a literal translation—of the Latin text precedes the notes to each paragraph.

INTRODUCTION

[142] "He taught the laws of unalterable destiny". Here he now commences an important and difficult subject, about which the ancient thinkers started a debate, which is still being continued. A perfunctory treatment of this question in accordance with Platonic doctrine is therefore appropriate; for it would take too long to describe the doctrine of the other philosophers. Many of those think that nothing happens by fate, some hold the opposite view, not attaching any influence to free will, others take it that some things happen by fate, other things by free will.

In this introductory chapter Calcidius clearly states his subject. Starting from his translation of *Timaeus* 41 e 2-3 (νόμους τε τοὺς εἰμαρμένους εἶπεν) he will deal with destiny and its relation to free will. It is remarkable that nothing is said here about any of the other entities related to fate, among which providence takes such a prominent place, especially in the very first chapters. Of course this omission may be of no importance, but it should be noted that also in the closing chapter (190) it is only fate and free will or human power which are mentioned. The last words of that chapter are: *Sola igitur uera illa ratio est fixaque et stabilis sententia, quae docet quaedam fato fieri, alia porro ex hominum arbitrio et uoluntate proficisci* (214.14-16). They form an obvious counterpart to the opinion of the *quidam* in ch. 142: *alia esse quae fato nihiloque minus alia esse quae uoluntate fiant* (181.18-19). Strictly speaking this opinion ought not to have been included in *ceterorum, quorum* (181.16), for this point of view, which the author will prove to be the correct one, is Platonic.

A. THE FUNDAMENTS OF THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE

1. FATE AND PROVIDENCE

a) *The main principle: Providence ranks above fate*

[143a] Now according to Plato providence precedes, destiny follows. For he says that "God after establishing the world divided the souls equal in number with the stars and provided each soul with a separate star and showed them the nature of the universe and revealed the complete chain of destiny." For the first part of this text indicates providence, the second the laws of destiny and therefore according to Plato providence was born first; therefore we say fate is in accordance with providence, but not providence in accordance with fate.

DEVN POST συστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλεν ψυχὰς ἰσαριθμούς τοῖς ἄστροις, ἐνείμην θ' ἑκάστην πρὸς ἑκάστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἐδείξεν, νόμους τε τοὺς εἰμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς (41 d 8-e 2). Two things attract attention here. (1) The words νόμους τοὺς εἰμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς are rendered by *uniuersam fatorum seriem reuelasse*. This differs from the expression used in the translation proper and its quotation as the starting-point of the treatise (*legesque immutabilis decreti docuit*, 36. 21; 181.13). The use of the term *series* is striking. It is the Latin rendering of εἰρμός, which word the Stoics connected etymologically with εἰμαρμένη, explained by them as a "chain of causes".¹ It should be remembered that the Stoics were the first to elaborate a doctrine about fate and thus put their stamp on any discussion of this subject. All other systems are more or less a critical answer to their doctrine. (2) More interesting is a mistake made by the author: συστήσας τὸ πᾶν is wrongly translated by *post mundi constitutionem*, a somewhat simpler version of *coagmentata mox uniuersae rei machina* (36.18) in the translation proper. τὸ πᾶν does not signify *mundus* or *uniuersae rei machina* at all. It is just "the whole" of the ingredients poured into the mixing-bowl by the Demiurge for the making of souls. This mistake is quite important, for it is part of an argument, repeated in ch. 147

¹ Cf. SVF II 914, 915, 917, 918, 921 and Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* p. 102.

(*Mundi quippe machinam absoluere* etc., 184.19). Establishing the universe, joining together its machinery is the work of providence. The laws of destiny do not come until after this. The meaning of the passage itself, which has been discussed very briefly in ch. 141, does not concern the author here. It is merely used as a proof of the precedence of providence, a point on which the author lays much stress.

b) *The two aspects of fate*

[143b] Now fate according to Plato has two meanings and names, one, when we contemplate its essence, the other, when we recognize its being and the kind of power it has from its acts. This same fate in the *Phaedrus* (248 c 2) he calls "an inevitable decree", in the *Timaeus* (41 e 1) "the laws God taught the heavenly souls about the nature of the universe", in the *Republic* (617 d 6) "the speech of Lachesis", not taken in a dramatic, but in a theological sense. [144a] Now we can explain "inevitable decree" as a law unchangeable because of its inevitable cause, "the laws about the universe" as the law accompanying the nature of the world and by which all things in the world are ruled, "the speech of Lachesis, daughter of Necessity" as divine law, by which the future is connected with the past and present. Fate taken as an essence, on the other hand, is the World-Soul, divided into three parts, an unerring sphere, a sphere considered to be erratic and a sublunar one. The highest of these is called Atropos, the middle Clotho, the lowest Lachesis: Atropos, because the unerring allows of no deflection; Clotho on account of the variously intricate and tortuous whirling, by which comes to pass that which is introduced by the devious motion of the Different; Lachesis, because to her was allotted the task to take up the workings of her sisters.

This paragraph bears a close resemblance to the first chapter of the small work *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*,¹ wrongly ascribed to Plutarch.² Indeed for a great part both texts run exactly parallel to one

¹ The most recent edition is: Ps. Plutarco, *De Fato, Introduzione testo commentario traduzione* di E. Valgiglio, Roma 1966.

² For the arguments, which are largely of a linguistic and stylistic character, cf. Valgiglio p. XXXI sqq.

another, the literal correspondences outnumbering the differences, as the quotations in Waszink's edition clearly show. Although nothing is known concerning the author of *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*, there are sufficient clues for a useful hypothesis as regards the time and the philosophical school, to which the treatise could be attributed. Gercke¹ thought it might be the work of a young pupil belonging to the school of Gaius. Schmertusch in his short article² about the work, having reviewed the philosophical systems which supply the materials for the treatise, concludes *opusculi auctorem philosophorum praecepta undique furatum esse*, without putting forward any suggestions about the author or the date of composition. Valgiglio finds the tone of the work more self-assured. He detects a certain "indipendenza di pensiero" and rates the originality of the author higher than Gercke. For the rest he thinks the writer belongs to Middle-Platonism, putting the date sometime in the second half of the second century A.D. In his commentary he goes even further, identifying Πείσων, the addressee (568c), with L. Calpurnius Piso, consul in 175.

In addition to *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* there is another text providing a clear parallel to this paragraph, namely ch. 38 of *Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου*,³ a work of Nemesius of Emesa, who probably was a Christian bishop living in the 5th century. The first lines of the chapter mentioned run as follows: Πλάτων δὲ διχῶς λέγει τὴν εἰμαρμένην· τὴν μὲν, κατ'οὐσίαν, τὴν δέ, κατ' ἐνέργειαν. κατ' οὐσίαν μὲν, τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν· κατ' ἐνέργειαν δέ, θεῖον νόμον ἀπαράβατον δι' αἰτίαν ἀναπόδραστον. καλεῖ δὲ τοῦτον θεσμὸν ἀδραστείας. Obviously this is a shorter version of the same doctrine as is found in the texts of Calcidius and pseudo-Plutarch.

IDEM FATVM Calcidius first speaks about fate *in actu*, as he should have stated explicitly, in the way he does further on, when starting to speak about fate *in substantia*. SCITVM INEVITABILE This is Calcidius' translation of θεσμὸς 'Αδραστείας found both in pseudo-Plutarch and Nemesius. Somehow he took 'Αδραστείας as an adjective meaning "inevitable". This can be explained by taking into account the expression *ex inevitabili causa* (182.12).

¹ A. Gercke, *Eine Platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus* (Rh. Mus. 41 (1886) p. 277).

² R. Schmertusch, *De Plutarchi qui fertur περὶ εἰμαρμένης libello* ('epimetrum' of his dissertation *De Plutarchi sententiarum quae ad divinationem spectant origine*, Leipzig 1889).

³ Ed. C. F. Matthaei, Halle 1802 (repr. Hildesheim 1967).

The parallel words in pseudo-Plutarch are δι' αἰτίαν ἀνεμπόδιστον, but in Nemesius we read δι' αἰτίαν ἀναπόδραστον. Evidently *inevitabilis* is a better translation of ἀναπόδραστος than of ἀνεμπόδιστος, which word means "unhindered". It is interesting that in the last sentence of the text just quoted Nemesius seems to have connected ἀναπόδραστος with Ἀδραστεία, which of course is quite a possible connection. Somehow Calcidius has done this too, even overdoing it by rendering both ἀναπόδραστος and Ἀδραστείας by *inevitabilis*. POSSVMVS With admirable and clear brevity the three texts quoted are explained as indicating the inevitability of destiny (Phaedrus) in all places (*mundana omnia*) and all time (*praeteritis* etc.). In Περί εἰμαρμένης 568 d this is much less plain, which may also well result from a textual lacuna, as Drexler has indicated.¹ The fact that in all three cases the quotation is interpreted as a law, is very notable. The full significance of this emphasis will become clearer in ch. 150 sqq. NON TRAGICE About the parallel words οὐ τραγικῶς ἀλλὰ θεολογικῶς in pseudo-Plutarch Valgiglio notes: "L'autore mette in rilievo che l'espressione solenne Ἀνάγκης . . . λόγον non vale per il suo aspetto stilistico-formale, che le conferisce una tinta solenne da tragedia, ma per il suo contenuto filosofico-teologico, cioè Platone non ha voluto scrivere una bella frase, ma esprimere il suo pensiero con una nozione teologica". AT VERO Further on the equating of fate and the World-Soul will take a prominent part in Calcidius' description of the hierarchical order of divine beings. ATROPON . . . CLOTHO . . . LACHESIN Plato mentions the three Moirai in the famous Er-myth. In *Resp.* 617 c he allots different tasks to them: ὕμνεῖν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Σειρήνων ἁρμονίαν, Λάχεσιν μὲν τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθῶ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, Ἄτροπον δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα. In 620 d-e he again mentions them, this time hinting at an etymological explanation of their names. At least this seems to be the case with Atropos: ἀμετάστροφα τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα ποιῶντα. In *Leg.* 960 c ἀμετάστροφος is used once more in connection with Atropos' name. Xenocrates (fr. 5 H.) links the Moirai with the three kinds of knowledge distinguished by him: ὅθεν καὶ τρεῖς Μοίρας παραδεδοσθαι, Ἄτροπον μὲν τὴν τῶν νοητῶν, ἀμετάθετον οὖσαν, Κλωθῶ δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, Λάχεσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν

¹ De Lacy and Einarson in their Loeb-edition (*Plutarch's Moralia* vol. VII p. 303-359) have suggested the following addition based on Calcidius: ὥς δ' ἐν Πολιτείᾳ, νόμος θεῖος καθ' ὃν συμπλέκεται τοῖς γεγονόσι καὶ τοῖς γινόμενοις τὰ γενησόμενα.

δοξαστῶν. Here again only Atropos' name is explained etymologically. Moreover we notice that the sisters are put in a hierarchical order, the νοητά being allotted to Atropos. For a full-scale etymological elucidation we have to turn to the Stoics, great lovers of that pastime. In *SVF* II 913 and 914 we find some ideas elaborated by Chrysippus. The explanations are rather as expected, but it is noteworthy that the Moirai are not put in a hierarchical order. In three works of Plutarch we find the Moirai connected with different parts of the universe: *De gen. Socr.* 591 b, *De fac.* 945 c and *Quaest. conv.* 745 b. Though the substance of these texts is by no means identical, the order always puts Atropos highest and Lachesis lowest. The closest parallel is *Quaest. conv.* 745 b, quoted by Schmerzosch:¹ Τοῦ κόσμου τριχῇ πάντα νενεμημένου, πρώτην μὲν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν μερίδα, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων, ἐσχάτην δὲ τὴν τῶν ὑπὸ σελήνῃν . . . ἐκάστης φύλακα Μοῦσαν εἶναι, τῆς μὲν πρώτης Ὑπάτην, τῆς δ' ἐσχάτης Νεάτην, Μέσσην δὲ τὴν μεταξύ συνέχουσιν ἅμα καὶ συνεπιστρέφουσιν, ὡς ἀνυστόν ἐστι, τὰ θνητὰ τοῖς θείοις καὶ τὰ περίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις. Ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἡνίξατο τοῖς τῶν Μοιρῶν ὀνόμασιν τὴν μὲν Ἀτροπον, <τὴν δὲ Κλωθῶ>, τὴν δὲ Λάχεσιν προσαγορεύσας. Here we encounter the hierarchical order and also hints at an etymological explanation. In comparing pseudo-Plutarch with Calcidius we find two notable differences: (1) Calcidius has the Moirai in the "right" order, like Xenocrates and Plutarch, whereas in *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* Clotho is wrongly put highest.² Of course Atropos ought to have been connected with the ἀπλανῆς μοῖρα as Calcidius says *disertis uerbis: quod aplanas in nulla sit deflexione* (183.3). (2) pseudo-Plutarch only explains Lachesis' name, Calcidius explains all three, the most interesting being the elaborate elucidation of Clotho, where the words *ea quae diuersae naturae diuini motus importat* (183.4-5) are quite striking. There is not the slightest trace of these words in pseudo-Plutarch. They can only be used by someone who is well informed about the *Timaeus* and who also has that dialogue in mind. Perhaps Calcidius after all realizes quite well he is commenting upon the *Timaeus*, a fact he

¹ o.c. p. 32.

² Valgiglio, however, quotes Proclus, in *Plat. Remp.* II 94.20 (Kroll): ἡ μὲν Κλωθῶ τὴν ἀπλανῆ λαχοῦσα σφαῖραν, ἡ δὲ Ἀτροπος τὴν πλανωμένην, ἡ δὲ Λάχεσις τὸν ὅλον οὐρανόν. On the other hand Maximus Tyrius has the same order as Calcidius: τοιοῦτο χρῆμα ἡ εἰμαρμένη, ἡ Ἀτροπος, καὶ ἡ Κλωθῶ, καὶ ἡ Λάχεσις, ἄτρεπτον, καὶ ἐπικεκλωσμένον, καὶ διειληγὸς τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους βίους (*Philos.* V 5).

seemed to have forgotten, when he wrote *in Timaeo* (182.8) instead of *in hoc ipso Timaeo*, as he correctly says in ch. 73 (121.6). LACHESIN VERO These words are rather strange; pseudo-Plutarch writes: Λάχσεις, δεχομένη μὲν τὰς οὐρανίας τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐνεργείας. Calcidius' *suscipiat* must stand for *δεχομένη*, which is not incorrect. Yet at first it seems as if he is going to explain the name Lachesis by using the verb *sortiri*, which is much closer to the Greek λαγχάνειν. Somehow Calcidius seems to have been confused by his source. At this point the parallel with *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* is broken off, only to be resumed in ch. 148, where Calcidius deals with fate *in actu*.

c) *Relation between Providence and fate according to the Stoics and Plato*

[144b] Now some think it a mistake to assume a difference between providence and fate, as in reality they are one. In fact providence is God's will and His will is a train of causes and because His will is providence, it is called by that name, and because it is a train of causes, it is called fate. Hence what is according to fate is also in conformity with providence and in the same way what is according to providence is also in conformity with fate. This is the opinion of Chrysippus. Others however are of the opinion that what is in accordance with the authority of providence also takes place in conformity with fate, but that the reverse is not true. Cleanthes is one of these.

[145] But Plato adheres to the principle, that neither are all things according to providence nor < according to fate >, for the nature of regulated things is not uniform; thus some things result from providence alone, some from destiny, some from our free will, some also from the vicissitudes of fortune, while a great many things happen by chance. Now divine and intelligible things and those near to them are ruled by providence alone, the natural and corporeal things are according to fate; things belonging to our free will and right happen at our initiative; things outside the scope of our influence, happening without reason and unexpectedly, are said to take place fortuitously, when having their starting-point in our arrangement of matters, casually, when this is not the case.

Before we deal with this paragraph it may be useful to recapitulate what the author has said up to this point. In ch. 142 he gave

a brief and incomplete introduction, speaking only about fate in relation to free will. After that he started his treatise by immediately setting fate against providence and stating the basic rule: "providence before fate". This same rule is to be found in pseudo-Plutarch and Nemeseius (cf. Waszink's note *ad* 182.4-5), but Calcidius stresses this point much more, as will be seen in ch. 146 and 147. Next the author spoke about fate itself, dividing it into two aspects and discussing both of these. He now first records the Stoic point of view concerning the relation of fate and providence, answered next by Plato's opinion, stated in ch. 145, which in fact is a much more adequate table of contents of the *tractatus* than ch. 142.

ITAQVE Von Arnim has included 183.6-14 in his *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* in Vol. II pars II cap. VI, the second paragraph of which chapter is entitled *fatum divinum* and contains a few texts about the equalization of εἰμαρμένη and God, e.g. 931: οἱ Στωικοὶ δέ φασιν ὡς ταῦτόν εἰμαρμένη καὶ Ζεὺς. Fr. 932, taken from Augustine's *De civitate Dei* provides a very close parallel to Calcidius: *ipsum causarum ordinem et quandam connexionem Dei summi tribuunt uoluntati et potestati*. It is worth remarking that Calcidius and Augustine do not say fate is equated to God Himself, but to His will. This way of presenting matters tells less about the Stoic doctrine, for which such a distinction does not really have much meaning, than about the authors. For in later Platonic philosophy it is by no means uncommon to distinguish the Highest Being from His will. In Περὶ εἰμαρμένης 573 b we find: ἡ δὲ ἀνωτάτω πρόνοια πρεσβύτατον ἀπάντων, πλὴν οὐπὲρ ἐστὶν εἴτε βούλησις εἴτε νόησις εἴτε καὶ ἑκάτερον, which at least implies the possibility of such a distinction, and in Calcidius ch. 176, where the hierarchical order of metaphysical entities is described, *providentia* or *dei uoluntas* takes the second grade after the highest God himself. PRAESVMI Van Winden¹ in commenting upon ch. 321 (316.23) deals with this verb and its corresponding noun *praesumptio*: "The verb *praesumere* with its fairly wide meaning should here be translated by 'to grasp', 'to acquire the knowledge of'." About *praesumptio* he says (*o.c.*, p. 49): "*Praesumptio* seems to be a translation of πρόληψις; Calcidius uses the term frequently. From

¹ J. C. M. van Winden O.F.M., *Calcidius on Matter, His Doctrine and Sources* (Leiden 1965), p. 174.

345.3-5¹ it is evident that, to him, it has the general meaning of 'intellect' or 'knowledge'." In our context however these significations are impossible. The *non nulli*, who of course are the Stoics, are obviously of the opinion that it is wrong to create a difference between fate and providence. One can solve this problem by assuming that a word like *falso* has dropped out. Yet this is not necessary, for it is possible that *praesumere* has a more special meaning. For this we first turn again to Van Winden. In his remarks on ch. 325 he says concerning *praesumere* (320.20): "this 'use without further reflection' is the rendering of *praesumere*, so the meaning of this verb here is quite different from that found in most other places (see *ad* 345.5, p. 174), but it has a parallel in *ut libet exagitata praesumptio* (327.2²)". Further help is provided by Index C of Waszink's edition. In ch. 346 (338.10) νόθος is rendered by *praesumptus*. As regards *praesumptio*, apart from the text quoted by Van Winden (*ut libet exagitata praesumptio*) the following instances are most interesting: *error praesumptioque* (125.15), which must be an example of a Calcidian doublet, and *si quis nominis praesumptione inductus . . . , errat in nomine* (239.13). About this last text Waszink in his index remarks: *i.q.* error. This may be a little too emphatic, but it seems perfectly possible to interpret *praesumere* in this direction, awarding it a more special sense, *viz.*, 'to grasp mistakenly', 'to be mistaken in thinking'. That would suit the context very well.³

ET DIVINA QUIDEM In the Timaeus the Demiurge himself takes care of the creation of the World-Soul, the heavenly gods and the divine part of the human soul. After that the lower gods have to fashion both the mortal bodies and the part of human soul that still had to be added. In pseudo-Plutarch, Apuleius and Nemesius this state of affairs has been transformed into a curious doctrine of three providences, *viz.*, of the highest God, the second gods and the daemons. Pseudo-Plutarch has developed this idea most fully. In the beginning of ch. 9 (572 f) he says: "Ἐστὶν οὖν πρόνοια ἡ μὲν ἀνωτάτῳ καὶ πρώτῳ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ νόησις εἴτε καὶ βούλῃσις οὕσα εὐεργέτις ἀπάντων, καθ' ἣν πρώτως ἕκαστα τῶν θείων διὰ παντὸς

¹ Van Winden, whose book was originally published in 1959, quotes the pages of Wrobel's edition of 1876. Waszink's edition appeared in 1962. 345. 5 is 316.23 in the new edition.

² = 300. 11.

³ Tertullian, too, sometimes uses *praesumere* and *praesumptio* in a comparable meaning, *e.g.* *Apol.* 8.1, 16.3, 38.5, 49.1, *De anima* 4.2.

ἄριστά τε καὶ κάλλιστα κεκόσμηται. Further on, having quoted *Timaeus* 29 d-30 a, he says: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα μέχρι ψυχῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κατὰ πρόνοιαν νομιστέον τήν γε πρώτην συνεστηκέναι (573 d). About the second providence he says: καθ' ἣν τὰ τε θνητὰ γίνεται τεταγμένως καὶ ὅσα πρὸς διαμονὴν καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐκάστων τῶν γενῶν (573 a) and in 573 f, having quoted *Tim.* 42 d-e he says: ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων θεῶν τάξις καὶ δημιουργία τὴν δευτέραν πρόνοιαν δηλοῦ. Apuleius, within the framework of his short introduction to Platonic philosophy, treats this subject of the three providences much more briefly,¹ though with obvious similarity apart from one notable difference: he seems to attribute the creation of mankind to the highest God.² Otherwise even in Apuleius' short paragraph there are some verbal resemblances to the *Timaeus*-chapters just mentioned.³ In *Nemesius* finally the task of the first providence has been somewhat enlarged and now includes the care of the ideas and other universals. With him we are much farther removed from the *Timaeus* than was the case with pseudo-Plutarch and Apuleius.

In *Calcidius* we do not find such a partition of providences. The same *Timaeus*-chapters are the basis, but with a different result. Divine and intelligible things are committed to the care of a single providence. The nearest parallel is presented by the tasks of the first providence in *Nemesius*. The most important difference, however, is the fact that the tasks which pseudo-Plutarch, Apuleius and *Nemesius*, in close adherence to the *Timaeus*, allotted to the gods, with *Calcidius* are taken up by fate. NATURALIA VERO Waszink refers to *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* 573 d, a passage which to my opinion offers no parallel to the present text. Pseudo-Plutarch first quotes *Tim.* 41 d 8-e 3 (the same text is quoted by *Calcidius* 181.20-182.2) and then continues: ταῦτα δὲ τίς οὐκ

¹ Apuleius, *De Platone* I 12.

² *Non solum deos caelicolas ordinavit, quos ad tutelam et decus per omnia mundi membra dispersit, sed natura etiam mortales eos, qui praestarent sapientia ceteris terrenis animantibus, ad aevitatem temporis [s]e<di>dit.* However, no stress is laid on the creation of man's totality. The emphasis seems to be on 'sapientia', which makes the transformation less notable.

³ *quos ad tutelam et decus per omnia mundi membra dispersit*

*diis ceteris tradidit
fundatisque legibus
ordinationis paternae*

νείμας περὶ πάντα κύκλῳ τὸν οὐρανόν,
κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον
εἶναι καθ' ὅλον (40a)
τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκεν θεοῖς (42d)
ἅπαντα ταῦτα διατάξας (42 e)
τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν (42 e)

ἀν διαρρήδην καὶ σαφέστατα οἰηθείη τὴν εἰμαρμένην δηλοῦν. Valgiglio correctly translates these words as follows: 'Chi potrebbe mettere in dubbio che queste parole indichino in modo esplicito e chiarissimo il fato'. Indeed ταῦτα which of course refers to the whole quotation is subject, τὴν εἰμαρμένην is object and δηλοῦν means 'to reveal', 'to indicate'. Waszink says in his note, that this text and the words *naturalia uero et corporea iuxta fatum* (183.20), to which it provides a parallel, differ from ch. 147, where it is said, that one of the tasks of providence is *leges immutabilis decreti docere* (184.21). I cannot understand how this statement contradicts the quotation from Περὶ εἰμαρμένης. Besides, I fail to see any special connection between these two passages and the words *naturalia uero et corporea iuxta fatum*. These words merely restrict the authority of fate to a certain sphere, whereas in the texts quoted and also in ch. 143 we find an exegesis of the words τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν νόμους τε τοὺς εἰμαρμένους, which are taken to be a description of fate, which is at the same time proved to be posterior to providence.

EA PORRO, QVAE This is treated in ch. 155 and 156. PORRO, QVAE EXTRA This is the subject of ch. 158 and 159.

d) *The sacred text of the Timaeus shows that Providence
is prior to fate*

[146] All this he explains more clearly in the Timaeus by these words: "When the creator of the universe, having thus arranged these things, persisted in his manner of life". Now what things had he arranged? Evidently he means his connecting the World-Soul and its body in an appropriate euphony. "Understanding the order from their father, the sons, according to the ordinance enjoined upon them, having received the immortal principle of a mortal creature, borrowed from the materials of the world—fire, earth, air and water—the "elementary" capital to be repaid when necessary, and cemented together what they took, though not with the indissoluble bonds whereby they were connected themselves". Truly the order from God, obeyed by the second gods, is Reason, containing the perpetual ordinance, which is called fate and this derives its origin from providence. [147] He further says: "Having cemented together the engine of the universe he chose the souls in equal number to the stars and arranged them each to a separate star and having mounted them in appropriate chariots he told them to observe the nature of

the universe and taught them the laws of unalterable decree." For completing the engine of the world, choosing souls in equal number to the stars, mounting them in appropriate chariots, showing them the nature of the universe, teaching the laws of unalterable decree, all these are duties of providence. The laws themselves however, which were mentioned, are fate, and that is a divine law penetrated into the World-Soul, a salutary guidance of all things. This fate is in accordance with providence, but not providence in accordance with fate.

The main argument in both these chapters is the principle of the priority of providence, proved from two texts of the *Timaeus*. SCILICET QVOD VNIVERSAE REI This is a much too wide explanation of ἅπαντα ταῦτα διατάξας (42 e 5). These words refer only to the immediately preceding paragraph about the souls. But, exactly as in the translation of τὸ πᾶν (41 d 8), the correct exegesis is too simple for Calcidius' line of thought: in fact, he wants to see these words as a summary of the whole work of providence, which is prior to the work of fate. ETENIM This sentence gives a concise summary of the contents of the words quoted. Although he does not quote this passage, pseudo-Plutarch certainly would have ascribed it to the second providence. Calcidius however takes the words to refer to fate, for he wants to prove from the sacred text the truth of *naturalia uero et corporea iuxta fatum* (183.20). DII SECVNDI Waszink regards this as a trace of the doctrine of three providences. This may indeed be possible, but it is by no means necessary. For it should once more be stressed that the sentence *etenim iussum dei etc.* only summarizes the quotation. Now in that quotation Plato mentioned "God's sons". Calcidius refers to these beings as *dii secundi*. To me there seems to be no need to read much more in the use of this appellation, for Calcidius does not include these gods in his hierarchical system. A different entity takes their place. For this we have to turn to ch. 177, where fate in the hierarchy comes after providence: *sequitur hanc prouidentiam fatum* (206.1). Next it is stated: *huius obsequitur ea quae secunda mens dicitur, id est anima mundi tripertita* (206.3). This is a striking parallel to *cui parent dii secundi*. Now the relation between fate and *anima mundi* is not completely clear. The reason of this is Calcidius' failure to make full use of the distinction made in ch. 143 and 144 between fate as an essence

and fate as an act. Therefore in ch. 144 he says: "fate is the World-Soul", whereas in ch. 177 we read: "the World-Soul obeys fate". This difference should not be emphasized too much, because it is only the result of two different points of view. It therefore seems admissible to say that in the system presented by Calcidius the World-Soul takes the place of the gods and, by implication, of any providence of the second gods which Calcidius, or rather his source, may have found. In Nemesius ch. 38, quoted by Waszink, we also find the World-Soul taking orders from the highest God. For although by the law, given by God to the World-Soul, Nemesius means the θεσμός 'Ἀδραστέας, this law can safely be identified with the *leges immutabilis decreti*, as Calcidius has stated in ch. 143: *Idem fatum in Phaedro quidem scitum ineuitabile, in Timaeo leges quas deus de uinuersae rei natura dixerit* (182.7-9).

IDQVE TRAHIT This is the most momentous statement of chapter 146: the quotation from the *Timaeus* has again proved the subordination of fate to providence. Calcidius wants to hammer home the truth of this dogma. MVNDI QVIPPE MACHINAM After the same quotation as at the start of ch. 143 Calcidius more clearly defines the respective texts instead of the vague *prima* and *secunda* of that chapter. IPSAE VERO Note the verbal resemblances in this sentence to the text Waszink quotes from Nemesius. SALVBRE Van Winden (*o.c.* p. 36-37) has some interesting things to say concerning this adjective. In his notes on ch. 270 he says with reference to *salubri persuasione* (275.1): "One is also struck at once by the epitheton *salubris* to *persuasio*. Plato simply writes τῷ πείθειν. Although Calcidius' style is usually on the florid side, this *salubris* seems to be more than just a *epitheton ornans*. For though Calcidius uses this adjective frequently, it also occurs in the passage translated from Numenius, which, moreover, shows a striking resemblance to the present one. There we read: *ex providentiae consultis salubribus*. The further wording of this phrase also shows similarity to the passage from Numenius, e.g., *providis auctoritatibus, minus consulta parentia, provida parentia*. Hence *salubris* seems to come from Numenius. However, the occurrence of the same word in the translation points to an influence of Numenius rather than to verbal adoption". The cautiousness of the last sentence may also be applied in our case.

SIC FATVM This conclusion ends the first part of the treatise which started with the statement of the same principle: *praecedit*

providentia, sequitur fatum (181.20). The essence of the argument of ch. 143-147, apart from 182.5-183.6, means to emphasize the metaphysical relation of providence and fate.

2. FATE TAKEN AS ACT

a) *Fate is not chaotic, but limited*

[148] Now we shall speak about fate taken as function and act, for about this many discussions of an ethical, physical and logical character are held. For although all things happening are infinite and take place from boundless eternity throughout immeasurable time, fate itself, enclosing all this from all sides, is limited and determined—for no law or reason or anything at all provided with divinity is unlimited—and this fact is made clear from the state and constellation of heaven at that moment, which they call the perfect year. About this Plato says: “It is easy to understand, that the perfect number of time fulfils the perfect year only, when the courses of all eight revolutions after their completion will return as it were at the origin and head of another revolution, which will be measured by the ever-identical motion”. In fact, all this time being limited, because its determination can be contemplated by the measure of a fixed revolution, everything taking place in heaven or on earth must return to its former condition, as for instance the constellation of this moment will after a long stretch of time be renewed and in the same manner any constellation following after this.

[149a] From this it is clear that, in spite of the infinite variety of events which take place from infinity to infinity, fate taken as an act is itself determined. For as circular motion and also time measuring are both circles, thus all these things going round in circuits necessarily are circles.

In this paragraph the very close resemblance to the treatise *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* which was interrupted half-way ch. 144 at 183.6, is resumed. When we compare ps. Plut. 568 f-569 b with our paragraph, the similarities are again obvious, even at a first glance. In this case we get no support from Nemesius.

QVIPPE DE HOC The division of philosophy into ethics, physics and logic is of course the normal one since Hellenism. Both the Stoics and Epicurus agreed on this point and in Platonic philosophy we find a similar tripartition, e.g. in Albinus' *Epitome*

ch. 3. Still there is a great difference, as for the former schools ethics is the all-important department and the Platonists are chiefly interested in physics or, as it should rather be put, metaphysics or theology. It is easy to understand that in the discussion about fate quite a few problems of an ethical and logical character have been raised. We shall find traces of this discussion in the *tractatus*. In all these cases the Stoic ideas about fate are, in one way or another, attacked by referring to the impossible implications in the field of either logic or ethics. Now it is evident that such strictures, owing to their partial character, never strike the Stoic tenets to the heart. For that purpose a more fundamental point of departure is needed. In Platonic philosophy this could only be found within the scope of physics, taken of course in the ancient sense of the word. Just as Platonic thinking as a whole is fundamentally opposed to the Stoa, concerning this special subject, too, a really fundamental starting-point had to be found, from which both Stoicism could be criticized and Platonism could develop its own tenets. In this chapter, as in its counterpart ps. Plut. 568 f *sqq.*, this is definitely the case. For although many other arguments, traditional quotations etc., may have played a prominent part in shaping Platonic doctrine, the real foundation of the latter consists in the reflections reported in our chapter. *NAM CVM OMNIA* These words summarize the point of departure. Calcidius' reasoning is as follows: "If fate would completely regulate all events, determining the infinite, unlimited quantity of incidents, it would be unlimited itself. It would thus have a chaotic character, lacking order, and therefore be completely excluded from the divine sphere of limitation, order and form". It seems to me that in this line of thought the general antithesis between the monistic system of the Stoa and Platonic dualism, which totally separates rational order from chaotic, ungodly capriciousness, has rightly been transferred to the special domain of the *fatum*-doctrine. If fate is divine, if it is a law, then it cannot be formless, hence must be limited. Only then it is a *diuina lex*. Neither pseudo-Plutarch nor Calcidius seem to realize quite fully the importance of this basic point.

The weight of this argument is also shown in the very short summary of Platonic *είμαρμένη*-doctrine in Albinus' *Epitome*. In the beginning of ch. 26 he says: 'Ἡ γὰρ εἵμαρμένη νόμου τάξιν ἐπέχουσα οὐχ οἷον λέγει, διότι ὅδε μὲν τάδε ποιήσει, ὅδε δὲ τάδε πείσεται· εἰς

ἄπειρον γὰρ τοῦτο, ἀπείρων μὲν ὄντων τῶν γεννωμένων, ἀπείρων δὲ τῶν περὶ αὐτοὺς συμβαινόντων. This is obviously in the same strain as Calcidius and pseudo-Plutarch.¹ At the moment we limit ourselves to the statement that the philosopher who originally designed this argument and developed a Platonic theory of fate, as will be unfolded in the next chapters, must have been an important thinker. PERFECTVM ANNVM The limited nature of fate is now illustrated by a reference to Plato's doctrine of the perfect year, which is completed, when all heavenly bodies come back to the same relative positions. To that end he quotes *Tim.* 39 d 2-7, translated quite correctly apart from ταυτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος, where the genitive has wrongly been rendered by two adjectives. The passage itself has already been treated in ch. 118. At the end of that chapter a brief rejection of the Stoic ἐκπύρωσις-doctrine has been added. In his edition Waszink suggested a Numenian origin of that rejection, but he now ² prefers to refer it to Adrastus. In the present context Plato's description of the great year has only been adduced as an illustration of fate's limitation. FINITO VT CVIVS Time is limited and can therefore be grasped by reason using the measure of a fixed period. OMNIA QVAE With these words Calcidius comes very near to the Stoic doctrine of a repetition of World-periods, a new διακόσμησις taking place after each ἐκπύρωσις. Yet this similarity must not be stressed, for actually only the words *in terris* go into this direction. When we leave these words out of consideration, there is nothing un-Platonic, because the passage would only bear upon the phenomena of the sky. The example too (*ut puta etc.*) speaks precisely about the sky. In pseudo-Plutarch the resemblance to Stoic doctrine is much closer, for that author continues his reflections somewhat further: ἔστω δὲ πρὸς τὸ σαφές τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς νῦν ὄντων, ὅτι οὐ συμβαίνει ἀπὸ τῶν οὐρανίων ὡς πάντων αἰτιῶν ὄντων καὶ τὸ ἐμὲ γράφειν νυνὶ τάδε καὶ ὧδί, σέ τε πράττειν ἅπερ καὶ ὅπως τυγχάνεις πράττων. πάλιν τοίουν

¹ In his comments on 569 a Valgiglio says: "La frase appartiene agli Stoici, e precisamente a Crisippo, secondo il quale la διοίκησις τοῦ παντός si compie ἐξ ἀπείρου εἰς ἄπειρον ἐνεργῶς τε καὶ ἀκαταστρόφως (SVF II 945)". If this reference is right, which seems likely, one should not overlook the tacit polemic with the Stoa. Instead of saying that the phrase belongs to the Stoics it would be more correct to consider it as directed against them, though making use of their own tenets.

² J. H. Waszink, *Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius. I. Die erste Hälfte des Kommentars* (Leiden 1964) p. 33.

ἐπειδὴν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀφίκηται αἰτία, τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως οἱ αὐτοὶ γενόμενοι πράξομεν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ πάντες ἄνθρωποι· καὶ τὰ τε ἐξῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐξῆς αἰτίαν γενήσεται καὶπραχθήσεται καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα κατὰ μίαν τὴν ὅλην περίοδον καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην τῶν ὅλων ὡσαύτως ἀποδοθήσεται. (569 b-c) One can see from these words that, on the one side, pseudo-Plutarch is extremely near to the Stoic doctrine, but on the other, probably realizing the danger of determinism, explicitly states that the constellations are not responsible. Be that as it may, in any case it is clear that Calcidius does not at all expound a theory of an ἀποκατάστασις. Besides, he has turned down the idea of an ἐκπύρωσις at the end of ch. 118. The all-important factor in his introduction of the perfect year is the limitedness of the latter. No other special doctrine *qua talis* is derived from the idea of the great year. In contrast to pseudo-Plutarch only the words *in terris* give a Stoic flavour to the text. This may perhaps be regarded as a somewhat careless addition, quite natural after *in caelo*. Hence the views of Gercke¹ and Schmertusch², who in the passage from *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* found respectively a Stoicizing and a Pythagorizing tendency, cannot be applied to Calcidius. In my opinion they also err concerning pseudo-Plutarch, laying too much stress on the individual paragraph instead of following the line of thought.

APPARET This is obviously the equivalent of φανερόν (ps. Plut. 569 c), but *Ex quo apparet* refers much more clearly to the quotation from the sacred text. The structure of the paragraph is simple and easy to understand. First the thesis is stated (*Nam cum omnia* etc., 185.5), next in support of this thesis the sacred text is quoted and briefly explained, and finally the thesis, which has now been proved, is repeated. We find exactly the same structure in the short paragraph in ch. 143 a. VT ENIM The reason why C. writes *enim* here is very obscure. It does not explain the preceding sentence at all. Fortunately this text is very close to pseudo-Plutarch and when we turn to his argument, we find Calcidius has omitted an important passage: καὶ τό γε ῥηθέν, ὅτι κύκλος τίς ἐστι, μετρίως που κατῴπται. When he continues with ὥς γάρ, the equivalent of Calcidius' *ut enim*, there is no problem at all, for he wants to illustrate the statement "fate is a circle". So in pseudo-Plutarch there are two things stated about fate: (1) it is limited (2) it is circular. Now Calcidius has either failed to understand

¹ O.c. p. 289-291.

² O.c. p. 32.

this or not regarded these statements as essentially different. Although the former possibility is obviously the more probable one, the latter is not completely absurd, as circle and sphere in Greek thought are regarded as perfect and implicitly limited forms.

SIC EA OMNIA Instead of τῶν κατὰ κύκλον γινομένων ὁ λόγος κύκλος ἂν νομισθείη Calcidius has *ea omnia quae in gyros circumferuntur circuli sint necesse est*. So he leaves out the very important word λόγος, which pseudo-Plutarch uses as a description of fate. The conclusion must be that Calcidius has not fully understood the idea of the circle, which is somehow the quintessence of the example of the perfect year, the argument being: "as time is a circle, so is reason, which reveals itself in the events happening in time".

b) *Fate is a law*

[I49b] So he calls fate 'the inevitable decree', regarding its inevitable force and power as the principle cause of everything in the world that enacts itself in an uninterrupted continuity. This, moreover, is the tripartite World-Soul, which, as we said above, is fate taken as an essence. Further the 'decree' is the law of God, which we declared to be inexorable because of its inevitable cause.

[I50a] Moreover this law is both the 'speech' and the 'ordinance' which God ordained to the World-Soul for the perpetual management of all things, for he had taken care, not only that the world should be, but also that it should be eternal and indissoluble.

Having established the fact that fate as a divine being is limited, Calcidius now returns to the argument of ch. 144, where a division was made into fate in its actuality, principally taken as divine law, and fate as an essence, viz., the tripartite World-Soul. In this paragraph the two aspects are brought together again. The reasoning is rather clumsy; the train of thought seems to be: "fate is the inevitable decree, fate is the World-Soul, the inevitable decree is divine law, as I told you in ch. 144. So there is a connection between this law and the World-Soul." HAEC PORRO LEX These words are reminiscent of the whole passage 41a-42e, though perhaps not very clearly. The word *oratio* seems a reminiscence of λέγει (41 a 5), while *sanctio* is a satisfactory rendering of τάξις in

42 e 7. Besides, *aeternus et indissolubilis* is strongly reminiscent of ἀθάνατοι and ἄλυστοι in 41 b 2-3. Once more this is a hint that the World-Soul has taken the place of the gods of the *Timaeus*. This impression is confirmed, when we take into account the chapters of Apuleius, pseudo-Plutarch and Nemesis concerning the different providences. All these authors attribute to second providence, *i.e.* the providence of the gods, the task of preservation, whereas the first providence is at work in the creation of the world. Although there are no exact parallels, it is clear that according to the authors mentioned the second gods must so to speak keep the world going forever. Apuleius: *reliquarum dispositionem ac tutelam rerum, quas cotidie fieri necesse est, diis ceteris tradidit* (*De Platone* I 12, 206); pseudo-Plutarch: καθ' ἣν τὰ τε θνητὰ γίνεται τεταγμένως καὶ ὅσα πρὸς διαμονὴν καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐκάστων τῶν γενῶν (573 a); Nemesis: τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τῶν ἀτίμων ζώων τε καὶ φυτῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ, τοὺς δευτέρους θεοὺς, τοὺς τὸν οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντας, προνοεῖν (ch. 44, p. 345 Matth.). Although not in the same manner, in Calcidius, too, we find the task of preservation, but this time it is ordained to the World-Soul.

c) *This law has a hypotheticalal character*

[150 b] As this ordinance contains everything within itself, some things should be considered as a starting-point, others as resulting from that point, as in geometry the first principles are the starting-point, the propositions its consequences; for when the principles have been granted (for instance the origins and elements of point, line and so on), the propositions are laid bare as the result, being as it were the consequences of the starting-point granted. In the same way the decree, existing as an ordinance and law containing all things, has the causes issuing beforehand from our merits as certain principles; what takes place next, bound by necessity, is happening as a consequent result of its starting-point and necessity.

In this chapter Calcidius starts his exposition of the most characteristic contribution of Platonism to the discussion of the problems of fate. The doctrine expounded here and in the next chapters may indeed be regarded as the culmination-point reached from metaphysical premisses which are diametrically opposed to Stoicism.

Put very briefly: fate is regarded as an ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-law, a law

with an "if . . ." -formula, in Calcidius' own words: *si hoc erit, sequetur illud*. (187.16). This same doctrine is enunciated in ch. 4 and 5 of *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* and Nemesis ch. 38. Pseudo-Plutarch starts from a comparison with the law of the state. This law does not speak about any particular deserter or war-hero; it has general regulations, according to which we either punish or honour such persons. Law takes the lead by issuing universal rules, special cases subject to this law follow next: τὰ μὲν καθόλου προηγουμένως, τὰ δ' ὑποπίπτοντα τούτοις ἐπομένως (569 d). In medical and gymnastic law we have the same state of affairs: the law potentially includes all details together with the general rules: δυνάμει τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τοῖς ὅλοις συμπεριλαμβάνει (569 e). Exactly the same can be said about fate: fate too concerns universal rules. Pseudo-Plutarch explicitly states the foundation of this truth. It is precisely what is found in the principle on which so much stress was laid: "fate is limited, not boundless". Now limitedness corresponds much better with anything universal than with details, which belong rather to boundlessness: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀρισμένον οἰκεῖον τῇ θεῖᾳ φρονήσει ἐν τῷ καθόλου μᾶλλον θεωρεῖται (τοιοῦτος μέντοι γε ὁ θεῖος νόμος καὶ ὁ πολιτικός), τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ καθ' ἕκαστα (570 a). The first words of this quotation sum up briefly the typical character which Platonism ascribed to fate.

Anything arising from something decided beforehand as its starting-point is subject to that decision, taking its guidance and following in its steps. Plato has spoken about it in the law of *Adrasteia*: "Whatsoever soul has followed in the train of a god, and discerned something of truth, shall be kept from sorrow until a new revolution shall begin; and if she can do this always, she shall remain always free from hurt".¹ This corresponds well with its general character: τοιοῦτον μὲν δὴ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἅμα καὶ καθόλου (570 b). The appellation *εἰμαρμένη* also makes this clear; it is indeed something connected, strung together (*εἰρομένη*). This last point is a fine example of the use of a Stoic argument in a Platonized way.

Next in ch. 5 we find a treatment of the question, if the statement: "all things according to fate" is true. This proves to be the fact only in so far as fate encompasses all things. When we use more precision we cannot say that all things take place according to fate, but only those "following" in the sense explained in ch. 4.

¹ *Phaedrus* 248 b, translation R. Hackforth.

For comparison we may again take political law. Not all things covered by the law are legal in the sense of 'according to law'. Treason, desertion, adultery are covered by law, yet not legal. We should reserve the term 'legal' for commandments and provisions made by law. In the same way fate embraces everything, yet strictly speaking we cannot say that everything takes place according to fate, when we bear in mind all preceding decisions.

This short summary of ch. 4 and 5 of *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* can give a good idea of the doctrine under consideration, as these chapters contain the most complete account of the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-doctrine that has reached us. Apart from pseudo-Plutarch the brief exposition of Nemesius is also of great value, as we shall presently see.

QVAE SANCTIO CVM The contents of this sentence can indeed, as Waszink remarks, be compared with pseudo-Plutarch's argument in 570 a-b, yet more important still is the fact that the wording is paralleled exactly by Nemesius 38, quoted by Waszink: αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ θεὸς νόμος . . . πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχει, τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. (p. 304 Matth.) Instead of the one expression ἐξ ὑποθέσεως used by pseudo-Plutarch, both authors make use of two prepositions. At first sight they seem to be exactly the same in the two languages: *ex* corresponding with ἐξ and *secundum* with κατά. But this is not true: ἐξ is rendered by *secundum*, which is quite correct, because according to the argumentation of *περὶ εἰμαρμένης* the facts in question result from, follow (cf. the expressions ἀκολούθως and ἐπομένως); κατά might perhaps more justly have been rendered by *per* or the sole ablative.¹ Some things belong to the domain of a person's resolution and intention: these things are καθ' ὑπόθεσιν or *ex praecessione*. Other things are the results which through the influence of fate originate from one's resolution: those things are ἐξ ὑποθέσεως or *secundum praecessionem*.

SCILICET VT As we have seen, pseudo-Plutarch took the law of the state as the clearest parallel. Calcidius also uses that example in ch. 179. Here in its stead he takes his first illustration from geometry, which indeed is rather removed from the sphere of human action, but lays more emphasis on the strict necessity of the consequences. This last point of course is the only *tertium comparationis*.

¹ The rendering of κατά by *ex* is of course quite normal, e.g., κατά νοῦν (*Tim.* 36 d 8) in Cicero's translation becomes *ex sua mente et uoluntate* (Cicero *Tim.* 26).

d) *Choice is in our power, fate causes the consequences*

[151] So the origin of divine law, which is fate, is providence; fate, on the other hand, is that which contains both the obedient yielding and the disobedient arrogance as by an ordinance. Next punishments or rewards originate according to the preceding merit. Now the preceding merit which can take one of two directions is caused by a motion of our mind and a judgment and an agreement and desire or avoidance, things put within our power, because these things as well as their contraries are for us to choose. So in this ordinance of things and according to a most ancient law some things are said to result from a preceding decision and are in our power; what comes after them, however, is the result, bound by necessity. And as the law differs from what follows the law, *viz.*, legal things, thus differ fate and things following fate from inevitable necessity, *viz.*, fatal things.

ERGO INITIVM Once more this principle, which was fully treated in ch. 143-147, is emphasized. PARENDI SIBI This is a strange statement, for it is not clear, how one can *obey* fate, like the law of the state. In the latter case there is always a rule, which is either obeyed or neglected, rewards and punishments being the consequences of our obedience or disobedience. When a person commits desertion in time of war and capital punishment is inflicted, the execution can indeed be called a *consequence* of such an action. Put this way the example affords an acceptable parallel to fate, where according to Platonic thought we keep finding *consequences* of actions. Here lies the *tertium comparationis*. But at the same time the execution of the deserter is a *punishment*. The law is not a neutral apparatus linking consequences with causes. But when we turn to the explanation of 186.19-22, fate, strictly speaking, is such a thing; our deeds precede and fate only puts the machinery of consequence into action, according to the adage *si hoc erit, sequetur illud* (187.16). Here, however, that neutral way of speaking is silently and suddenly changed. Instead of cause and consequence, merit and reward, crime and punishment are introduced. In this way fate is indeed spared the indignity of being regarded as a mere robot, producing certain effects, when a certain button is pressed, but now fresh difficulties arise, which can be illustrated by the examples Calcidius himself uses in the next chapter. It is, for instance, difficult to understand how Laios' begetting a son is

something punishable. In the case of Achilles, who could choose between two possible ways of life, this is even less clear. In any case there is a discrepancy between the two ways in which Calcidius speaks about fate, a discrepancy which is not solved and which, besides, can hardly admit of a solution. For no matter what kind of law is taken as an example, all these laws cover only one portion, one aspect of reality and somehow the special limitation of the example finds its way into the description of fate itself.

QVAEQVE This, as it stands, is hardly explicable. When one takes the word in its normal meaning, *viz.*, 'each', 'every', it makes no sense at all. For it cannot be true, that *all* things are said to be *ex praecessione*. Such a statement would be in flat contradiction with the argument. Another possibility is to take *quisque* for the equivalent of *quicumque*, which according to Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr, *Lateinische Grammatik II. Syntax und Stilistik* § 108 c is in fact quite possible. As a consequence, *et* in 187.8 should mean 'also'. The translation of *quaeque ex praecessione dicuntur fore et sunt nostrae potestatis* would be: "all things that are said to be *ex praecessione* are also in our power. "This is rather unsatisfactory, as such a statement would be completely unnecessary. Moreover it seems much more likely that *et* in line 8 has the same function as in line 9. Now there would not be any difficulty, if instead of *quaeque* we had a word, meaning 'some things'. In view of this an alteration in the text seems justified. I propose the conjecture *quaedam*. This same word is used in a similar context in ch. 145: *quaedam ex providentia tantum, quaedam ex decreto*. Finally attention must be paid to a very close similarity in Nemesius: τὰ μὲν ἡγούμενα καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν· τὰ δὲ ἐπόμενα ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης (ch. 38, quoted by Waszink).¹

ATQVE VT ALIVD In 570 c-e pseudo-Plutarch is also speaking about the difference between νόμος and νόμιμος. In his argument that was an important distinction, for it illustrated the difference

¹ It is also possible to take *antiquissima* as a *nom.pl.neut.* and to assume that *antiquissima quaeque* are the antithesis of *quae post illa sunt*. In my opinion this explanation, although simple, is not satisfactory. The only meaning in the *Thesaurus* which in that case could be taken into account for the present context is *qui antefertur, gravis, laudabilis*. This is best illustrated by Nonius' lemma *antiquior melior* (Nonius 425.36). Such a meaning does not seem plausible, for the things which are *ex praecessione* simply come *first* in the order without deserving any special *praise*. Besides, it seems unlikely that after the expression *in hac rerum ordinatione* the word *lege* is deprived of any further qualification.

between *εἰμαρμένη* and *εἰμαρμένα* (things decreed by *εἰμαρμένη*). Indeed, as we have seen, the whole of ch. 5 is concerned with the problem, whether it is correct to say: "all things are according to fate". The answer to this problem is to be found in the distinctions just described, which consequently are part and parcel of the reasoning of ch. 5. They are not made just for their own sake, but for another purpose, namely to find an answer to the problem we have just mentioned. In Calcidius these distinctions have no such end in view and thus appear to have little meaning. In the next chapter, however, more use is made of this point.

e) *Phaedrus* 248c 3-5 proves the correctness of this principle

[152] So the World-Soul is fate as a substance. It has also been provided, as an instruction¹ to rule the universe rightly, with a law which contains fate as an act, and which has the following structure and succession: "if this will be, that will follow". Now what precedes in this rule is in our power, what follows is according to fate. This with another name is called 'fatal', which is something greatly differing from fate, so that there are three things: (1) that which is in our power, (2) fate itself, (3) that which according to the law of fate repays our merits. Thereafter he states the words of the law itself: "The soul that has followed in the retinue of a god and discerned something of truth, will be kept from sorrow until the time of a new revolution and if she will do this always, she will always keep free from hurt". The words just quoted are the law and ordinance, which is properly called fate; when Socrates, following the ordinance of the law, joined God's retinue, that was Socrates' own work; in turn the fact that, because Socrates' life was such, his soul continues to be free from sorrow until the time of the next revolution, is a product of destiny, and provided he will always do that, which is in Socrates' power, he will always be free from sorrow according to fate.

EST IGITUR Like ch. 151 this chapter too is opened by a repetition of an important principle. ERGO QVOD The meaning of

¹ In giving this translation of *informatio* I base myself on the Thesaurus. The passage in question reads as follows (TLL VII 1474): *b de animo erudiendo, imbuendo fere i.q. instructio, doctrina: α in univ . . .* CHALC. transl. p. 42 *E iuxta mandatam -em (antea: iussionem, gr. διατάξιν) . . . β acced. gen. explic. . . .* CHALC. comm. 152 -o rem . . . recte regendi. 157 fati.

this distinction between *fatum* and *fatale*, made somewhat abruptly in ch. 151, is easier to understand now. Calcidius and pseudo-Plutarch have different reasons for this distinction. The author of *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* wanted to show that fate rules all things without determining them in the rigid way of Stoicism, whereas Calcidius is much more interested in human freedom. PRO MERITIS Already in ch. 150, after the example of geometry, use was made of this word (*ex meritis nostris*, 186.20), but there the context was quite 'neutral', although the use of the word in itself pointed into a certain direction. This came to light very clearly in the *animaduersiones* and *praemia* of ch. 151, which presented something of a problem. How could that highly special way of speaking be reconciled with *si hoc erit, sequetur illud*, the most general and neutral rule one can imagine? A solution for this discrepancy cannot be found, but the reason why Calcidius lays emphasis on merit and subsequent requital is now brought to light. It is to be found in Calcidius' use of the famous law of Adrasteia. QVAE SE COMITEM This is a correct translation of the θεσμός 'Αδραστείας of *Phaedrus* 248 c, also quoted by pseudo-Plutarch 570 a. It is one of the proof texts of the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-doctrine. Another such text is the well-known αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος (*Resp.* 617 e 4-5), which is actually quoted in ch. 154. The great importance of these texts is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that they are both mentioned in the very short summary of Platonic doctrine in Hippolytus' *Refutatio omnium haeresium*. The entire paragraph about fate (I 19,19) runs as follows: εἰμαρμένην δέ φησιν εἶναι, οὐ μὴν πάντα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἶναι τι καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἐν οἷς φησιν 'αἰτία ἐλομένου, θεὸς ἀναίτιος' καὶ 'θεσμός τε 'Αδραστείας ὁδε'. οὕτω τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην οἶδε καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Evidently these texts were considered to be fundamental and to offer a good summary of Platonic thought on this subject. Both of these texts are indeed corner-stones of the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-doctrine. In Middle-Platonic doctrine about fate Plato's mythical picture of human responsibility through the free choice of the rational soul is used in a completely new way, stripped of the garb of myth and as a rule without relation to the dogma of reincarnation. The rational choice in the other world is replaced by an empirical choice in our world. Plato's myths have been secularized. The combination of personal choice and necessary consequences is also found in a quite unexpected place, viz., Tacitus, *Annales* VI 22, 2: *ac tamen electionem uitae nobis relinquunt, quam ubi*

elegeris, certum imminentiū ordinem. Theiler, who has devoted a special study to this chapter of Tacitus¹, thinks Tacitus' remarks ought to be related to pseudo-Plutarch, Calcidius and Albinus. The last-mentioned in his short chapter on εἰμαρμένη remarks: ἀλλὰ διότι ἤτις ἂν ἔλγεται ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον βίον καὶ τάδε τινα πράξει, τάδε τινα αὐτῇ ἔψεται. (*Epit. c. 26*). This is a most remarkable and important piece of information. It can serve as an exact illustration of what was said a moment ago about the secularization of Plato's words. For it is easy to see that Albinus' terms are an adaptation of the law ofAdrasteia, which is thus brought down to earth from the mythical sphere.²

Now we turn to the other great pillar of the doctrine, viz. the word of Lachesis (*Resp.* 617 d-e). This is the heart of the great myth of Er, which concludes the Politeia. It was indeed to be expected, that this myth, in which the choice of life is described, should also be used to prove the correctness of the doctrine under discussion. Thus, for instance, Porphyry has dealt with this myth in his book Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, excerpts of which have been preserved by Stobaeus (II 5, 39-42). In par. 42 we find the following passage: Οἱ τε γὰρ νόμοι, οὐκ ἀναγκάζοντες, διαγορεύουσιν, ὥς ἐὰν ληστεύσης, τάδε πείσῃ· ἐὰν δὲ ἀριστεύσης, τῶνδε τεύξῃ· οἱ τε καθ' εἰμαρμένην θεσμοί, ἐὰν βίον ἔλγῃ ἀνδρός, οὕτως ζήσῃ, οὐ μὴν ἔτι καὶ ἐλοῦ ἐκ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσι· καὶ ἐὰν < ἐν > ἀνδράσι γενόμενος βίον ἔλγῃ στρατιώτου, τάδε σε παθεῖν καὶ δρᾶσαι ἀνάγκη, οὐ μὴν ἔτι βίον σε ἀνάγκη ἐλέσθαι στρατιώτου καὶ τάδε παθεῖν < καὶ δρᾶσαι > ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Δι' ὃ κεῖται μὲν τὰ παραδείγματα καὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων· ἐπὶ δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐστί, τοὺς τε πρώτους ἐλέσθαι βίους καὶ ζῆσαι, φέρε, βίον ἀνθρώπου, τῶν τε δευτέρων ἐλέσθαι βίον τινα· ἐλομένῳ δὲ καὶ ζῶντι κατὰ τοῦτον, ἀνάγκη ἀκόλουθα καὶ δρᾶσαι καὶ παθεῖν. (Wachsmuth 2, 169, 8-20). Theiler, who also refers briefly to this passage, remarks: "er ist da offenbar von Gaios abhängig". Be that as it may, these words of Porphyry belong

¹ W. Theiler, *Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre in Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* (Berlin 1966) p. 46-103.

² Concerning Albinus Theiler (*o.c.* p. 85) remarks: "Es ist also selbst hier zunächst an eine empirische Lebenswahl gedacht. Es ist nun wichtig zu beobachten, dass diese Wenn-form, nur leicht verkappt, auch bei Albinos in dem schon zitierten Satz vorkommt, ja im Grunde bei Tacitus *ubi elegeris*, aber bei Plato fehlt sie!" This is obviously a mistake. Plato too, like Albinus, has ἤτις ἂν ψυχῇ. The adaptation of the text calls for attention; the tone of the sentence is more important than its structure.

certainly to the same sphere as the expositions of the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-doctrine. Porphyry, however, did not so much secularize the Er-myth as add the more empirical¹ choice.

A brief word may be added about the probable designer of this doctrine. In the introduction to his edition Waszink suggested Numenius as the *auctor intellectualis* but he now² subscribes to the opinion of Theiler, who has put forward Gaius as the author. Theiler's arguments are indeed rather strong. In the first place one can point to Albinus, who is known to have been Gaius' pupil. But Theiler also attaches great importance to Tacitus, whose chapter *Ann.* VI 22, as we have mentioned, is the subject of his enquiry. According to Theiler, this chapter is a summary of a polemical dissertation of Gaius. He even adds a dash of romance by making the suggestion that Tacitus may have met this philosopher during his proconsulate in Asia in 112/3. However that may be, the following points concerning the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-doctrine are certain: (1) It was known about 115 A.D., when Tacitus wrote his *Annals*, and it has not been attested before that date, unless one has to assume that pseudo-Plutarch's *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* was written earlier. (2) It belongs to Platonic thought and it is opposed to the Stoa. (3) Within the framework of ancient philosophy it is an admirable theory, well founded on metaphysical premisses (cf. the *ἄπειρος*-argument, above p. 22), so that the designer must have been a philosopher of quite high accomplishments. All these indications indeed fit Gaius. In the absence of another hypothesis it seems reasonable to regard pseudo-Plutarch as having received his philosophical training in a Medio-Platonic school—perhaps as a disciple of Gaius himself.³

EST IGITVR TOTVM As in ch. 146 and 147 the quotation of the sacred text is followed by a clarifying summary, this time by way of an example. It is striking that Calcidius keeps very close to the literal text of the Phaedrus, even using the same words, yet at the same completely alters it by adding *cum ita uiueret Socrates*. Evidently these words mean a radical change, for now the text is explicitly made to refer to earthly life and thus is secularized. On the other hand this faithful adaptation of Plato's words makes it more understandable that Calcidius insists on merits and reward

¹ This is the term used by Theiler.

² *o.c.* p. 22, note 2.

³ Gercke, *o.c.*, p. 279 has also tentatively suggested Gaius' name.

or punishment, for these are implied in the original law, and in spite of the secularization this element has been preserved. There is therefore a certain difference from the way in which Albinus and pseudo-Plutarch make use of the contents of the θεσμός 'Αδραστέλας.

f) *The cases of Laios, Achilles and Adam also prove man's free choice*

[153] In this way Apollo has prophesied to Laios: "Take care not to sow in forbidden furrows: the son you beget will wickedly slaughter you and the whole palace will be besprinkled with blood". For by this oracle he showed that it was in the power of Laios not to sow. That is the preceding decision; what followed next, was no longer in Laios' power, but lay rather in the necessity of fate according to the merit of the preceding decision. But if it would be necessary that Laios fell a victim to the destiny we all know of, or if that disaster threatened him long before as a result of inevitable destiny, the inquiry would be void and so would be the prediction. But the god, as he knew beforehand what was to follow, forbade him to sow, knowing it was in his power to abstain, but Laios, as a human being who did not know the future, asked from him who knew, what he had to do, yet he sowed, though not because fate enticed him, but as he was defeated by his own intemperance.

[154] In the same way Thetis had predicted to her son that, if he would take part in the Trojan war, where his friendship would lead to his death, he would meet an early end of life combined with enormous glory, but that, if he would return home, a long life lay in store for him, though without glory. All the same Achilles chose war, doing so without any violent compulsion by fate, since he was not confronted with any doubtful choice; no, he acted thus as it were by the violence of his fury, and because his sympathy inclined towards glory. With this also harmonizes Plato's saying: "The blame is his who chooses; God is blameless" and also "virtue is independent and not subject to any necessity" or when Lachesis says to the souls "that none of them would come under the authority of daemons by lot, but that they would freely and personally choose the daemon, whom each thought he ought to choose". And according to Moses God forbade the first-born men to eat food from the trees, from

which the knowledge of good and bad might take hold of their souls. Since the ability to abstain or not was within their own power, God, who wanted to take care of them, showed them what they had to avoid, and He would not vainly have tried to keep them away, if it had to take place of necessity.

The case of Laios had drawn the attention of the Stoics. They considered prognostication to be a proof of the rigid necessity of fate, Laios providing a fine example. Von Arnim has called par. 4 of the testimonia about Stoic fate-theory *Vaticinatio probat fati necessitatem* and among other things Laios' case is mentioned. SVF II 941 is taken from Alexander Aphrodiensis' Περὶ εἰμαρμένης ch. 31, which chapter concerns μαντική. Alexander thinks oracles are useful by their advice, so that people can be on the alert. About Stoic doctrine he says: ὅπως οὖν πάντα ταῦτα σωθῇ καὶ πληρωθῇ τὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης δρᾶμα, φαντασίαν ὁ θεὸς διὰ τοῦ χρησμοῦ τῷ Λαίῳ παρέσχεν ὥς δυναμένῳ φυλάξασθαι τὰ λεγόμενα (202.21-23 Bruns). This doctrine he finds horrible, for in this way Apollo would not be the prophet, but the originator (ποιητής), which is a most unholy thought. The story of Laios also plays a part in another chapter of Stoic fate-doctrine, viz., the *confatalia*. This aspect is put forward in the passages Waszink has quoted from Cicero and Origen.

For Calcidius the oracle given to Laios proves the personal freedom and responsibility of man and so the story is another argument for the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-doctrine. In about the same vein it is used by Albinus: Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀπόλλων τῷ Λαίῳ προεῖπεν· Εἰ γὰρ τεκνώσεις παῖδ', ἀποκτενεῖ σ' ὁ φύς· ἐν τῷ θεσμῷ δὴ περιέχεται μὲν καὶ ὁ Λάιος καὶ τὸ φῦσαι αὐτὸν παῖδα, καθείμαρται δὲ τὸ ἐπόμενον (*Epit.* 26.2). Strangely enough, Calcidius in his translation has not kept εἰ, which would have agreed very well with the *si*-formula.

Throughout the chapter there is an indirect, though evident polemic with the Stoa, which is perhaps best illustrated by *non fato eliciente*. This corresponds very well with the quotation from Alexander.

EODEMQVE MODO For the details of this story cf. Waszink's notes in the edition. NVLLA QVIPPE This is rather difficult, as *quippe* somehow indicates a reason. Yet it is incomprehensible how the fact that Achilles is not in doubt about his choice can illustrate the absence of any constraint by necessity. Maybe Calcidius has abbreviated the argument too much, the original

line of thought being: "There is no necessity, for the fact that Achilles so resolutely made his choice was only a result of his character". *VIOLENTIA ... VIOLENTIA* Mark the parallelism. There is no question of any vehemence of fate: the only vehemence to be noted lies in Achilles' own character. *QVIBVS CONCINIT* Calcidius began the illustrations of the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-law and the reality of human freedom by quoting the θεσμός 'Αδραστείας. He now concludes these proofs by the second great pillar of the doctrine, namely Lachesis' speech in *Politeia* 617 d-e, of which he quotes some words, which at the same time wind up the whole paragraph on this subject. *CAVSA PENES OPTANTEM* Most of all these words (αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀνάγκης) are quoted, e.g. Hippolytus I 19, 19 (cf. above page 31), Justin *I Apol.* 44, Maximus Tyrius *XLI* 5a, Nemesius c. 38 (p. 306 Matthaei). *LIBERAM ESSE* ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον. As in the case of the law of Adrasteia Albinus has made a variation: ἀδέσποτον οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ. (*Epit.* 26.2). *IVXTAQVE MOYSEA* This is a remarkable sentence. The strangeness does not regard its content, which clearly refers to *Genesis* 2, 17: God's interdiction to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. It is understandable that this text could catch the eye of a Platonist as suitable in this connection. The striking fact is, however, that the example is somehow added as an afterthought. With the quotation from the *Politeia* the treatment of the law was fittingly concluded and indeed in ch. 155 a new subject calls for attention. There are a few more examples in Calcidius' commentary, where Plato's doctrine receives a supplementary proof from the Old Testament. In ch. 130, which deals with daemonology, we read: *Cui quidem rei Hebraeorum quoque sententia concinit* (172.24-173.1) and in ch. 300 about the doctrine of matter: *Quibus Hebraei concinunt* (302.11). In both cases a text from *Genesis* is quoted or hinted at. According to van Winden (o.c. pag. 123) a definite Numenian influence can be established in ch. 300. Numenius was a great connoisseur of Jewish doctrine, to which he attached great value. The authority of this doctrine, together with that of the Magi, Brahmans and Egyptians was to him very high.¹ In fact he was of the opinion that it was necessary to "find the way back" to these doctrines and to call them to witness (cf. fr. 9a Leemans). Regarding this "ἀναχώρησις-doctrine" cf. Waszink's

¹ Cf. E. A. Leemans, *Studie over den wijsgeer Numenius van Apamea* (Brussels 1937), p. 32 sqq.

Praefatio XLII-XLIII and note. Concerning Moses Numenius' most famous saying was: τί γάρ ἐστι Πλάτων ἢ Μωυσῆς ἀττικίζων; His high regard for Moses is also testified by the fact that he seems to have referred to him simply as ὁ προφήτης (*test.* 46 Leemans = Porphyr. *De Antro Nymph.* 10). In view of this, the reference to Genesis as an extra piece of evidence for the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-doctrine might be considered as a hint of Numenian influence.

3. OTHER NOTIONS RELATED TO FATE

a) *The possible and its two species*

[155] Now we shall speak about the things within human power. The ancients divided all things into three parts: the possible, the necessary and the contingent. The possible is a genus, the other two are species. So everything possible is either contingent or necessary. Now the necessary is called by that name, because it is bound by necessity, and as most possible things cannot be prevented from taking place, some are prevented and averted by human measures, their outlines are drawn by the following definitions: the necessary is the possible of which the contrary is impossible, *e.g.* all things that have come into being will perish and after having grown they will wane. For everything that is born will inevitably die and having reached old age it will decay and there is no room for the contrary, namely, that a thing which has come into being will not perish. The definition of contingent things on the other hand is as follows: the contingent is the possible of which the contrary is also possible, *e.g.*: today after sunset it is going to rain. For this is possible, but its contrary 'it will not rain' is equally possible.

NVNC IAM Having spoken about fate and providence and the relation between these two, Calcidius turns to the problem of human will. In order to mark out its domain, some preliminary distinctions have to be made. Here again there is a close parallel to pseudo-Plutarch, starting about halfway the 6th chapter of *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* at 571 b. VT GENVS Although this is reminiscent of πέφυκε δὲ τὸ δυνατόν ὡς γένος προυφειστάναι τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου (570 f), there is nothing in Calcidius resembling the argument which immediately follows this statement and which concerns the distinction of δύναμις, δυνατόν and δυνάμενον. So it is perhaps better to

put the beginning of the parallel at *Necessarium porro* (189.16), from which point onwards there are some very close verbal resemblances, as can easily be seen from the quotations in Waszink's edition. However, we must not overlook the strong resemblances to Nemesius that are found in this chapter and the next. In fact, these parallels are hardly less striking. GENVS . . . SPECIES These terms herald the much more Aristotelean colour of the next chapters in contrast to the typically Platonic atmosphere of the chapters we have examined up till now. Aristotle himself has not made a distinction between ἐνδεχόμενον and δυνατόν, at least not explicitly. Bonitz (*Arist. Metaph.* rec. et en. H. Bonitz, 386-387) thinks that these words, when taken in their strict sense, have a different meaning. According to Ross, however, Aristoteles has made no such difference. (W. D. Ross, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II p. 245).

b) *The contingent and its relation to free will*

[156] Now there are further differences between contingent events: some have a certain frequency, of others the frequency is quite evenly matched, *e.g.* wearing a beard and knowing how to write and pleading a cause. Things taking place frequently are opposed by those of rare occurrence, those of which the frequency is evenly matched by those of which this is not so. Therefore the choice of things evenly contingent is in the power of man, who, being a rational animal, refers all things to reason and deliberation. Now these two are the innermost motion of that which has a ruling function in the soul; this moves of itself and its motion is approval or desire. So approval and desire move of their own accord, yet not without imagination, called 'phantasia' by the Greeks. From this it follows that quite often, when the imagination deceives us, that motion of the soul's leading power, or rather its approval, is distorted and chooses the wicked instead of the best. The reason of this is manifold, either a coarse carelessness in deliberation or a want of knowledge or a mind too much devoted to dangerous acclamation or a pre-conception of a false opinion or a perverse habit, in any case a certain tyrannical despotism of some fault; for that cause we are said to offend by force or forcible allurements rather than by free will.

QVAEDAM ENIM This rather clumsily put statement would be unintelligible but for the parallels in pseudo-Plutarch and Nemesius,

to which can be added the following words from Ammonius in *Arist. de interpr.* 9: οὐπερ (i.e. τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου) εἰς τρία διηρημένον τὸ μὲν λέγεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, οἷον τὸ γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον πενταδάκτυλον . . . τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐπ' ἔλαττον, οἷον τὸ τὸν σκάπτοντα θησαυρῷ περιτυχεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἐπ' ἴσης, οἷον τὸ λούσασθαι καὶ μὴ λούσασθαι (142. 1-5 Busse)¹. In 190.9 *frequentia* stands for τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (that which takes place for the most part), τὸ δ' ὡς ἐπ' ἔλαττον (that which happens less generally) is rendered by *quae quidem rari exempli sunt* (190. 10-11). Calcidius, who wants to hurry on to his elucidation of human power, fails to tell that these things belong mainly to the domain of nature (καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τὸ πλεῖστον) and to give an example (after the dog-star's appearance heat is more likely than cold). HIS PORRO this is wrong; the right point of view can be found in pseudo-Plutarch (αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἀντιτίτακται). ERIT ERGO cf. pseudo-Plutarch: ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ ἐπίσης (571 c), Nemesius: περὶ τούτων οὖν, τῶν ἐπίσης ἐνδεχομένων, μόνον βουλευόμεθα (c. 34, p. 288 Matth.). An even better parallel is to be found in Ammonius in *Arist. de interpr.* 9: περὶ δέ γε τὸ ἐπ' ἴσης ἐνδεχόμενον ἡ προαίρεσις ἔχει μόνη (143. 1-2). Indeed *optio* is the rendering of προαίρεσις. That notion has been examined by Aristotle in the first chapters of book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. First he eliminates the wrong answers to the problem: προαίρεσις is not the equivalent of ἐκούσιον, which is a wider notion (ἐπὶ πλεον τὸ ἐκούσιον) 1111 b 8). It is neither ἐπιθυμία or θυμός, nor is it βούλησις, which is something quite different, for one wants to reach a certain τέλος, whereas προαίρεσις is concerned with the means by which this τέλος can be reached (οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, 1111 b 27-28). That needs thinking: ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας (1112 a 15-16). So finally we discover that the essence of the notion under discussion must be found in deliberation and counsel, in βουλευέσθαι: ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξίς τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν (1113 a 10-11). Aristotle's argument in these chapters evidently provided the substance of Nemesius' treatment of human free will, especially in ch. 33 and 34. Even at first glance one is struck by the very strong similarity, which emerges in many verbal parallels. The mere titles of these chapters are an indication

¹ The same distinctions can be found in Philoponus, *In Arist. Anal. Priora* 151. 27-152. 4 (Wallies), Alexander Aphr., *In Arist. Topica* 177. 22-27 (Wallies), Alexander Aphr., *In Arist. Anal. Priora* 162. 1 sqq. (Wallies).

of this: ch. 33 is called *περὶ προαιρέσεως*, ch. 34 *περὶ τίνων βουλευόμεθα*. Alexander Aphr. uses this capacity for deliberation as a strong weapon against Stoic determinism. Man would vainly have received this gift, if everything went according to fate. But man is a *βουλευτικός* ζῷον (178.12) and he has *ἐξουσίαν τῆς αἵρέσεως* (179.9).¹ The Aristotelean colour of Calcidius' words is especially evident in the combination *rationem atque consilium*, which strongly reminds of *μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας*, just quoted from Aristotle. In *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* this has been changed slightly into the expression *ἐξ ἐπιλογισμοῦ ἢ διανοίας*. In the next part of the argument about human freedom Calcidius has Stoic philosophy in mind, though he does not mention this *disertis verbis*. It is an anticipation, put in very mild terms, of the explicit polemic with the Stoa, to which the second part of the *tractatus* is devoted. The purport of these words is easy to see. Put briefly Calcidius says: "man's reason and reasonable choice are often deceived by all kinds of things. In view of this one can say that man sins involuntarily, but that is only a way of speaking to emphasize the sinister influences to which we are exposed. In reality we act by our free will." A similar argument can be found in ch. 157, which we will examine presently. IN ANIMO PRINCIPALE τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ASSENSVS συγκατάθεσις APPE- TITVS ὁρμή The juxtaposition of the last two terms in this context is after the manner of Chrysippus. In contrast to Zeno and Cleanthes Chrysippus concentrated everything in the ἡγεμονικόν: ὁρμῶμεν κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ συγκατατιθέμεθα τούτῳ (SVF II 896) and τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐν ταύτῳ φαντασίαν, συγκατάθεσιν, ὁρμήν, λόγον συνείληφε (SVF II 826).² ANTICIPATIO πρόληψις PROPTEREAQVE VI The most important word in this sentence is *dicimur*: it is only a way of speaking, to which in itself no exception needs to be taken.

c) Divination

[157] These things being so, divination stays unimpaired, so that no authority is being withdrawn from prognostication; in fact, someone who knows beforehand, can, when fate has instructed him in such a way, give advice either to undertake something or not to do so and the astrologer will correctly and

¹ This same notion plays an important part in his short paragraph τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, part of *De anima libri Mantissa* (p. 172-175, Bruns).

² Cf. M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* I p. 91.

rationally try to catch the right moment to undertake an act according to the favourable position of stars and constellations, so that, if this will happen, that will be the result. Now these and similar things are the medicines in doubtful cases, in which the salutary character of deliberation is the medical art. The sciences also have their place and especially the proposal of laws; for what else is law but command ordaining decent things and preventing their opposites? Therefore, as the choice of these is within our power, the honour of praise, the reproach of censure, and the punishment of penalties, likewise the remaining encouragements of virtue and curtailments of malice are rightly provided for.

QVAE To what does this word refer? One might say to the whole of the argument of ch. 155 and 156 and especially to human free will. But perhaps it is better to regard *quae* as a summary of what immediately precedes, namely the dangers involved in free choice. In that case the train of thought gains even more clarity. Having spoken about the dangers menacing the right judgment of human freedom, Calcidius in this chapter deals with the different kinds of support, to which man can turn. SALVA EST It should be noted that here the author is not proving the possibility of divination. The word *salua* does not concern its existence, but its full authority. So on second thoughts we had better translate: "divination is spared any danger to its authority". It is one of the useful acquirements to lead man on the right path. Both prognostication and astrology (cf. ch. 174) can supply advice to people not knowing how and when to act. In a somewhat comparable manner Alexander Aphr. has spoken about *μαντική*, though in a context, where he polemizes vehemently with Stoic views on divination. (Περὶ εἰμαρμένης ch. 31, see above p. 35). NE In non-classical Latin *ne* can be the equivalent of *ut non* in consecutive clauses. (Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr, *Lateinische Grammatik II. Syntax und Stilistik* § 347 γ). However, the possibility should not be excluded, that *ne* has its normal meaning as a final conjunction. In that case the train of thought would be as follows: "Our argument in the preceding chapter has saved divination, in order to warrant the authority of prognostication". CONSILII SALVBRITAS The use of the word *salubritas* according to Waszink points in the direction of Numenius, who seems to have had a special liking for this notion, as Van

Winden has shown (o.c. 36-37). To me, however, this clue seems to be too small to be of any importance, unlike the use of this term in 185.1 (see above, p. 19). In contrast to the passages Van Winden is speaking about, the word is used here only metaphorically. The imagery can be made clear in this way: "healthy deliberation is like a surgeon, who makes use of medical methods." The methods at the service of deliberation are such things as divination, law, praise, punishment. SCISCENS HONESTA, PROHIBENS CONTRARIA This is a Stoic definition of law: προστακτικὸν μὲν ὦν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὦν οὐ ποιητέον (SVF III 314) and *lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria* (SVF III 315). The text which Waszink quotes from Alexander Aphr. is also Stoic, because it is taken from a paragraph, where Alexander is reporting a Stoic argument. It is not the only place in the *tractatus*, where a Stoic tenet is used to prove a Platonic point of view. LAVDISQVE HONOR One of the main moral objections to Stoic doctrine about fate was the fact that praise and punishment and the like were made impossible, for, when everything is fully determined, man is neither to be blamed nor to be praised.¹ πῶς ἔτ' ἂν εὐλόγως οἱ μὲν εἶεν ἐν ἐπαίνοις, οἱ δὲ ἐν ψόγοις; asks Alexander Aphr. (c. 16, 187. 26). Aristotle himself had already raised this point in his argument in the above-mentioned chapters of *Eth. Nic.*: κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά... τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες, τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες (II13 b 23-26).

As was the case with divination, here too there is no question of a polemic with the Stoa. Calcidius is far from using the existence of praise etc. as a weapon against Stoic doctrine; instead he points out that these things are the expedients to be used by human freedom. Whereas usually in anti-Stoic criticism praise etc. are important proofs for the doctrine of free will, here their function is only to act as *instruments* of free will, which has been proved to exist in a quite different, more Platonic and metaphysical way.

¹ Cf. Dom David Amand, *Fatalisme et Liberté dans l'Antiquité grecque* (Louvain 1945), p. 576 sqq. The aim of Amand's voluminous book can be seen from the sub-title: *Recherches sur la survivance de l'argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez les philosophes grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles*. In the pages referred to he gives a *Reconstitution conjecturale de l'argumentation de Carnéade*.

d) *Fortune and chance*

[158] Now, having described providence, fate both as an essence and in its actuality, the things within human power and those which occur according to fate's decree, we shall examine fortune and chance. He says that the full power of fortune is in the affairs of man, chance being competent in another domain. All that befalls things lifeless or living beings devoid of reason, not through nature or art, is said to have happened by chance; things befalling men, either favouring their affairs or hindering them, are regarded as fortuitous and as ruled by fortune.

Now of causes one is principal, the other incidental. The principal cause of undertaking a journey is some business or the inspection of an estate or anything of this kind, the incidental, *e.g.* when the sun and heat burn those departed on a journey, the tanning of the face, which follows. So we shall say that both fortune and chance are causes incidental to the principal cause, so that the principal cause is in fate, the accidental causes are in fortune and chance. And because things happening partly obey necessity, partly take place ordinarily and frequently, partly occur seldom, fortune as well as chance belong to those occurring seldom; fortune's irrational and surprising event originates from human design, chance however stands apart from this, since what happens by chance belongs to the domain of lifeless things or dumb animals.

[159] To recapitulate briefly: when two causes originating from an intention of ours meet in such a way, that not our intention, but something quite different and unexpected is actualized, that is a jest of fortune, *e.g.* when someone secretly buries a treasure and afterwards a farmer intending to propagate a vine or some other plant, while digging a trench, finds it; certainly neither did he who buried the treasure take this trouble in order to have it found by someone else, but to fetch it back, when he would need to bring it forth, nor had the farmer been working to find a treasure, but to dig a trench, and yet both experienced an unexpected fortune. For that reason fortune may rightly be defined as follows: fortune is the meeting of two simultaneous causes originating from an intention, from which meeting something unexpected and amazing results, for instance if a creditor tired of reclaiming a debt, appears on the forum to provide

himself with advocates and the debtor comes to the same place on some errand, and next the debtor accosted in the presence of the advocates pays out the long-standing debt; for both men had a different reason to appear on the forum and that which was not intended was done rather than that which was already on the point of being done.

So in the same way chance will be the meeting of two simultaneous causes not connected with reason in lifeless things or dumb animals, for instance when wild beasts locked in an enclosure after breaking out return of themselves to the same enclosure or when we say a stone fell of itself.

About fate and that which is within human power, also about fortune and chance, enough has been said.

NVNC The parallel with pseudo-Plutarch, broken off at 190.13 is once more resumed. The 7th chapter of *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* starts with these words: *περὶ δὲ τῆς τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ εἴ τι παρὰ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται, νῦν ἡμῖν λεκτέον* (571 e). But although there are some obvious correspondences in that chapter with Calcidius ch. 158 and 159, the parallel is by no means as close as in preceding chapters. There is in fact a striking difference. As we have seen in former capita, the doctrine is occasionally supported by a quotation from the sacred text. Now pseudo-Plutarch 572 b-c quotes a passage from the beginning of the *Phaedo* (58 a) and then enlarges on the use of the word *συνέβη* (58 a 6): *ἐν γὰρ τούτοις τὸ 'συνέβη' οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ 'γέγονεν' ἀκουστέον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκ συνδρομῆς τινος αἰτίων ἀπέβη, ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο γεγονότος*. This use of a Platonic text would have suited Calcidius' argument in ch. 159 extremely well; its omission is therefore quite remarkable. *FORTUNA . . . CASV* The elucidation of these notions has a Peripatetic background, just as in the preceding chapters. In fact Aristotle himself has dealt with these problems in *Physics* B ch. 4-6. He confines *τύχη* to the sphere of human action, whilst he considered *αὐτόματον* as the wider idea (*ἐπὶ πλεῖον* 197 a 36). As can be seen in Waszink's notes, this is faithfully repeated by Aetius and pseudo-Plutarch. For Calcidius, however, the two notions are of equal status, each being kept to its own sphere. This corresponds with the statement of Nemesius, of whom there are more remarkable echoes in these chapters. *QVAE ENIM VEL* This sentence, up to *dicuntur* verbally resembles the text of Nemesius: *τοῦ δὲ*

αὐτομάτου, τὰ τῶν ἀψύχων ἢ ἀλόγων συμπτώματα, ἄνευ φύσεως καὶ τέχνης. (ch. 39 p. 313 Matth.).

CAVSARVM VERO Pseudo-Plutarch starts his treatment of the subject with these words: αἷτιον μὲν δὴ τι ἢ τύχη. Calcidius, however, before the actual explanation first wanted to clarify the distinction between *fortuna* and *casus*, which he had already mentioned briefly in his summary in ch. 145: *si quidem ex nostro disposito coepta erunt, fortuita, si sine nostra institutione, casu prouenire dicuntur*. (184.2-3). Having made this distinction he now starts the explanation proper, which is a shortened version of pseudo-Plutarch's argument in ch. 7, which ultimately goes back to Aristotle's doctrine in *Physics* B 4-6. Unfortunately, this abbreviation is no change for the better. The omission of pseudo-Plutarch's αἷτιον τι ἢ τύχη is a mistake; this principle should have been stated clearly. Besides Calcidius might have done better by first giving some examples of principal and incidental causes in general, as Aristotle and pseudo-Plutarch do. ACCIDENS It is surprising that the tanning of the skin is called *causa accidens*. Obviously this tanning should rather be called the incidental *consequence* than the incidental *cause* of what happens, so that we have to assume a mistake by Calcidius. If he had argued correctly, he would have stated that the journey, of which *negotiatio*, not *coloratio*, is the *causa principalis* (or *causa finalis*), might itself be called the *causa accidens* of the *coloratio*. COMMVNITER ERGO This sentence up to *dicemus* is a clear reminiscence, indeed almost a translation of *Phys.* 197 a 32: ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἄμφω αἷτια, καθάπερ εἴρηται, κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ET QVIA Here we are strongly reminded of *Phys.* 197 a 33-35 (immediately following the last quotation):—καὶ ἡ τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον—ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις γίγνεσθαι μὴ ἀπλῶς μὴδ' ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ² and *Phys.* 196 b 10-13: ἐπειδὴ ὁρῶμεν τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως γινόμενα, τὰ δὲ ὥς ἐπὶ πολὺ, φανερόν ἐστι οὐδετέρου τούτων αἷτία ἢ τύχη λέγεται οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης, οὔτε τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αἰεὶ οὔτε τοῦ ὥς ἐπὶ πολὺ. RARO ACCIDVNT The classification of chance and fortune in the sphere of rare occurrences is normal in Aristotelean thinking. In Aristotle's words which were just quoted this was indeed implied

¹ Note the remarkable similarity between *et fortuna et casus* and καὶ ἡ τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον.

² The consequence can be found in Ammonius, *In Arist. de interpr.*, 142. 13-15: περὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπ' ἑλαττον ἐνδεχόμενον δύο ταῦτα ἔχουσιν, ἥ τε τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον.

and it is explicitly said in the texts quoted by Waszink and in the words of Ammonius quoted in note 2 on p. 45. As can be seen from *rari exempli* (190.10-11), *rarus* is indeed used to render ἐπ' ἑλαττον. However, one should also take notice of the term σπάνιος which is used by some of the authors quoted.

ET FORTVNAE QVIDEM Aristotle defines τύχη as follows: αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἐνεκά του (197 a 5-6). This is faithfully repeated by pseudo-Plutarch 572 b. Obviously *propositum* must be regarded as the rendering of προαίρεσις. THE-SAVRVM This example devised by Aristotle has often been repeated. Some instances are to be found in the notes in Waszink's edition. NEQVE QVI CONDIDIT cf. Nemesius ch. 39: οὔτε γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὔτω τέθεικεν, ὥς τοῦτον εὑρεῖν, οὔτε ὁ εὐρὼν οὔτως ὥρυξεν, ὥς εὑρεῖν θησαυρόν (p. 313 Matth.). Apart from Calcidius' greater verbosity there is again a remarkable similarity in the structure of the sentence. QVARE SIC ETIAM Again this corresponds almost exactly with the text of Nemesius: ὀρίζονται γὰρ τὴν τύχην σύμπτωσιν καὶ συνδρομὴν δύο αἰτίων, ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχόντων, καὶ ἄλλο τι παρ' ὃ πέφυκεν ἀποτελούντων (p. 313 Matth.). VT CVM The examples Calcidius puts forward do not clarify the simultaneity of more causes. VLTRO This word is a much better translation of αὐτομάτον than *casus*.

Calcidius' discussion of fortune and chance in these chapters owes very much to Aristotelean philosophy, especially to Aristotle's handling of the problem in *Physics* B 4-6. Yet in all respects pseudo-Plutarch provides a much stronger echo of Aristotle: ch. 7 of Περὶ εἰμαρμένης might almost be called a paraphrase of the chapters from the *Physics*. In fact Calcidius' argument, especially in ch. 159, shows a stronger resemblance to Nemesius, as was shown in some striking examples.

B. REFUTATION OF SOME STOIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE

1. FOUR STOIC OBJECTIONS

[160] But because there are several arguments which are put forward against this doctrine, these must be set forth and refuted; for only then Plato's doctrine will have been put on firm foundations. They say: "So, if God knows all things from the beginning, before they happen, and not only the phenomena of heaven, which are bound by a fortunate necessity of unbroken blessedness as by a kind of fate, but also those thoughts and desires of ours; if he also knows that, which is contingent by nature, and controls past, present and future and that from the beginning, and if God cannot be mistaken, the conclusion must be that all things are arranged and determined from the beginning, things said to be within our power as well as fortuitous and chance events".

Next they infer that, because all these things have been determined long before, all things taking place take place according to fate, and that also laws, exhortations, reprehensions, instructions and the like are all bound by the stipulations of fate, because, if it is decreed that something is to befall a person, at the same time also that is determined, through the power or service of which it is bound to take place; so that, if to someone is to befall safety during a voyage, that will befall him, not when any other pilot, but when that particular pilot is guiding his ship, or if it is to befall some state to enjoy good institutions and customs, *e.g.* Sparta, this is bound to happen by the laws of Lycurgus. Likewise, if someone is bound to become righteous like Aristides, the education by his parents will give assistance to him in obtaining righteousness and fairness.

[161] They say it is clear that the arts, too, are subject to the decree of fate, for from this cause it has been arranged long before, which patient will become well again by whose medical help; that, in fact, it happens frequently that a sick person is cured, not by a doctor, but by an unskilled person, when fate's stipulation is such. There is a similar state of affairs in the case of praises, censures, punishments and rewards; for it frequently

happens that because of the obstruction of fate noble acts not only fail to produce any praise, but even lead to censure and punishments.

Now they say that divination shows clearly that events are decreed long before; for that, if the decree would not precede, prophesiers could not have had access to its plan.

They say that, however, the motions of our souls are only functioning as servants of the decrees of fate, since actions take place necessarily through us by fate's acting; that, in this way, man has the status of those things of which it is said 'without them no action can take place', just as motion or rest cannot exist without space.

SED QVIA In a not dissimilar way Alexander Aphr., after his concise synopsis of the Peripatetic view of fate in ch. 7 of his *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*, starts the refutation of the Stoic ideas: τῇ τῶν δοξῶν παρ' ἀλλήλας θέσει γνωριμώτερον τάληθές ποιήσομεν (171.20-21, Bruns). But whereas Alexander proceeds to an extensive examination of Stoic doctrine, Calcidius confines himself to a few important points. We must bear in mind, that in the positive part of the *tractatus* some important details of Stoic theory have already been criticized between the lines. Now, however, the refutation becomes explicit, for it is only when the last annoying obstacles to Platonic doctrine have been cleared, that the latter may be considered to be well founded.

Now Theiler (*o.c.* p. 92) says: "Auch Calcidius hat einen polemischen Teil, der nun nicht der platonischen Lösung, die der Timaioskommentar zu vertreten hat, vorangestellt ist, sondern mitten hinein 193.15-204.2 mit darauf sichtlich mühsamem Zurückgreifen auf den früheren Zusammenhang". In my opinion this assertion of Theiler's betrays the fact that he has overlooked an important aspect of Calcidius' polemic: indeed this polemic is not so much an attack on the Stoa, but rather, as the author says himself, a defence against some Stoic objections to the Platonic doctrine of fate, which has just been elucidated. This matters very much, for the Stoic attack is aimed at some of the theories expounded in the first part of Calcidius' treatise. So it is only natural that Calcidius reverts to these theories. Indeed, his argument is consistent with the latter. There can of course be difference of opinion about the quality of the argument, which has some weak parts,

but I cannot see any motive to speak about "mühsamem Zurückgreifen".

ΑΙΥΝΤ Though not sharply divided, four Stoic arguments can be distinguished in ch. 160 and 161. They are: (1) God's prescience, 193.17-194.4; (2) The doctrine of the *confatalia*, 194.4-13; (3) Unexpected experiences, 194.14-20; (4) Prophecy, 194.20-22. In the last part of ch. 161 (194.22-25) we find the conclusion to be drawn concerning human freedom of action.

ΣΙ ΔΕΥΣ The same problem is raised by Alexander Aphr. Περὶ εἰμαρμένης c. 30: τὸ δὲ λέγειν εὐλογον εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ ἐσόμενα προειδέναι (ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ λέγειν ἐκείνους ἀγνοεῖν τι τῶν ἐσομένων) καὶ τοῦτο λαμβάνοντας κατασκευάζειν πειρᾶσθαι δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε γίνεσθαι καὶ καθ' εἰμαρμένην οὔτε ἀληθές οὔτε εὐλογον (200.12-15). It is also found in Boethius' *Consolatio Philosophiae* V 3: "Nimium," inquam, "aduersari ac repugnare uidetur praenoscere uniuersa deum et esse ullum libertatis arbitrium. Nam si cuncta prospicit deus neque falli ullo modo potest, euenire necesse est quod providentia futurum esse praeuiderit. Quare si ab aeterno non facta hominum modo sed etiam consilia uoluntatesque praenoscit, nulla erit arbitrii libertas..." (3-5). ΝΕCESSITATE... ΔΥΒΙΑΜ These two terms refer to ch. 155, where *necessarium* and *dubium* or *ambiguum* were defined as species of the *possibile*. QΥΑΣΙ QΥΟΔΑΜ These words are the translation of οἶον, as is proved by 46.20, where *quasi quaedam nutricula* is the rendering of οἶον τιθήνην (*Timaeus* 49 a 6). The vague expression is somewhat surprising, but perhaps Calcidius wants to add a touch of authenticity to the objections of his opponents, who thus are represented as arguing very cautiously: "In the regularity of the phenomena of heaven there must be something at work, which for instance could be called fate". ΔΕCΡΕΤΑ This word is adequate, because in Calcidius' terminology it is specially used in the domain of fate. In the translation of the *Timaeus* the words *immutabilis decreti* (36.21) are the Latin equivalent for εἰμαρμένος (*Tim.* 41 e 2) and in ch. 145 *decretum* is used as a substantive synonymous with *fatum*. ΝΟΣΤΡΑ ΠΟΤΕΣΤΑΤΕ... ΦΟΡΤΥΙΤΑ... CΑSΙΒΥS Here again Calcidius carefully sticks to the terms which he has explained in the first part of ch. 158 (191.20-21).

ΛΕΓΕS This passage, up to *suppliciaque afferant* in the next chapter, is the Stoic attack on the remarks in the second part of ch. 157 (191.13-17). As stated above (p. 41), that chapter deals

with the support to which man's freedom can turn in order to keep on the right path. All these things, as law, exhortation, blame, are *remedia* (191.12). They are also, as it were, supplements to human freedom, with which they are firmly connected. The point of view of the Stoics is represented as diametrically opposed to these tenets, for, according to them, all these things are completely governed by fate. Two arguments are put forward to prove this, *viz.*, the conception of *confatalia* and, in the next chapter, the irregularity of events in this domain. VNA This is the crucial word, summarizing the essence of the doctrine of *confatalia*. Testimonia for this doctrine can be found in *SVF* II 956-958. It is the Stoic answer to the so-called ἀργὸς λόγος, the reasoning of which can be illustrated by fr. 957, taken from Origenes, *Contra Celsum* II 20: "If fate decrees that a sick person will recover, this will happen, whether he calls for a doctor or not. The same holds, when it is fated that he will not recover; in that case, too, the calling for a doctor is superfluous. So the conclusion is: ἤτοι δὲ εἴμαρταί σοι ἀναστῆναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἢ εἴμαρταί σοι μὴ ἀναστῆναι· μάτην ἄρα εἰσάγεις τὸν ἰατρόν". With such arguments the opponents of Stoic doctrine wanted to show that the Stoa condemned men to inactivity, all endeavour towards a certain goal being useless. What did the Stoa answer in defence? Chrysippus' answer can be found in Cicero's *De fato* XIII 30 (= *SVF* II 956): *Quaedam enim sunt, inquit, in rebus simplicia, quaedam copulata. Simplex est: 'Moriatur illo die Socrates'; huic siue quid fecerit, siue non fecerit, finitus est moriendi dies. At si ita fatum est: 'Nascetur Oedipus Laio', non poterit dici: 'siue fuerit Laius cum muliere, siue non fuerit'; copulata enim res est et confatalis: sic enim appellat, quia ita fatum sit et concubiturum cum uxore Laium et ex ea Oedipum procreaturum.* In the passage which we are now discussing this defensive argument is turned into an offensive one, directed against the Platonic point of view, which Calcidius elucidated in ch. 157. Perhaps a real Stoic opponent would have reasoned with greater subtlety, but of course it is not unusual to represent arguments of an opponent as a little weaker than they really are.

ARTES QVOQVE At first sight it seems that the argument concerning the *confatalia* is carried on, but with *denique fieri frequenter* in l.16 the argumentation is changed and a fresh point is raised, *viz.*, the fact, that things often happen contrary to expectation and calculation. This argument can be summed up in the words

Sed praeter spem aiunt aliquanta prouenire, which constitute the opening sentence of ch. 172, where Calcidius will try to answer this particular objection. *REPREHENSIONEM SVPPPLICIAQVE* In ch. 172 Socrates and Aristides are mentioned as examples. *DIVINATIONEM* This indeed was an important proof for Stoic doctrine. In *SVF* the relevant texts (II 939-944) are headed by the title *Vaticinatio probat fati necessitatem*.¹ Fr. 939, taken from Diogenianus (apud Euseb. *prep. Ev.*) is a good parallel to Calcidius: μή γάρ ἂν τὰς τῶν μάντεων προρρήσεις ἀληθεῖς εἶναι φησιν, εἰ μὴ πάντα ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης περιείχοντο. Both the firm position of divination in antiquity and the high value attached to it by Stoic philosophy made it obligatory for any other thinker to pay much attention to this subject and to develop a plausible theory within the framework of his own system. Calcidius has already spoken about these questions in ch. 153, 154 and 157 and he will do so again in ch. 169-171. *ANIMORUM* In order to explain this sentence we must turn to Alexander Aphr. ch. 13. Here Alexander is criticizing Stoic doctrine in its attempt to find some corner for human freedom: ἀναιροῦντες γὰρ τὸ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῆς αἰρέσεώς τε καὶ πράξεως τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγουσιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ γινόμενον καὶ δι' ἡμῶν. (181.13-14). In order to save human freedom Chrysippus had used the example of a cylinder: *Sicut lapidem cylindrum si per spatia terrae prona atque derupta iacias, causam quidem ei et initium praecipitantiae feceris, mox tamen ille praeceps voluitur, non quia tu id iam facis, sed quoniam ita sese modus eius et formae uolubilitas habet: sic ordo et ratio et necessitas fati genera ipsa et principia causarum mouet, impetus uero consiliorum mentiumque nostrarum actionesque ipsas uoluntas cuiusque propria et animorum ingenia moderantur* (Gellius, *N.A.* VII 2, 11).² An answer to such efforts can be found in Alexander Aphr. ch. 13 and Nemesius ch. 35. In both cases the answer amounts to emphasizing the correct use of some prepositions: τὰς διὰ τῶν ζώων ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης γινόμενας (κινήσεις) ἐπὶ τοῖς ζώοις εἶναι λέγουσιν (Alex. Aphr. 182.12-13), οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δι' ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης γινόμενον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι. (Nemes. p. 293 Matth.).³ Both these texts are a close parallel to Calcidius'

¹ Fragment 943 consists of Calcidius ch. 160 and 161. This does not do full justice to the contents of these chapters for, as I have tried to show, they also contain some very different arguments.

² Cf. Cicero, *De fato* XIX 43.

³ Cf. Theiler, *o.c.* p. 78 sqq.

per nos agente fato in 1.24. MINISTERIA In the given context this word can almost be translated by 'slavery'. True enough, Chrysippus had tried to spare mankind this indignity, but his endeavour only won the ridicule of his opponents and Oenomaus spoke about the ἡμιδουλεία, which Chrysippus had introduced (SVF II 978).

2. CALCIDIUS' ANSWERS

a) *God's prescience does not jeopardize man's freedom*

[162] What are we to answer against these doctrines laid down so contentiously and with even greater violence than fate itself possesses? Our answer is: That it is true that God knows all things, but that He knows everything according to its own nature: that which is subject to necessity as submissive to necessity, the contingent, however, as provided with such a nature that deliberation opens a way for it. For God does not know the nature of what is contingent in such a way as that which is certain and bound by necessity (for in that case He will be deceived and fail to know), but in such a way that he really knows the contingent according to its nature. So what do we say? That God knows all things and His knowledge is of all time, and further that the things He knows are partly divine and immortal, partly perishable and temporal; that the substance of immortal things is immutable and immovable, that of mortal things changeable and contingent, and that now it has this condition, now another, because of its inconstant nature. Thus also God's knowledge of divine things, which have a sure happiness protected by continuous necessity, is sure and necessary, both because of the certain grasp of the knowledge itself and on account of the substance of the things He knows; on the other hand His knowledge of uncertain things is indeed necessary, *viz.*, His knowledge that these things are uncertain and their course contingent—for they cannot be different from their nature—, yet they are themselves possible in both directions rather than subject to necessity.

[163] So contingent things are not inflexibly arranged and determined from the beginning with the sole exception of the very fact, that they must be uncertain and depend upon a contingent course. Therefore it is completely fixed and decided from the beginning that the nature of man's soul is such, that it now applies itself to virtue, now shows preference for evil (exactly

as the body is sometimes nearest to health, sometimes to illness). But it is neither decided nor commanded, which particular person is to be good or bad, and therefore there are laws, instructions, consultations, exhortations, cautions, education, strict rules for nourishment, praise, blame and similar things, because the choice to live rightly is in our power.

These chapters are the reply to the first part of ch. 160: "God's prescience proves that all things are completely governed by fate". ANCEPS VERO This definition of the contingent is not the general one given at the end of ch. 155: *Dubium est possibile cuius etiam contrarium possibile*. (190.4-5). It is rather a shortened version of the way in which the class of the so-called *peraeque dubia* was defined in the next chapter: *Erit ergo eorum quae peraeque dubia sunt optio penes hominem, qui, utpote rationabile animal, cuncta reuocat ad rationem atque consilium*. (190. 12-13).¹ It is of course quite understandable, that a definition of this special part of the *dubia* has been preferred to a description of the general character of contingent things. Human freedom remains the main object of interest and the problem of God's prescience is not discussed abstractly, but in close relation to man's free choice. DEI SCIENTIA The concurrence of God's knowledge and its objects seems to be inspired by *Tim.* 29 b5-c2, where Timaeus points out the similarity of an object and the account given of it: τοῦ μὲν οὖν μονίμου καὶ βεβαίου καὶ μετὰ νοῦ καταφανοῦς μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους—καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε καὶ ἀνελέγκτοις προσήκει λόγοις εἶναι καὶ ἀνικήτοις, τούτου δεῖ μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν—τούς δὲ τοῦ πρὸς μὲν ἐκεῖνο ἀπεικασθέντος, ὄντος δὲ εἰκότος εἰκότας ἀνὰ λόγον τε ἐκείνων ὄντας. Both Albinus and Apuleius have made use of this text. In *De Platone* ch. 6 Apuleius is speaking about the two *essentiae*, one of which is an object of the intellect and the other is known by the senses. Apuleius concludes this chapter as follows: *intellegendi substantia quoniam constanti nititur robore, etiam quae de ea disputantur, ratione stabili et fide plena sunt; at eius, quae ueluti umbra et imago est superioris, rationes quoque et uerba, quae de ea disputantur, inconstanti sunt disciplina*. Albinus *Epitome* 4.3 shows an even greater resemblance to Calcidius. Albinus is dealing with human λόγος.

¹ This parallel seems to me much more obvious than the reference to ch. 157 given in Waszink's edition *ad* p. 195.2-5.

This λόγος is double: the ἐπιστημονικός λόγος has the νοητά as its object, the δοξαστικός λόγος deals with αἰσθητά. This has its consequences: "Οθεν ὁ μὲν ἐπιστημονικός τὸ βέβαιον ἔχει καὶ μόνιμον, ἅτε περὶ τῶν βεβαίων καὶ μονίμων ὑπάρχων, ὁ δὲ πιθανὸς καὶ δοξαστικὸς πολὺ τὸ εἰκὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ τὰ μόνιμα εἶναι. NECESSITATE PERPETVA MVNITA FELICITAS cf. *felici necessitate perpetuae beatitudinis* (193.18). AT VERO This sentence is the counterpart of *de diuinis quidem etc.*, but there is a remarkable difference. If the parallel had been complete, God's *scientia* would here have been called *incerta*. It is of course easy to understand, that this conclusion is not drawn because of its impious consequences. Therefore in this case, instead of God's knowledge, the contingent character of its objects receives the main attention. This has the additional advantage that now the transition to the next chapter is easy and smooth. The conclusion of Alexander Aphr.: ὥστε καὶ οἱ θεοὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἂν ὡς ἐνδεχόμενα προγιγνώσκοιεν (201.16-17) is of course fairly similar to that of Calcidius, but this conclusion has been reached by way of a wholly different argumentation. Alexander's reasoning has a strictly logical character, whereas Calcidius turns to metaphysics and bases his case on the fundamental difference between the world of true being and the sphere of transience. IN VTRAMQVE PARTEM cf. Alexander Aphr. c. 9: τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τε καὶ τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν γίνεσθαι τινα (174.30-175.1).

In later Platonism the problem of God's (or the gods') knowledge of transient things is solved in a wholly different way. In prop. 124 of his *Elements of Theology* (110.10-23 Dodds) Proclus deals with this question: Πᾶς θεὸς ἀμερίστως μὲν τὰ μεριστὰ γινώσκει, ἀχρόνως δὲ τὰ ἐγγχρονα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα ἀναγκαίως, καὶ τὰ μεταβλητὰ ἀμεταβλήτως, καὶ ὅλως πάντα κρειττόνως ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τάξιν.

Εἰ γὰρ ἅπαν, ὃ τι περ ἂν ᾖ παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς, κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἔστιν ιδιότητα, δῆλον δῆπουθεν ὡς οὐχὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν χειρόνων φύσιν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς οὕσα ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐξηρημένην ὑπεροχήν. ἐνοειδὴς ἄρα καὶ ἀπαθὴς ἡ γνῶσις ἔσται τῶν πεπληθυσμένων καὶ παθητῶν. εἰ ἄρα καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν εἴη μεριστόν, ἀλλ' ἡ θεία γνῶσις ἀμέριστος καὶ ἡ τῶν μεριστῶν· καὶ εἰ μεταβλητόν, ἀμετάβλητος· καὶ εἰ ἐνδεχόμενον, ἀναγκαῖα· καὶ εἰ ἀόριστον, ὠρισμένη. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων εἰσδέχεται τὸ θεῖον τὴν γνῶσιν, ἵνα οὕτως ἡ γνῶσις ἔχῃ, ὡς τὸ γνωστὸν ἔχει φύσεως.

In his commentary Dodds remarks: "This attempt to picture a grade of intellectual knowledge higher than νόησις is in the main

post-Plotinian".¹ Similar views were held in the Alexandrian school: οὐ γὰρ δὴ συμπαραθέειν τῇ ῥύσει τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν τῶν θεῶν γνῶσιν ἀνεξόρμεθα λέγειν (Ammonius in *Arist. de interpr.* c. 9, p. 136.17-18 Busse) and καὶ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ μὲν φύσει τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνδεχόμενον, τῇ δὲ γνώσει τῶν θεῶν οὐκέτι ἀόριστον ἀλλ' ὠρισμένον. (id. p. 136.30-137.1). In Boethius' *Consolatio Philosophiae* such views can also be found. At V 4, 1 *Philosophia* is starting her answer to the problem of God's foreknowledge. According to her this problem is very old and obscure; *cuius caliginis causa est, quod humanae ratiocinationis motus ad divinae praescientiae simplicitatem non potest admoueri, quae si ullo modo cogitari queat, nihil prorsus relinquetur ambigui.* (2). In this preliminary remark the essence of the answer is already included in the word *simplicitatem*. The rule is: *omne quod scitur non ex sua sed ex comprehendentium natura cognoscitur* (V 6.1).² God's *natura* is *aeternitas*. This has its implications for His knowledge: *scientia quoque eius omnem temporis supergressa motionem in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae infinitaque praeteriti ac futuri spatia conplectens omnia quasi iam gerantur in sua simplici cognitione considerat.* (V 6.15).

However, let us leave Boethius and rather turn to another passage in Proclus, which deserves even more attention. In his *Commentary on Tim.* 29 c-d Proclus says: αὐτοὶ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ τὸ γενητὸν ἀγενήτως καὶ τὸ διαστατὸν ἀδιαστάτως ἐγνώκασι καὶ τὸ μεριστὸν ἀμερίστως καὶ τὸ ἐγχερον διαιωνίως καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀναγκαιῶς (in *Tim.* I 352.5-8). Most interesting is the rejection of the opposite view: μὴ γὰρ οἰηθῶμεν, ὅτι ταῖς τῶν γνωστῶν φύσεσιν αἱ γνώσεις χαρακτηρίζονται, μηδ' ὅτι τὸ μὴ ἀραρὸς οὐκ ἀραρὸς ἐστὶ παρὰ θεοῖς, ὥς φησιν ὁ φιλόσοφος Πορφύριος—τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ ἐκεῖνος ἀνεφθέξατο, ὅπερ τ' ἄρρητον ἄμεινον (Hom. ξ 466)—ἀλλ' ὅτι ταῖς τῶν γνωσκόντων διαφοραῖς ἄλλοις γίνεται τῆς γνώσεως ὁ τρόπος (id. 352.11-16). Summed up very briefly, the difference between the two theses is this: the character of knowledge agrees with the object (*unumquidque pro natura ipsorum*, Calc. 195.2-3) or with the subject (Proclus and other Platonists, cf. Boethius' *ex comprehendentium natura*). The consequence of the first view, i.e., that for God too the contingent is contingent, has perhaps been drawn more implic-

¹ Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, a Revised Text with Translation, Introduction and Commentary by E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1962, p. 266.

² Cf. V 4.25: *Omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui uim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem.*

itly than explicitly by Calcidius in ch. 162, but there is in any case a very remarkable correspondence with the view, which the shocked Proclus ascribes to Porphyry. This similarity becomes even more striking, when we bear in mind, that Proclus is commenting on the same paragraph which, as we just showed, is the ultimate base of Calcidius' argument in ch. 165. Sodano in his *Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum Fragmenta*¹ assumes that the idea censured by Proclus belongs to Porphyry's commentary on the Timaeus and indeed to the same paragraph which Proclus himself is elucidating.

Our conclusion can therefore be that both Calcidius and Porphyry put forward similar views about God's knowledge of transient and contingent things and that in both authors this view is based upon Tim. 29 b-d.

NON ERGO This sentence is a reaction to the Stoic tenet of ch. 160 *Omnia certe ex initio disposita atque decreta sunt* (194.2-3). NISI FORTE A very interesting parallel is provided by Origen, Περὶ εὐχῆς 6.3: ἐὰν δὲ τις ταραττήται διὰ τὸ μὴ οὐ ψευσάσθαι τὸν θεὸν τὰ μέλλοντα προεγνωκότα, ὥς τῶν πραγμάτων κατηναγκασμένων, λεκτέον πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὅτι αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῷ θεῷ ἔγνωσται ἀραρότως, τὸ μὴ ἀραρότως τόνδε τινὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ βεβαίως βούλεσθαι τὰ κρείττονα ἢ οὕτω θελήσειν τὰ χείρονα, ὥστε ἀνεπίδεκτον αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι μεταβολῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ συμφέροντα (314.4-9 Koe.). The train of thought is indeed the same as in Calcidius 195.19-196.3. Two details in Origen's text are quite remarkable: (1) the striking resemblance of *id ipsum* (195.19) and αὐτὸ τοῦτο. (2) the use of the term ἀραρότως, which reminds one of the word ἀραρός which, according to Proclus, Porphyry used when speaking about God's knowledge. PROPTEREAQVE This conclusion contradicts *leges etiam et exhortationes et obiurgationes et disciplinas quaeque huius modi sunt omnia teneri fatalibus condicionibus* (194.5-7) and repeats the statements found in the second half of ch. 157 (191.13-17). NVTRIMENTORVM CERTA OBSERVATIO The inclusion of this strictly corporeal care among moral and spiritual *remedia* may seem strange, but in ch. 168, too, care for the body is mentioned beside other requirements: *Corporis quoque obsequium sufficiens animae viribus esse debet ad tolerandum exercitii laborem.* (198.22-23). QVIA RECTE cf. *quia horum electio in potestate nostra est* (191.14-15).

¹ Naples 1964, p. 28-29.

b) *An appendix: the correct use of praise and blame*

[164] Therefore, when most existing things belong to our authority, and some lie outside our power, ours are desire, judgment, will, agreement, preparation, choice and avoidance; not within our power are riches, glory, beauty, bravery and other things which we can rather wish for than claim. This being so, if by chance someone might want to suppose that things not within our power belong to our authority, one may rightly call such a person ignorant; consequently also the person, who considers things in our personal power as lying outside that sphere, in my opinion is ignorant. Indeed no one is praised for obtaining good fortune, which is not within human power, unless perhaps he is considered blessed (for prosperity is not in his power), but in the agreements based on justice, in the pains of moderation and the observance of the other virtues we are justly praised, since virtue is free; and, when acting contrarily, we are censured, because we are thought to sin on purpose.

This chapter does not add much to the argument. It seems merely a digression about the last two terms of the enumeration in ch. 163, viz., *laus uituperatio* (196.4). It may also be, that Calcidius intends this chapter as an answer to the objections in ch. 161 (*Similis ratio est laudum etc.*). In that case, however, the refutation would not deserve that name, for the essence of the objection was the exception taken at the fact, that *quae recte gesta sunt* are often not praised, but censured. This problem is by no means solved in the present chapter. The argument is as follows. First Calcidius shows that from what precedes it may be concluded (*igitur*) that some things, such as riches and glory, are not subject to our decision, and that other things, such as judgment and desire, are within our power. Those who hold the opposite view are rather stupid. In conformity with the right idea, however, praise and blame should be confined to the domain of our free will. **PRAESUMERE** In the notes on ch. 144 b I tried to show, that this verb could have the special meaning 'to grasp mistakenly', 'to be mistaken in thinking' (cf. above p. 15). In the present text the meaning may simply be 'to suppose', 'to assume'. Here too, however, *praesumere* is used to indicate a false opinion. Perhaps this can give support to the meaning suggested for ch. 144 b. **DENIQUE**

NVLLVS cf. Alexander Aphr. ch. 27: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦν ἐκ γενετῆς ὁ φρόνιμος τοιοῦτος καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῷ δεδομένοις εἶχεν παρ' ἐκείνης λαβών, οὐδ' ὅλως ἂν ἦν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι τοιούτῳ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι ἢ λογικῷ, οὐδ' ἂν ἐπ' ηγεῖτο ἔτι ἐπὶ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐθαυμάζετο ὡς ἔχων παρὰ τῆς θείας φύσεως δῶρον τηλικούτον. (197.17-22). Although this idea is quite similar to the thought of Calcidius, the context is different. In fact the argumentation is the other way about, for Alexander is using praise as a link in an argument to prove the freedom of virtue —διὰ τοῦτο ἐφ' ἡμῖν τέ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν κτῆσις (198.23-24) is the conclusion reached—, whereas Calcidius proves the usefulness of praise by pointing to the freedom of virtue: *siquidem uirtus libera est* (196.16). NISI FORTE One might say that there is a certain amount of praise in calling a person happy. BEATVS Aristotle considered external goods indispensable to reach a state of happiness: (εὐδαιμονία) φαίνεται δ' ὁμῶς καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἵπομεν (*Eth. Nic.* I 9, 1099 a 31-32). Most interesting is also the view of Antiochus of Ascalon: *Zeno in una uirtute positam beatam uitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit, beatam, sed non beatissimam.* (Cicero, *Acad. pr.* II 134); cf. also Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* V 22 and Seneca, *Epist.* 92, 14. VIRTVS LIBERA cf. the quotation from the *Politeia* in ch. 154: *liberam esse uirtutem* (189.5) and Waszink's notes.

3. A FRESH STOIC OBJECTION: PERVERSIO

a) Introduction

[165 a] Their next argument is: offences are not voluntary, because every soul partaking in divinity by natural desire always aspires to the good, yet sometimes errs in its judgment of good and evil; for some of us consider pleasure as the highest good, others riches, most glory and all other things rather than the true good itself. The reason of their error is manifold. The first is called 'double perversion' by the Stoics. This arises both from the things themselves and from the glorification by the people(?).

Von Arnim has included ch. 165-167 (as distinguished by Wrobel, *i.e.*, up to p. 198.19) in his *SVF* III as fragment 229. In his notes Waszink suggests that ch. 168 ought to have been included as well.

The first problem we have to solve is: what is the function of these chapters in Calcidius' argument? Are they simply a digression of some kind? Despite their striking verbosity this does not seem the case. At first sight the fresh objection from the side of the Stoics, with which chapter 165 opens, may appear quite sudden, but in fact there is a close link with the preceding chapter. To see this we have to read between the lines, paraphrasing l. 18-22 as follows: "Let us grant you the liberty of man's choice, *etc.* Now you, Platonists, have a high opinion of the human soul, taking it to be of divine origin and thus participating in divinity. Certainly such a soul by nature will strive after the good. Yet what do we see? A lot of errors in defining the supreme good. So in principle the choice may be free, but people's actual choices, by going astray, abolish this freedom, because they lead towards a wrong goal, which had not been chosen. So after all behaviour is not spontaneous". If this paraphrase is right, the content of the Stoic objection amounts to a disqualification of the *remedia* of human freedom, which Calcidius has so enthusiastically enumerated in ch. 157. As was the case with the *confatalia*, here too Calcidius makes it appear, as if the Stoics are using an argument, *viz.*, their doctrine of διαστροφή, for the purpose of attacking their opponents, whereas in using it they were in fact rather on the defensive.

Testimonia for this doctrine of διαστροφή can be found in SVF III 228-236. The problem with which the Stoa was confronted, was the fact that the pursuit of ἀρετή, which according to Stoic doctrine was inherent in human nature, was obviously often perverted. Pohlenz (*Die Stoa*, p. 123) says: "'Als Vernunftwesen hat der Mensch von Natur nur die Zueignung zum Sittlichguten' hat Chrysipp mit aller Entschiedenheit erklärt; die Schlechtigkeit kommt von aussen in ihn herein. Hier sind freilich die schlechten Einflüsse so übermächtig, dass kaum einer sich ihrer erwehrt." This straying from the right path is called διαστροφή or perversion.¹

Instead of reporting this doctrine concisely Calcidius gives a detailed account of it. Obviously he is quite interested in the subject, so much so, that occasionally his style becomes florid, especially in ch. 167. Thus these chapters in the end are indeed a digression, although at the close of ch. 167 Calcidius, as we shall see, once more finds rather a clever transition to return to his actual subject.

¹ A similar idea has already been briefly sketched in ch. 156 (190.17-191.6).

SPONTANEA cf. Plato, *Protagoras* 345 d 9-e 1: οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν.¹ This maxim of Socrates' intellectualism fits in very well with the fundamental optimism of the Stoa. NATVRALIS...EXPETIT cf. Cleanthes' view, as reported in *SVF* I 566: πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν. SVMMVM BONVM For the Stoa this is ἀρετή. VOLVPTATEM...DIVITIAS...GLORIAM These terms are juxtaposed, as if they were on an equal footing. We shall see that in fact this is not so. The emphasis is very much on *uoluptas*; riches and glory are even in a subordinate position. This preponderance of *uoluptas* or ἡδονή is easily accounted for: our experience seems to tell us clearly that all people strive after pleasure, and much attention has to be paid to this dangerous problem. Another very important factor, although not mentioned by Calcidius, is of course the rival doctrine of Epicurus, for whom ἡδονή is the τέλος of man's endeavours. DVPLICEM PERVERSIONEM cf. *SVF* III 228, quoted in Waszink's edition. The wording, which Galenus ascribes to Chrysippus, is perhaps even closer to Calcidius: διττὴν γὰρ εἶναι τῆς διαστροφῆς τὴν αἰτίαν, ἑτέραν μὲν ἐκ κατηχήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐγγιγνομένην, ἑτέραν δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς φύσεως (*SVF* III 229a). DIVVLGATIONE FAMAE This expression should be the Latin equivalent of κατήχησις (τῶν συνόντων or τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων), but the meaning of these words is not the same at all; κατήχησις according to the *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae* IV 1350 means: *Institutio, et quidem peculiariter ea, qua prima scientiae alicujus rudimenta traduntur*. The Lexicon of Liddell and Scott agrees with this: "instruction by word of mouth", but for the translation of *SVF* 228 and 229 a another sense is suggested: "communication with companions, in bad sense". Pohlenz (*Stoa* p. 124) translates 'Katechese durch die Umwelt'. All this differs greatly from the meaning, which the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* V 1647 gives to *diuulgatio*: *i.q. actus in publicum proferendi, promulgatio*. Now it may be possible to solve this problem. *SVF* III 233 quotes a text from Origen, *contra Celsum* III 69, where instead of κατήχησις we find περιήχησις. In itself this does not help much, for the meaning of this word is *circumsonatio* (*TGL* VI 829), *resounding, echoing* (Liddell and Scott). Lampe's

¹ Socrates' maxim is used in a different context in *Tim.* 86 d 7: κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐκὼν οὐδεὶς.

Patristic Greek Lexicon even gives the translation *instruction in evil* for the quotation from Origen. But when we turn to the corresponding verb, a solution is possible. Both the *Thesaurus* and Liddell and Scott refer to Euseb., *Prep. Evang.* I 10. There we find the following expression: Ἡσίοδος οἷ τε κυκλικοὶ περιηχημένοι. The following translations are given: *celebro* (TGL VI 829), *pass. to be noised abroad, to be celebrated* (Liddell-Scott). The Latin verb *diuulgare* according to the *TLL* can be used concerning *res* and *homines*. In the second case the first meaning given is: *in bonam partem i.q. praedicare, proclamare aliquem*. A text is quoted from Tertullian, *adv. Marc.* 4, 8 p. 439.12 *destructor creatoris nihil magis gestisset, quam a spiritibus ipsius agnosci et diuulgari*.

So the verbs περιηχέω and *diuulgare* can have a similar meaning. If the same holds for the corresponding nouns, *diuulgatio* could be the rendering of περιήχησις and the meaning of both words (according to Calcidius of course) would be 'glorification', 'being made famous'. If that is right, *famae*, taken as a genit. subiectivus, can very well have its original sense 'the talk of the multitude', 'that which people say' (cf. τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, *SVF* III 229a). So the translation of *diuulgatio fama* could be 'being celebrated by the talk of the people'. I may add that with this explanation I have only tried to explain, why Calcidius uses this term. In fact the use of *diuulgatio* is wrong, as we shall see in ch. 167.

b) *peruersio ex rebus*

α) in the case of newborn babies

[165 b] For as soon as children are born and come forth from the womb of the mother, their birth involves considerable pain, because they migrate from a warm and humid residence to the cold, dry air which envelops them; against this painful cold, which the babies have to endure, the midwives by way of medicine have taken this ingenious precaution: they cuddle the new babies with warm water and replace and imitate the womb of the mother by warming and cuddling. Relieved by this care, the tender body is pleased and rests quietly. So from both sensations, that of pain and that of pleasure, proceeds a kind of innate opinion that everything sweet and pleasant is good, and, on the other hand, that what causes pain is bad and has to be avoided.

MOX This stands for εὐθύς, as in the translation of *Tim.* 20 c 6 εὐθύς ἐνθένδε: *mox conuentu soluto* (12.2). The rest of this paragraph about the behaviour of newborn babies has a remarkable parallel in one of the texts quoted by Usener, *Epicurea Test.* 398, to which Waszink refers, viz., Sextus Empiricus, *adu. math.* XI 96. The Epicureans say, ὅτι φυσικῶς καὶ ἀδιδάκτως τὸ ζῶον φεύγει μὲν τὴν ἀλγυδόνα, διώκει δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν· γεννηθὲν γοῦν καὶ μηδέπω τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν δουλεῖον ἅμα τῷ ῥηπισθῆναι ἀσυνήθει ἀέρος ψύξει ἐκλαυσέ τε καὶ ἐκώχουσεν. εἰ δὲ φυσικῶς ὁρμᾷ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἐκκλίνει δὲ τὸν πόνον, φύσει φευκτόν τέ ἐστιν αὐτῷ ὁ πόνος καὶ αἰρετὸν ἢ ἡδονή¹. Such a text shows the vulnerability of the Stoic doctrine about the natural striving after virtue. The words φυσικῶς and ἀδιδάκτως are almost directly opposed to the Stoic view. But, as appears from Calcidius, the Stoics had an answer. They pointed to the actions of the *obstetrices*, who put the newly-born babies on the wrong path, suggesting to them that pleasure is preferable. Thus at least the Epicurean ἀδιδάκτως was argued away. QVAEDAM NATVRALIS Here *quaedam* is certainly the rendering of οἶον. Two instances of this in the translation of the Timaeus can be found in the Index Graeco-Latinus of Waszink's edition, page 369.

β) in the case of adults

[166] Exactly the same view is also held concerning need and satisfaction, flatteries and rebukes, when they have become a little older, and therefore, when this age has gained strength, they persist in the opinion already formed, considering everything agreeable as good, even if it is useless, and everything troublesome, even if it gives benefit, as bad. Consequently they exceedingly love riches as the most excellent tool of pleasure and they cherish glory instead of honour. For by nature every man strives after praise and honour,—as honour is the evidence of virtue. But men of sense, who are engaged in the pursuit of wisdom know, which and what kind of virtue they have to cultivate, whereas the unthinking mass, on account of its ignorance of (the value of) things, instead of honour cultivate glory and reputation with the people, and instead of virtue they eagerly pursue a life soaked in pleasures, regarding the power to do what

¹ It is perhaps useful to note two differences in Mutschmann's edition: ῥηπισθῆναι/ῥαπισθῆναι and φευκτόν τέ/φευκτόν τι.

they like as a kind of royal prerogative. Since man by nature is a royal animal and because kingship is always attended by power, they presume that power is also accompanied by kingship, whereas in fact kingship is the righteous guardianship of the subjects. Likewise, because a happy person must needs live cheerfully, they think that also those who live with pleasure are happy. Such is, I think, the error which, arising from things, dominates the souls.

After the discussion of the newly-born in ch. 165 this chapter deals with older children and adults.

OMNE BLANDUM BONVM cf. *omne suaue bonum* in l. 7-8. The change of *suaue* into *blandum* is due to *blanditiis* in l. 10. DIVITIAS . . . GLORIAM In our comments on ch. 165 a we have already said, that these terms are not on a level with *uoluptas*. As far as riches are concerned, this is obvious, because they are called the tool of pleasure. But glory, too, is dependent on *uoluptas*, as we shall presently see in l. 15-20. HONOR VIRTUTIS TESTIMONIUM Wise men (*prudentes uersatique in sciscitatione sapientiae uiri*, l. 17) strive after honour by way of their virtue. Stupid people (*uulgus imperitum*), however, seek glory and a life of pleasure instead of honour and virtue. So there is the following parallel: *prudentes—uirtus—honor, uulgus imperitum—uitam . . . uoluptatibus delibutam—gloria*. PRO VIRTUTE . . . VOLVPTATIBVS The fundamental antithesis of the Stoa and Epicurus.

REGIVM ANIMAL μόνον τὸν σοφὸν βασιλέα was the Stoic adage (cf. *SVF* III 617-622) QVIA REGNVM This sentence (197.22-23) runs parallel to *Simul quia . . . fore* (198.1-2), but this involves a difficulty concerning the meaning of *obsequi*. Both sentences criticize the erroneous conversion of a true statement. The second phrase (198.1-2) grants that happiness implies living with pleasure (*libenter*). But this statement cannot be converted: a life of pleasure (*cum uoluptate*) does not make a person happy. In *quia regnum etc.* a similar warning is given. Indeed kingship is always accompanied by power, but power does not necessarily imply kingship. That at least seems to be the purport of the words, but, unfortunately, *obsequi* normally means 'to yield', 'to submit'. This, however, would not suit the context at all. Therefore I venture the suggestion that *obsequi* here is about equivalent to *comitari*. BEATVS This is the Latin for εὐδαίμων (in the fullest sense of that word).

c) *peruersio ex diuulgatione*

[167] In consequence of '*diuulgatio*', however, the above-mentioned error is followed by ideas about riches, glory and other things erroneously considered good, which are suggested by the vows of mothers and nurses. Further confusion is caused by scares, which make a more violent impression on tender age, and also by soothing and all things of this kind. Nay, with regard to pleasure and distress, how strong is the appreciative inclination forced upon inexperienced souls by poetry, which has a soothing influence on more grown-up minds, and further by the brilliant works of prose-writers? What about the representatives of the plastic arts, do not they drag the souls away from activity to sweetness? The greatest rousing of vices, however, is due to the state of condensation of the fluids in the body, by whose respective abundance or shortage we are more prone to passion or anger. Add to these the hazards of life and lot, illness, slavery, lack of necessities, preoccupied by which we are led away from honourable pursuits to the worries attending such a life, and by which we are called back from the cognizance of the true good.

EX DIVVLGATIONE Neither the explanation, which I suggested above (p. 61), nor the normal meaning of *diuulgatio* (making public) suit the contents of this chapter, whereas *κατήχησις* would be very appropriate for the first part. So in all probability Calcidius has made a mistake here. Four dangers are mentioned: (1) l. 4-7: At a tender age the vows etc. of mothers; (2) l. 7-11: In later years the temptations of the arts; (3) l. 11-13: The condition of the body; (4) l. 13-15: Other physical dangers. Only the first two of these can actually be incorporated with *κατήχησις*. The other two sets of threats rather belong to the *res* dealt with in ch. 165 and 166. This strengthens the impression that Calcidius does not quite understand, what is meant by *κατήχησις*.

IUXTA I have translated this word by 'with regard to', starting from the fact that in Calcidius' translation of the *Timaeus* there are three instances, where *iuxta* stands for *περί* + acc. Two of these are relevant here: *περί τὸν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον θεόν* (34 a 8) is rendered by *iuxta nativum et unquam futurum deum* (26.14) and *περί τὴν ὑμετέραν γένεσιν* (41 c 5) results in *iuxta effectum uestrum* (36.6). VOLVPTATEM LABOREMQUE These terms are also juxta-

posed in *SVF* III 229a, where Galenus censures Chrysippus' view, μηδεμίαν οίκείωσιν εἶναι φύσει πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἢ ἄλλοτρίωσιν πρὸς πόνον. INCLINATIONEM FAVORIS These words can very well be synonyms, as e.g. Tacitus, *Hist.* IV 81: *caelestis fauor et quaedam in Vespasianum inclinatio numinum*. Therefore I take *fauoris* to be an example of the so-called *genitivus inhaerentiae* or *identitatis* (Leumann-Hoffmann-Szantyr, *Lateinische Grammatik, II. Syntax und Stilistik*, p. 63). PICTORES ET FICTORES Also juxtaposed in Plato *Politeia*, 373 b 6: οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα. VITIORM A similar view is put forward by Plato, *Tim.* 86 b sqq. Calcidius will say more about this subject in ch. 181. LIBIDINEM AVT IRACUNDIAM This is Platonic as well: the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the θυμοειδές get the upper hand of the λογιστικόν. INSTITVTAE This does not make much sense, even if we take the best suitable meaning of the verb *instituere*, i.e. 'to establish', 'to organize'. A modification is needed, the more so as *uitae institutae* obviously refers to the first half of the sentence. I think that we have to read *uitae* < *ita* > *institutae*. The dropping-out of *ita* can easily be explained as a case of haplogy. The combination *ita institutus* has been used twice by Calcidius in his translation of the *Timaeus*, both times as a free rendering of a Greek expression: *hominem ita institutum* (40.11-12) stands for τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτάς (44 b 7), *ita instituto sermone* (46.1-2) for κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου (48 c 5).

4. CALCIDIUS' REACTION TO THE CONTENTS OF CH. 165-167

[168] Therefore those who are to become wise need a gentlemanly education and rules leading to virtue as well as instruction distinct from the great mass, and they have to mark and observe all excellent things leading to wisdom. Before anything else they need divine assistance for the perception of the greatest goods, which, though belonging specially to the gods, yet are shared with men. The obedience of the body, as well, has to be adequate to the energies of the soul in order to bear the toil of exercise. Good teachers ought also to be available and that design of life, which each of us has obtained as a divine protector. For it is told that Socrates had 'a daemon who attended him from childhood', instructing him in everything he had to do, not in such a way that he instigated him to some action, but so that he held him back from things which had better not happen. For the same reason things in human power, if they are done

inconsiderately, when it is unprofitable that they are done, may cause harm, a thing which the friendly daemon kept away from Socrates.

OPVS EST Without doubt Waszink's correction in the distinction of the chapters is right. But I disagree with his suggestion that ch. 168 ought to have been incorporated together with ch. 165-167 in *SVF* III 229. In a note he gives the reason for this: *Uox sapientibus* (l. 17) *monstrat Stoicam doctrinam hic referre pergere C.* Indeed *sapiens* may very well stand for σοφός, especially in the typically Stoic sense of that word, but it may also be the rendering of φιλόσοφος. In Calcidius' translation of the *Timaeus* there are two instances of this: 8.13 and 16.16. Now, in my opinion, the first part of ch. 168 summarizes very briefly the programme for the education of the φύλακες τέλειοι or φιλόσοφοι, which is expounded in *Politeia* 521 c-541 b. The first sentence could contain a reminiscence of the mathematics etc. in 521 c-531 c, whereas the διαλεκτική of 531 c-541 b may be the ultimate base of the next sentence about the *perceptio bonorum maximorum*. I do not suggest that Calcidius really has in mind the paragraphs of the *Politeia* with all the implications of the three classes, etc. I only think that ch. 168 has a Platonic background rather than a Stoic one. This also enables us to explain Calcidius' train of thought more easily. Calcidius, having reported extensively and, so it seems, approvingly the dangers of perversion, to which the Stoa had drawn attention, now seems to say somewhat triumphantly: "All these difficulties, which you have set forth in order to challenge my emphasis on the benefit of education etc., in fact exactly prove my point, viz., that a proper education is necessary". ERGO If I am right, this word has a triumphant ring: "As you Stoics, say, there are many dangers. Therefore we need education". CVM SINT PROPRIA DIVINITATIS, CVM HOMINIBVS TAMEN The distance between god and man, emphasized in this concessive turn of phrase, can hardly be in tune with Stoic doctrine. The Stoa rather taught the fellowship of god and man: κοινωνίαν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν (*SVF* II 528; other testimonia can be found in the index, *SVF* IV page 71). CORPORIS QVOQVE This refers to γυμναστική. PROPOSITVM . . . NVMEN In the translation of the *Timaeus in proposito* (38.10) is the rendering of ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ᾗθει (42 e 5). This proves that *propositum* is Latin for ἥθος,

numen of course being the equivalent of δαίμων. So here we have a reminiscence of Herakleitos' famous saying ἥθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων (fr. B 119), although without its original meaning.

PROPTEREA QVOQVE This is very puzzling: as it stand, *propterea* can only refer to what precedes and the translation has to be: "for this reason human freedom can bring harm". But what is meant with "this reason"? It cannot refer to the preceding sentence about Socrates' daemon, with which the present phrase is obviously linked: *agi ea sit inutile* is of course the equivalent of *fieri non expediret*. The word *quoque* makes the problem even more difficult. It suggests that there are other reasons for the potential calamitous use of human freedom. In itself this could refer to the contents of ch. 165-167, but apart from the fact, that in this way the coherence of the text would be very weak, we do not make any further progress in elucidating *propterea*. Therefore I propose to change *quoque* into *quod*, which is only a slight change paleographically, and to place a comma after *expediret*. The full sentence would now run as follows: *Quippe Socrati dicitur a pueris comes daemon rerum agendarum praeceptor fuisse, non ut hortaretur eum ad aliquem actum, sed ut prohiberet quae fieri non expediret, propterea quod quae in hominis potestate sunt, si per imprudentiam agantur, cum agi ea sit inutile, cladem afferant, quod a Socrate arcebat benivolum numen. Propterea quod* is a normal combination, which is also used by Calcidius. If this change is right, we can summarize 1.1-6 as follows: Socrates' daemon did not instigate him, but held him back from unprofitable acts, *because* human freedom can by imprudence result in such acts.

5. CALCIDIUS' ANSWER TO THE STOIC ARGUMENT ABOUT DIVINATION

[169] However, divination of things subject to necessity and also of things which are contingent, but which have already come to their destined end, is true and '*complexibilis*', if it is to be called divination at all—for once something has happened, it cannot be undone—, but divination of contingent things, the outcome of which is still a matter of doubt as long as no merits yet precede, is contingent and oblique, as *e.g.* Apollo's oracle: "By crossing the Halys Croesus will destroy a very great kingdom". For in that case there were, if I am not mistaken, three contingencies, *viz.*, the first, whether the kingdom of Cyrus and

the Persians was to perish, the second, whether rather the kingdom of Croesus himself and the Lydians was to perish, and the third, whether war could on reasonable terms be avoided. This could indeed have happened, and there were precedents of wars which had been cancelled; but because the desire of both opposed a laying down of arms, as both Cyrus had a sort of wild and haughty character and Croesus, too, was self-confident and very fond of power, the decree which followed had been made certain because of the intention of both, *viz.*, that there was to be no peace between them; so either of the two remaining possibilities was still open, and the doubtful point was, whose kingdom was doomed to extinction; and therefore a dubious prophecy and an oracle of doubtful meaning was issued, in order that whatever happened would seem to be predicted by Apollo.

[170] There are other predictions resembling a multitude of advices, because, as it is within our power to choose one of two uncertain things, gracious divinity, lest out of ignorance a faulty choice is made, advises men, what is to be chosen. For instance, when the Argives inquired at the oracle, if it was suitable to start a war against the Persians, they received the following answer: "People loathed by the neighbours, very dear to god, stop any armed defence: all danger of the body will be averted solely by the shadow of the head." For God knew, what had to be chosen and that the choice is in the power of man; that however, which follows the choice, belongs to fate.

[171] To the Hebrews, too, an advice was given by God together with a prediction of the future in the following manner: "If you will obey my commandments, all the goods of the earth will be in your power. Accordingly milk and streams of honey will not be wanting. If you defy my will, the divine voice has preceded to describe the series of imminent punishments", because that which lay in man's power, *viz.*, either to obey or to defy the commands of heaven, was uncertain. But if their choice would be preceded by an inevitable decree and defiance be necessary, the prediction would be redundant, as would also be the promises and threats. So there is something in human power and men are not, like those holding the opposite view maintained, the instruments of the things that happen and by means of which they happen, but the preceding cause followed by that, which is according to fate.

These chapters contain the rejection of the Stoic contentions in ch. 161: *At uero diuinationem dicunt clare demonstrare prouentus iam dudum esse decretos* (194.20-22). Ch. 169 deals with oracles which prove nothing.

NECESSITATI . . . AMBIGVARVM As he did in ch. 162, Calcidius faithfully sticks to the distinction made in ch. 155 in which *ambiguus* is obviously the equivalent of *dubius*, but, as we shall see, he is at the same time playing with the latter notion.

COMPLEXIBILIS This is a ἀπαξ λεγόμενον, explained by the *Thesaurus* as *i.q. intellegi potest* (TLL III 2099). This is unsatisfactory. Indeed the verb *complector* can mean 'to understand', but in the first place this meaning has a special nuance: 'to embrace something intellectually as a whole' (Lewis and Short), which is not at all required here, and in the second place the whole notion of comprehensibility is not needed in the context. But there is a more remarkable fact. It seems that *complexibilis* is closely linked with *completus exitus*, and that Calcidius takes it to summarize the whole passage *quarum iam fatalis completus sit exitus*. If this idea is right, the course of things may have been such, that Calcidius had at his disposal the term *complexibilis*, a term which he did not understand and for which he invented an explanation. How did he get the term *complexibilis*? I suggest he misunderstood a Greek word, as he did in the case of κατήχησις (see above, p. 60). Which Greek word? Possibly, if we suppose a literal translation, συμπλεκτός. I shall try to illustrate this possibility. Naturally my explanation can only have the character of a suggestion.

Gellius, *N.A.* XVI 8 deals with ἀξιώματα; in par. 10 he says: *quod illi συμπεπλεγμένον, nos uel 'coniunctum' uel 'copulatum' dicimus*. This proves that the Greek verb συμπλέκειν can be rendered by the Latin *copulare*. Now we turn to Cicero, *De fato* XIII 30, which paragraph already called for our attention, when we dealt with the doctrine of *confatalia* (see above p. 50): *si ita fatum est: 'Nascetur Oedipus Laio', non poterit dici: 'siue fuerit Laius cum muliere, siue non fuerit'; copulata enim res est et confatalis*. The Greek equivalent of *confatalis* is συνειμαρμένος; *copulatus* might be the rendering of συμπλεκτός. Although in the passage quoted from Cicero the subject is not divination, but the doctrine of *confatalia*, the example given, is an oracle, even a famous one. The same statement might have been made, if the discussion had concerned divination. Calcidius may have read something in this

vein, but, misunderstanding the term συμπλεκτός, instead of translating it by a perfect participle, he took the suffix -τος in its normal meaning and invented the literal equivalent *complexibilis*. Once having devised this word, he found an explanation for it. As an additional argument for my suggestion I consider the strangeness of the conception of divination of things past. Cicero, *De divinatione* I 1, gives the following definition: *divinationem, quam Graeci μαντικὴν appellant, id est praesensionem et sententiam rerum futurarum*. Indeed Chrysippus' definition was broader: *uim cognoscentem et uidentem et explicantem signa, quae a diis hominibus portendantur* (Cicero, *De divin.* II 63.130 = *SVF* II 1189), but still this definition does not include divination about the past, which seems to be an invention of Calcidius.¹

AMBIGVARVM (10) . . . AMBIGVA (11) Here Calcidius is deliberately or accidentally playing with words. In the first case *ambiguus* must stand for ἐνδεχόμενος (i.e., 'contingent'), but the second time it means 'ambiguous', 'having a double meaning'. NONDVM PRAEDECEDENTIBVS MERITIS cf. *meriti praecessio* (187.4) PERDET CROESVS cf. Cicero, *De divin.* II 115: *Croesus Halyn penetrans magnam peruertet opum uim*. In his commentary Pease gives a list of texts where this famous oracle is quoted or hinted at.² GLORIOSA NATVRA as in the case of Achilles: *propenso iuxta gloriam fauore* (189.3) DECRETVM QVOD SEQVEBATVR This is the direct answer to *nisi decretum praecederet* (194.21).

DVBIVM . . . DVBIA . . . DVBII Evidently Calcidius wants to stress this word. Its meaning in this context is 'doubtful', 'uncertain', but probably Calcidius also wants the reader to remember the technical sense 'contingent'; cf. the use of *ambiguus* in this chapter. DVBIA SORS Perhaps there is an ellipsis of *erat*. In that case the trans-

¹ There is another possibility which should at least be stated, viz., to assume that *complexibilis* means 'susceptible of a conclusion'. Indeed both the verb *complecti* and the noun *complexio* can take such a meaning. The *Thesaurus* provides the following relevant notes to *complexio*: II A i.q. *enarrationis comprehensio, conclusio*, F i.q. *conexio, nexus sententiarum, συλλογισμός* (TLL III 2100). It might be argued that, thus understood, *complexibilis* refers to Calcidius' statement in ch. 152 *lex, quae . . . habet textum et consequentiam talem: "si hoc erit, sequetur illud."* (187.14-16). In my opinion this explanation is unsatisfactory, for in that case Calcidius would certainly have explained this himself, especially because the word *complexibilis* is very unusual. So for me the only acceptable explanation is to assume that *complexibilis* refers to *completus exitus*, whereas *uera* should rather be connected with *necessitati subiectarum rerum*.

² Cicero, *De Divinatione*, Ed. Arthur Stanley Pease, Illinois 1920, p. 538.

lation should be: 'fortune was dubious'. QVODCVMQVE ACCIDISSET cf. Cicero, *De divin.* II 116: *Utrum igitur eorum accidisset, uerum oraculum fuisset.*

Although he does not expressly say so, Calcidius appears to contend that oracles of the kind dealt with in this chapter do not prove the Stoic point. It is small wonder that necessary things and things of the past are known by the oracles, whereas ambiguous oracles like the one Croesus got rather demonstrate that events are not fixed.

CONSILIORVM . . . SVADET This function of the oracles is stressed by Alexander Aphr. ch. 31: τί δήποτε, εἰ πάντα τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται, αἱ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν μαντεῖαι μὲν γίνονται συμβουλαῖς ἐοικυῖαι (202.5-7). EXAMINI The meaning of this word in the present context is obscure. One of the normal senses of *examen* is 'swarm (of bees)'; from this results the more general meaning 'multitude' used in the paraphrase. This is unsatisfactory, but I have not been able to find a really convincing alternative. The only other possibility—apart from a mistake by Calcidius—that I can think of is the following. According to the *Thesaurus examen* can stand for *actio librandi vel aequilibrium*. Possibly Calcidius means to say that the advices given in the shape of an oracle are themselves in equilibrium. Man has to choose and by his choice he tips the scales. (cf. *parere uel contemnere*, 200.19). NE IN DELECTV In this case divination has the same task as Socrates' daemon; cf. especially the expressions *per imprudentiam* (199.4-5) and *ex ignoracione* (200.5-6). OPTIO PENES HOMINEM The oracle only gives advice, the choice stays in the hands of man. So this class of divination, too, fails to prove the Stoic contention that events have long been decreed.

HEBRAEIS QVOQVE As in some other parts of Calcidius' commentary, the argument is rounded off by an illustration taken from the Old Testament. In our notes on 189.8 *sqq.* we suggested the possibility of a Numenian influence (see above p. 36). Such may be the case here too. I do not think, however, that we can be so positive about a Numenian background for the present chapters as Waszink's notes suggest. There are so many parallels with ch. 150-159 in this second part of the *tractatus de fato*, indeed Calcidius' refutation of Stoic doctrine is so consistent with those chapters, that, if we reason according to the argument in the notes, we ought to ascribe the whole of ch. 150-159 to Numenius. In my opinion, this seems improbable. SI PRAECEPTIS This is not a

literal quotation of a particular text from Scripture. The mentioning of *lac et melliflui fluctus* does not help to determine the pericope which Calcidius might have in mind. The Bible speaks more than a dozen times about the 'land flowing with milk and honey' and none of these passages reminds one specially of Calcidius' words. Another possibility is, that the quotation is a kind of summary of a whole chapter, as e.g. *Leviticus* 26 or *Deuteronomy* 28, but in my opinion the nearest parallel to the text taken as a whole is *Isaiah* 1, 19-20, which in the version of the LXX reads like this: καὶ ἐὰν θέλητε καὶ εἰσακούσητέ μου, τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῆς γῆς φάγεσθε· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ θέλητε μηδὲ εἰσακούσητέ μου, μάχαιρα ὑμᾶς κατέδεταί· τὸ γὰρ στόμα κυρίου ἐλάλησεν ταῦτα. Both Justin (*Ap.* I 44) and Origen (*De princ.* III 6, 201.15-17 Koe.) make use of this text as a Scriptural argument to prove human freedom, the very subject Calcidius is speaking about.

ABVNDARET cf. *uacaret sciscitatio, uacaret etiam praedictio* (188.17) in the chapter about Laios. EST IGITVR This conclusion refutes the last part of ch. 161. PER QVAS AGVNTVR cf. *per nos agente fato* (192.24). CAUSA PRAECEEDENS Exactly the same conclusion was reached at the end of ch. 170. It is completely harmonious with the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-doctrine set forth in ch. 150 sqq.

6. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

a) *fate is not responsible for evil*

[172] "But they say that quite a number of things occur against all expectation". We know this and we know further that the character of all these things is twofold: on the one hand those which happen very seldom, either occurring accidentally or brought about by some chance, e.g. monsters being born from man, and on the other hand, things taking place more frequently, but originating from the perversion of human judgment, when things are judged either by people in power, when they are angry or by enemies, as befell Socrates and when by a judgment of the same people Aristides, the most righteous of men, was convicted, or when one of the prophets was cut up limb by limb by scoundrels and another buried by stones. Is the cause of these things also in the power of fate? They fail to understand that they are conferring different and conflicting powers (that is to say virtue and at the same time vices, which is impossible)

on fate, when they say that offences of this kind are proper to fate. Therefore let them determine what they want fate to be. Divine virtue? But then it would not be the cause of evils. Or perhaps the evil <World-> Soul? But in fact from badness no good can result, and it is said that by fate also good things happen. Perhaps they will say that it is a kind of mixed substance. And how can it be, that one and the same thing is at the same time provided with goodness and badness and creates excess and purity and brings about the remaining conflicting virtues and vices?

[173] Moreover, what is their opinion about fate going to be? That it certainly wants all things to be good, yet lacks the power? So it will be something weak and powerless. Or that, having the power, it yet does not want all things to be good? This truly is a kind of savage and monstrous jealousy. Or perhaps that it lacks both wish and power? But to say this about fate would be particularly disgraceful. Or perhaps that it has both powers and will? So it will be the cause of all good things and the responsibility for evils will have nothing to do with fate.

SED PRAETER SPEM The Stoic objections of 194.17-20 are repeated in a more general wording and indeed discussed in connection with the problem of evil in general. PERRARO . . . FREQUENTIVS Again Calcidius is completely in accordance with distinctions he has made earlier. That fortune and chance belong to the sphere of rare occurrences, has been said in ch. 158: *fortuna et casus in his inveniuntur quae raro accidunt* (192.12-13, cf. above p. 45). Man's free choice has to do with things of which the frequency is evenly matched (*erit ergo eorum quae peraeque dubia sunt optio penes hominem*, 190.12). It is of course quite correct to say that these things happen more frequently (*frequentius*) than those of the first category. DEPRAVATIONE cf. *deprauetur* (191.1). VIRTUTEM ET ITEM VITIA SIMVL The statement that fate, apart from being the cause of bad things, which were the only subject up till now, is also in Stoic doctrine the origin of good things is rather sudden. It seems to be considered as self-evident. Exactly the same unexpected turn can be found in ch. 174, where the whole argument shows a strong resemblance to the present chapter. ANIMAM MALIGNAM In ch. 297 we read that Numenius praised Plato for introducing two world-souls, a beneficent one and *malignam alteram, scilicet siluam* (299.16). I do not think that this forces

us to assume a Numenian influence in ch. 172. Calcidius has taught that fate as an essence is the world-soul. It is quite natural that, Stoic doctrine looking upon fate as the cause of evil, he suggests the possibility that this world-soul is evil. Moreover, in ch. 297 the *anima maligna* is matter and this is not mentioned in the present chapter.

Stoic doctrine leads to a dead end. It is impossible to ascribe everything, both good and evil, to fate. Now a short and somewhat over-ingenious argument in ch. 173 proves, of which class fate is the origin. QVOD VELIT The contents of this paragraph are a revised version of an argument against God's providential care for our world which according to Lactantius was devised by Epicurus: . . . *argumentum illud Epicuri. Deus, inquit, aut uult tollere mala et non potest, aut potest et non uult, aut neque uult neque potest, aut et uult et potest. Si uult et non potest, inbecillus est, quod in deum non cadit; si potest et non uult, inuidus, quod aequè alienum est a deo; si neque uult neque potest, et inuidus est et inbecillus est ideoque nec deus; si et uult et potest, quod solum deo conuenit, unde ergo sunt mala aut cur illa non tollit?* (Lactantius, *De ira dei* 13.20-21 = Usener, *Epicurea* fr. 374). Epicurus' argument was also eagerly appropriated by Sceptic philosophy: εἰ δὲ τινῶν προνοεῖ, διὰ τί τῶνδε μὲν προνοεῖ τῶνδε δὲ οὐ; ἤτοι γὰρ καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν, ἢ βούλεται μὲν οὐ δύναται δέ, ἢ δύναται μὲν οὐ βούλεται δέ, ἢ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε δύναται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καὶ ἡβούλετο καὶ ἡδύνατο, πάντων ἂν προυνόει· οὐ προνοεῖ δὲ πάντων διὰ τὰ προειρημένα· οὐκ ἄρα καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλεται μὲν οὐ δύναται δέ, ἀσθενέστερός ἐστι τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν οὐ δύναται προνοεῖν ὧν οὐ προνοεῖ· ἐστὶ δὲ παρὰ τὴν θεοῦ ἐπίνοιαν τὸ ἀσθενέστερον εἶναι τινος αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δύναται μὲν πάντων προνοεῖν, οὐ βούλεται δέ, βάσκανος ἂν εἶναι νομισθεῖη. εἰ δὲ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε δύναται, καὶ βάσκανός ἐστι καὶ ἀσθενής, ὅπερ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ ἀσεβοῦντων ἐστίν. οὐκ ἄρα προνοεῖ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ὁ θεός. (Sextus Empir., *Pyrrh. hyp.* III 10-11). Similar ideas can be found in Max. Tyr. 38, 6d and Min. Felix, *Oct.* XII 2. Of course Calcidius' use of this argument is diametrically opposed to the intention of both Epicurus and the Sceptics.

BONORVM OMNIVM, NEC MALORVM Although this conclusion only has value as a confutation of Stoic doctrine and as such cannot be regarded as the Platonic view stated by Calcidius, it is not wholly alien to the latter, in which fate ranks highly, as we have seen in the first part of the *tractatus*.

b) *the stars are not responsible for evil*

[174] So whence are evils? They consider the movement of the stars as the cause. But whence is this very motion? And is it according to or against the wishes of the stars, that this motion is such that from the same motion both good and evil result? If it is according to their will, the stars are living beings, moving after a plan; if against their will, they do not act at all.

Certainly either all stars are divine and good and do not do any evil, or some are wicked. But to what extent is it appropriate that there are wicked stars in that holy place full of goodness? And as all stars are full of heavenly wisdom, and badness, as we know, is born from insanity, to what extent is it appropriate to say that stars are wicked? Unless perhaps—which it is forbidden to do—we have to assume that the same stars are sometimes good, sometimes evil and therefore grant favors and injuries indiscriminately; but this is absurd, to think that a heavenly substance endowed with one and the same nature is not the same in all stars, but that most, as it were, degenerate from their own nature. “But surely the stars suffer this against their will.” And which is that necessity, so strong, that it forces them to offend against their will? Is this a divine or a wicked soul?

MOTVM STELLARVM Both Waszink (*Praefatio* p. LIX, *Studien* p. 22, note 2) and van Winden (*o.c.* p. 115) are very positive in linking this chapter with ch. 298. Indeed, they claim a fundamental resemblance to that chapter. I cannot subscribe to their opinion. As this is rather important, because it implies the possibility of a Numenian background, it is necessary to go further into this matter.

First we need a short summary of ch. 297. In that chapter Calcidius says that, according to the Stoa, matter is neither bad nor good. If asked: *unde igitur mala?*, they blame a certain *peruersitas*, whatever that may be. However, they fail to explain the origin of this *peruersitas*, God being good and matter neutral. Pythagoras and Plato have a better insight into this problem, as they hold matter to be bad. In this way, as is explained at the start of ch. 298, good can be ascribed to God, evil to matter. The next sentence is the crucial one: *Qua ratione intellegi datur Stoicos frustra causari nescio quam peruersitatem, cum quae proueniunt ex motu stellarum prouenire dicant.* Van Winden translates as fol-

lows: 'And thus we understand why the Stoics vainly put the blame on a certain 'perversity', *when* (my italics, d.B.) they say that things happen by virtue of the stars'. In my opinion the rendering of *cum* by *when* is incorrect. Grammatically it is possible to explain the subjunctive *dicant* as due to the fact that in *oratio obliqua* a subordinate clause always takes the subjunctive. But I think that we should take *cum* in a causal sense: *because*. Before explaining this, I first quote van Winden's remarks, which agree entirely with his rendering of *cum*: "QVA RATIONE From the clause *cum* . . . *dicantur* it seems that, to the Stoics, the 'perversity' mentioned is produced by the movement of the stars. This is confirmed by a passage in the treatise on fate: *Unde ergo mala? Motum stellarum causantur. Sed ipse motus unde?* (par. 174). This is precisely the same thought met with in par. 297. Numenius shows that, since the stars themselves consist of matter, it is quite useless to appeal to their perversity without indicating its basis".¹ Van Winden—and Waszink seems to agree with him—thinks that somehow a special bad influence is allotted to the stars in Stoic doctrine as reported by Calcidius. But, as I see it, the train of thought at the start of ch. 298 is quite different. In the first sentence of that chapter Calcidius says that evil is due to matter. Therefore (*qua ratione*) the Stoics' accusation of *peruersitas*, whatever that may be (*nescio quam peruersitatem*) is of no avail (*frustra*), because they also say, that all events—good and evil—are due to the stars. But the stars are corporeal (*Stellae corpora sunt*) and this is due to matter (*omnium corporum silua nutrix*), which, as Plato has so rightly taught us, is bad. So after all evil is the result not of that mysterious *peruersitas*, but simply of matter.

Thus the argument is meant to show that the Stoa is wrong in introducing the unknown *peruersitas* as the source of evil, wrong because of the Stoics' own tenet of the influence of the stars, which according to Platonic doctrine owe their corporeality to matter, and matter is evil. The conjunction *cum* has to be taken in a causal sense with special reference to *frustra*: the Stoic accusation is *vain, because* . . . So van Winden is wrong in suggesting, "that, to the Stoics, the 'perversity' mentioned is produced by the movement of the stars". On the contrary, the vague 'perversity' is rejected by a reference to the dominating influence of the stars.

¹ Van Winden, *o.c.* 115.

Let us now turn to ch. 174. VNDE ERGO MALA? It is important to follow Calcidius' line of thought carefully. The main subject is evil, for which the Stoa is seeking a cause. First fate (εἰμαρμένη) is blamed: it is the cause of evil, simply because it is the cause of everything, whether good or bad. But in ch. 173 Calcidius shows, that it is impossible to allot evil to fate. So the problem is still unsolved. The Stoics now play a second trump. They blame the *motus stellarum*. This is the source of evil, not for some mysterious reason, but again simply because this movement is source of everything, both good and bad: *talis, ut ex eodem motu et mala proueniant et bona*. Exactly as in the case of fate (201.10-11, see above p. 73) it is suddenly stated that not only bad things are caused by the stars, but good things as well. Indeed the only reason why one can ascribe evil to the stars is the fact that everything takes place through their influence. If van Winden would be right in his opinion that both in ch. 174 and in ch. 298 the Stoa is said to ascribe a special evil influence to the stars, the agreement of these chapters would indeed be remarkable and as ch. 298 represents Numenian doctrine, in ch. 174, too, Numenius would have to be considered as the *auctor intellectualis*. But the only similarity is the fact, that in both chapters the Stoa is said to teach that everything—good and evil—is dependent on the stars. This is not at all remarkable, indeed it is quite normal Stoic doctrine, so the parallel between ch. 174 and 298 is not remarkable either. Moreover, there is even a notable difference. In ch. 298 the stars' corporeality is stressed and said to be due to evil matter, but in ch. 174 no such blemish is found, on the contrary: the stars are expressly said to be holy, heavenly and wise. In virtue of all this I think no Numenian influence can be traced in the present chapters.

Astrology plays an important part in Stoic doctrine. Of the main Stoics only Panaetius was opposed to it. The introduction of astrology was supported by the theory of a συμπάθεια τῶν ὄλων and by the ideas about εἰμαρμένη. Pohlenz says: "...es ist auch kein Zufall, dass in der Antike sofort die orientalische Astrologie einen Bund mit der Heimarmenelehre der Stoa schloss. Chrysipp selbst hat sich bei seinen Untersuchungen über die Heimarmene ausdrücklich auf die chaldäische Astrologie berufen und wollte für sie die logische Begründung geben".¹ Indeed astrology so thoroughly invaded the doctrine of εἰμαρμένη, that it became

¹ Pohlenz, *o.c.* 107.

part and parcel with it. Nemesius, when arguing against the Stoic εἰμαρμένη, starts the chapter in question thus: Οἱ τῇ περιφορᾷ τῶν ἀστρῶν τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων πάντων ἐπιγράφοντες . . . (c. 35 p. 289 Mathaei). The possibility and usefulness of astrology is accepted by Calcidius: *recteque et rationabiliter mathematicus originem captabit instituendi actus ex prosperitate siderum atque signorum, ut, si hoc factum erit, proueniat illud*. (191.9-11). That does not mean, however, that the stars have to be regarded as causes; they are simply signs: *intellegi datur non stellas facere quae proueniunt, sed futura praenuntiare* (168.15-16). Similar thoughts are found in Origen's comments on *Genesis* 1. 14, reported by Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* VI 11 and in the treatise of Plotinus, to which Waszink refers. At the start of that treatise Plotinus declares straightaway: ἡ τῶν ἀστρῶν φορὰ σημαίνει περὶ ἕκαστον τὰ ἐσόμενα, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὴ πάντα ποιεῖ. (*Enn.* II 3.1). But whereas Calcidius confines himself to a few remarks, Plotinus discusses the problem thoroughly and in great detail. In the first chapters of *Enn.* II 3, however, there are a few not unimportant parallels, as can be seen in Waszink's notes. The most striking of these perhaps is the one between ἐν θείῳ τόπῳ ἰδρυμένα (par. 2) and *in illo sancto et pleno bonitatis loco* (202.6).

AVT QVAEDAM MALEFICAE The third possibility (*aut omnes maleficae*) is not stated. This is easily understood, for it would imply that only evil is caused by the stars, which idea, as I have explained, is not held by the Stoa. For the rest Calcidius is hinting at the astrological doctrine, that some of the stars, or rather planets, are beneficent, some maleficent. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* V 29 says: τῶν δὲ ἀστέρων ἐνίους μὲν ἀγαθοποιούς εἶναι λέγουσιν, ἐνίους δὲ κακοποιούς, τινὰς δὲ καὶ κοινούς, οἷον ἀγαθοποιούς μὲν τὸν τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης, κακοποιούς δὲ τὸν τοῦ Ἄρεως καὶ Κρόνου, ἐπίκοινον δὲ τὸν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ, ἐπεὶ περ μετὰ μὲν ἀγαθοποιῶν ἀγαθοποιός, μετὰ δὲ κακοποιῶν κακοποιός.¹ SIDERA PLENA SAPIENTIAE A similar view is held by Plato: τὸν τε εἰρημένον ἐν τοῖς ἀστροῖς νοῦν τῶν ὄντων (*Leg.* 967 d 8); cf. also *Epinomis* 982 c 6: νοῦν ἔχειν ἀστρα τε καὶ σύμπασαν ταύτην τὴν διαφορέαν. But it is also a Stoic idea: Ζήνων τὸν ἥλιόν φησι καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν

¹ Cf. Bardesanes ap. Euseb., *Praep. Ev.* VI 10, 337.22-24 Mras: καὶ οὐτὲ οἱ ἀγαθοποιοὶ τῶν ἀστέρων κεκωλύκασιν τοὺς μὴ μαιφονεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀθεμιτογαμεῖν οὐτὲ οἱ κακοποιοὶ ἠνάγκασαν τοὺς Βραχμᾶνας κακουργεῖν. Macrobius, *Comm.* I 19, 20 sqq. also deals with this question.

ἕκαστον εἶναι νοερὸν καὶ φρόνιμον (SVF I 120).¹ MALITIAM EX DEMENTIA The Stoa is reproved by virtue of her own tenets. The background of this argument is Stoic intellectualism in the field of ethics: μία μὲν ἀρετὴ γίνοιτο ἄν, ἡ ἐπιστήμη, μία δὲ ὡσαύτως ἡ κακία, προσαγορευομένη καὶ ἥδε ποτὲ μὲν ἄγνοια, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη (SVF III 256); τῆς ἀφροσύνης, ἣν μόνην φασὶν εἶναι κακὸν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (SVF III 79). Although the way in which Calcidius is reasoning is not without subtlety, beating the Stoics with their own weapons, I can hardly imagine Numenius arguing in such a cool manner. As Pohlenz says, the problem of evil was very important for him² and, as can be seen in ch. 297, he took matter to be the origin of evil. Of this we find no trace in this chapter. NISI FORTE This is quite similar to the refutation of fate as a *mixta substantia* in ch. 172 (201.15-19). INTERDVM...INTERDVM This, too, is an astrological theory, as is shown by the immediate sequel of the text just quoted from Sextus: ἄλλοι δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀστέρας κατ' ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην σχέσιν ὅτε μὲν ἀγαθοποιούς, ὅτε δὲ κακοποιούς ὑπάρχειν νομίζουσιν (*adv. Math.* V 30). INVITAE cf. Plotinus *Enn.* II 3, 3: 'Ἄλλ' οὐχ ἐκόντες ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ἡναγκασμένοι τοῖς τόποις καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν. Plotinus' reaction is very different, though: he goes on to show the impossibility of some astrological theories and ideas. DIVINA ANIMA AN MALIGNA As in ch. 172 (201.13) the mentioning of *anima maligna* might be regarded as a Numenianum. But this is not necessary. I think Calcidius, as he does more often, has abridged the argument. We must bear in mind that the motions of the stars and planets are in fact the circles and tracks in the World-Soul,³ as is explained in the Timaeus. If the stars by their movement involuntarily cause evil, they are constrained by some mysterious force. But the movement is due to the World-Soul, which is good or even divine. Are we then to suppose that the World-Soul is bad or to assume the workings of a bad World-Soul in the heavenly spheres? To sum up: in my opinion the two questions, which are put after the mentioning of the constraint put on the stars, are ironical and meant to show the impossibility of this way out.

¹ Cf. Firmicus Maternus, *Math.* I 5.7: *Habent enim stellae proprium sensum diuinamque prudentiam.*

² Pohlenz, *o.c.* p. 387-388.

³ In the above-mentioned treatise Plotinus has this to say about the World-Soul: ψυχῆς δὲ τὸ πᾶν τόδε διοικούσης (ch. 13).

Before dealing with the contents of ch. 175 something must first be said about the tone of that chapter.

Calcidius has started his defence against the attacks of Stoic theories calmly, even on a friendly note. He seems to feel sympathy for the Stoic doctrine of διαστροφή. But the last chapters show a much less friendly tone. Irony is introduced. This tendency now culminates in a definite sarcastic scorn. Calcidius seems to lose patience. This also comes to light in a shortening of the argument, which I think is traceable here, as at the end of the preceding chapter.

c) *refutation of some other pretended causes of evil*

[175 a] Or perhaps is there a certain 'Reason', as they (*viz.*, the Stoics) say, by which all things happen which are done at present and by which all future events will take place? But surely it is a monstrosity to say that evils take place by reason, evils of which it will be much more true to state that they take place without reason; it (?) is unfair or even arbitrary. But whence is that inevitable series of causes to receive its origin, if our merits have not previously taken any direction whatever?

RATIO Without any doubt this stands for the Stoic Logos. The intention of the last part of the refutation of Stoic objections is to criticize a few important Stoic terms and statements in the domain of fate; thus ch. 172 and 173 concern εἰμαρμένῃ, ch. 174 speaks about the φορὰ ἄστροων. The present chapter deals with λόγος and the εἰρμός αἰτιῶν, another aspect of fate. Now I suppose that the latter two notions (and perhaps some more) were to have been explained on the same scale and possibly with comparable arguments as the former two.¹ But instead these ideas are only just glanced at, because Calcidius' impatience causes him to abridge the source used by him. Only five lines are devoted to this matter, for at l. 9 he starts the conclusion of the whole of ch. 160-175. NVLLA RATIONE cf. the remark in the preceding chapter *malitiam porro sciamus ex dementia nasci*. Again this is quite a valid argument against Stoic doctrine. Having conceived the optimistic idea of a guidance of the universe by reason, the Stoa had a lot of trouble

¹ I certainly do not think that the start of ch. 175 merely continues ch. 174, *an uero ratio* introducing a third possibility along with *diuina anima an maligna*. *An uero* puts *ratio* against *motum stellarum* at the start of ch. 174.

in trying to find answers to the objections of those who pointed to the many evils in our world.

INIQVVS In my opinion the cohesion of the text is very obscure here. Waszink, agreeing with Fabricius, notes that the subject of this sentence is *motus stellarum*. Grammatically this is of course possible. Besides, Waszink could point to such texts as Nemesis ch. 35 p. 290 Matth.: "Ἀδικοὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀστέρες, τοὺς μὲν μοιχοὺς, τοὺς δὲ φονέας ἀπεργαζόμενοι. Yet I find this solution rather unsatisfactory. The *motus stellarum* has not been mentioned directly since the very start of ch. 174. But it has not been dealt with indirectly either, for in the rest of ch. 174 attention is directed to the stars themselves rather than to their motion. Add to this that, as far as I can see, the first part of the present chapter deals with λόγος. This, however, does not solve the problem, because the feminine *ratio* would have required *iniqua*. There are two possibilities. Either there is something wrong with the text and we have to assume a lacuna, or Calcidius has made a mistake. The first possibility is not very attractive, but the second, though not giving cause for great enthusiasm, is quite reasonable. We have discovered more mistakes and inexcusable abridgments. Perhaps the present case belongs to the latter class; Calcidius, who wants to hurry on, abbreviates the argument and then forgets that an adjective, which in the Greek text is masculine, because it refers to λόγος, ought in the Latin version to have the feminine gender, because λόγος has been translated by *ratio*.¹

SERIES CAVSARVM INEVITABILIS One of the Stoic definitions of fate was to call it a εἰρμός αἰτιῶν ἀπαράβατος (SVF II 917 and 918). The expression *series causarum* has already been used in ch. 144 (183.8-9). The connection between the sentence *series uero etc.* and the preceding one (*Iniquus est etc.*) is again very obscure. If Waszink is right in taking the last-mentioned statement to refer to the *motus stellarum*, there is quite a remarkable parallel in Eusebius: τὴν εἰμαρμένην εἰρμόν τινα αἰτιῶν εἶναι φασιν ἀπ' αἰῶνος ἀπαράβατως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἐκ τῆς τῶν οὐρανίων ἄστρων φορᾶς καθήκοντα. (*Praep. Ev.* VI 6, 309.26-28 Mras). But although this illustration is interesting, it does not at all elucidate the obscure abruptness with which the chain of causes is introduced in the present text. For how are we to interpret *illa*? We might take this pronoun

¹ For other abridgements by Calcidius cf. Waszink, *Studien* p. 10, 44, 66.

to mean 'the well-known', 'the famous'. But this is not convincing, for such a meaning could only have a very sarcastic connotation, and if Calcidius wanted to be sarcastic, the use of *iste* would have been normal. The other possibility is to take *illa* as an anaphoron, which is quite well possible according to Leumann-Hofmann par. 105c. In this case *ille* might be the translation of οὗτος, which in the Greek source, followed by Calcidius, would refer to a preceding sentence or argument, left out by Calcidius in his abbreviation. EXORDIVM NISI PRIVS This question is a very apt illustration of the difference between Platonic and Aristotelian criticism. Alexander Aphr. in the passage, from which Waszink quotes, is complaining that the chain of causes has no first cause, which is impossible: πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον τὸ λέγειν ἐπ' ἄπειρον εἶναι τὰ αἷτια καὶ τὸν εἰρμὸν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπισύνδεσιν ὥς μήτε πρῶτον τι εἶναι μήτε ἔσχατον; (ch. 25, 196.1-3). This is of course a typically Peripatetic question, to be expected in this case. Calcidius' question is wholly different. It is completely in accordance with the doctrine of *meriti praecessio*, which is expounded in ch. 150 *sqq.* and which has a Platonic character.

My notes to this paragraph imply a punctuation of lines 6 and 7 which is different from Waszink's, *viz.*, a semicolon behind *ratione* and a full stop behind *libidinosus*.

7. CONCLUSION

[175 b] But who could bear that beside their other impious statements and thoughts also God's providence is removed by this assertion of theirs and at the same time all divinity is annihilated? For what will God do, if all things will happen according to this affirmation of clever men and might rush on by a vehement impetus according to the instigation of necessity? Yet this idle presumption will make defence easy for the guilty, to whom it will be allowed not to condemn the perversity of their own spirit, but to complain of the violence of fate; it makes the vows of good people to lead a praiseworthy life and their ardour for intelligence more inactive; therefore we have to dismiss a kind of men grown from cunning and falsity, who, as is their own opinion, were born under an unfavourable fate, because it has befallen them through fate to hold these and similar opinions.

In this short paragraph, which concludes the refutation of Stoic objections, the Stoics are for the first time attacked rather harshly

for the unhealthy consequences of their doctrine in the field of religion and human behaviour. Calcidius' remarks belong to the class of what Amand calls 'l'argumentation morale antifataliste'. At the end of his learned and voluminous book, which we have mentioned before (p. 42, note 1), Amand gives a conjectural reconstruction of this argument, which ultimately goes back to Carneades, that great opponent of the Stoa (εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐγώ he used to say). For this reconstruction Amand mainly uses six 'textes témoins', which owe their privileged position to their length and mutual resemblance. But other texts, too, supply some evidence. Amand's six special texts are taken from Philo, Alexander Aphrodisias (Περὶ εἰμαρμένης ch. 16-20), Firmicus Maternus, Eusebius (*Praep. Ev.* VI 6) and St. John Chrysostomos. If Amand's hypothesis is right, Calcidius' strong words in the present paragraph may be termed as 'Carneadic' in origin.

CETERA QVAE INRELIGIOSE This could very well refer to Carneades' sixth argument in Amand's reconstruction: "Le fatalisme astrologique anéantit la religion et ruine la piété à l'égard de la Divinité. Celui qui croit à une invincible et inexorable εἰμαρμένη ne peut que mépriser des deux impuissants à le protéger et à le secourir. Logiquement il rejettera également les prières, nécessairement inefficaces et incapables de fléchir l'εἰμαρμένη. Il n'aura que du dédain pour les rites sacrés et les cérémonies du culte des dieux".¹ PROVIDENTIA DEI TOLLITVR cf. Nemesius ch. 35 p. 289 Matth.: ἐξορίζεται δὲ καὶ πρόνοια μετὰ τῆς εὐσεβείας and Waszink's quotation from Alexander Aphrodisias. Amand considers this the 'complément normal' of the sixth argument just reported. VERSV-TORVM HOMINVM cf. Alexander's ironical picture of Stoic philosophers: φιλοσοφεῖν τινες λέγοντες καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν μετέρχεσθαι καὶ ταύτην τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων πλέον ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνοντες (ch. 7, 171.23-25). FACILIOREM . . . PIGRIORES I quote part of Carneades' fifth argument in Amand's list: "Posons l'hypothèse—*dato non concesso*—du fatalisme astral. La croyance à l'εἰμαρμένη entraîne nécessairement avec elle le relâchement de l'effort, la négligence et l'indolence. Le fataliste se laissera naturellement aller à la nonchalance et à la fainéantise dans l'exécution de tout ce qui exige fatigue et labeur. A quoi bon les peines et les sueurs pour acquérir la vertu? Le fataliste négligera cette dernière ou ne

¹ Amand, *o.c.* 584. Not too much attention should be paid to the word 'astrologique'. The argument just as much aims at fate in general.

s'y portera qu'avec mollesse, tandis qu'il s'empressera de se livrer aux joies faciles du vice".¹ I do not think this argument is the original ἀργὸς λόγος. That objection certainly tried to show that man was condemned to inactivity. Pohlenz says: "Für die Gegner lag der Einwand nahe, dass dieser starre Determinismus ein Vernunftgesetz verlange, das den Menschen zur Untätigkeit verurteile, weil das Ergebnis auf jeden Fall feststehe, sodass jedes Handeln um eines Ziels willen zwecklos werde ('Αργὸς λόγος)"². But the ἀργὸς λόγος is mainly a logical argument, whereas in my opinion the present text has an ethical character after the manner of Carneades, who, it may be noted in passing, did not like the ἀργὸς λόγος: *Carneades genus hoc totum non probabat* (Cicero, *De fato* XIV 31).

¹ Amand, *o.c.* 583.

² Pohlenz, *o.c.* 103.

C. RENEWED EXPOSITION OF THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE

1. FATE AS PART OF THE METAPHYSICAL HIERARCHY

[176] We, however, shall, obeying divine law, repeat from the beginning in the right order of succession what Plato, inspired by truth itself, at least as it seems to me, has said about fate.

In the first place all things and the world itself are held together and ruled principally by the highest God, who is the Supreme Good, beyond all essence, above appraisal and understanding, after whom all things seek, whereas himself He possesses full perfection and does not need any fellowship; to say more about Him would cause a deviation from the course of my subject.

In the second place things are ruled by providence, which has the second eminence after that supreme God and which the Greeks call *νοῦς*; this is an intelligible essence, which emulates the goodness of the highest God because of its unwearied turning to Him, from whom it has a draught of goodness, by which it is as much adorned itself as other things, which are embellished on His personal authority. Therefore this will of God, because it is a wise guardianship of all things, is called providence by mankind, which name is not used, as most people think, because of its anticipation in seeing and understanding future events, but because it is characteristic of the divine mind to understand, which is the characteristic act of mind. And God's mind is eternal: so God's mind is the eternal activity of understanding.

[177 a] This providence is followed by fate, which is divine law published by the wise harmony of intelligence for the government of all things. This is obeyed by the so-called second mind, *i.e.* the tripartite World-Soul, as has been observed above, just as if one would call law the soul of an expert law-giver.

This passage, together with ch. 188, is very important. Here we find the doctrine of fate incorporated in a hierarchical system of divine hypostases.

Many scholars¹ have already commented on these paragraphs,

¹ *E.g.* Theiler, *o.c.* 56, 260, van Winden, *o.c.* 29, 89, 111, H. J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik*, Amsterdam 1964, p. 278.

usually however in the context of their current subject and without enough attention to the connection with the rest of the *tractatus de fato*. Although one can maintain that the present exposition is a kind of *Fremdkörper* within the whole of the treatise, it should not be forgotten that right at the beginning, in ch. 143a, 146 and 147, preparations have been made. As I have shown above (p. 8, 18 and 19), in these chapters Calcidius with the help of some texts from the *Timaeus*—in part wrongly interpreted—proved the thesis that providence ranks above fate. Now these particular chapters have no parallel in pseudo-Plutarch, in contrast to some other fundamental paragraphs like 144 a and 148. The chapters 143a, 146 and 147 are an elucidation of a few statements in *Timaeus* 41 d 4 *sqq.* about the final stages of the Demiurge's creative work and his orders to the *ἑοὶ θεοί* to finish the task. It is quite clear that the position of the Demiurge is taken by providence, whereas the second gods are superseded by the World-Soul. This state of affairs should be taken into account in commenting on the present paragraph.

But first it is necessary to call to mind some of the main characteristics of Middle-Platonic theology. Middle-Platonism distinguished three metaphysical principles: God, matter and ideas. Principal witnesses to this doctrine are Albinus, *Epitome* c. 8-10 and Apuleius, *De Platone* I 5. Their testimony is confirmed by others, but it should be stressed that the ideas are, so to speak, the weakest of the three *ἀρχαί*. This can be seen very clearly in Diogenes Laertius III 69, where the ideas have disappeared altogether: *δύο δὲ τῶν πάντων ἀπέφηεν ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ὕλην*.¹ Such a development is not surprising, when we bear in mind the general increase in the interest taken in religion and theology, which is so obvious in the second century A.D. In Middle-Platonism the chief materials used to build a conception of God were found in the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*, τὸ ἀγαθόν of *Politeia*, the passage about beauty in *Symposium* 210 e 3-211 b 3, the *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος* of *Phaedrus* and other such texts. In this way the dualistic tendencies in Platonism came more into prominence, for over against the godhead matter

¹ Cf. van Winden in his comments on ch. 307: "In Calcidius the ideas are scarcely more than an addition mentioned for the sake of completeness. They are by no means an integrating part. If their occurrence in his system had not been absolutely necessary, the ideas would have been omitted". van Winden, *o.c.* 143.

makes its influence felt as a powerful principle. There is not one unanimous opinion about ὕλη however. One can say that there is a fluctuation between a highly abstract, formalized conception of matter as an almost 'neutral' force and the idea that matter is a strong power, seeking free scope for its viciousness. The former opinion is held *e.g.* by Albinus, *Epit.* 8 and Apuleius, *de Platone* I 6, whereas the latter doctrine is characteristic of Numenius. But in any case God and matter are the protagonists on the scene of our universe. This places Platonic philosophy before the following dilemma: on the one hand God has to be removed as far as possible from the influence, whether evil or 'neutral', of matter, but on the other side there is the strong religious need of a God who cares for the affairs of the world in general and humanity in particular. Platonism sought a way out of this problem by distinguishing different phases in the godhead, first tentatively, gradually with more resolution, finally with complete elaboration in Plotinus' system of hypostases. On the whole this process is characterized by the separation of a highest divine entity, free from contact with matter, from lower entities, in charge of such tasks as creation and the care of our world. Now in following this philosophical development from Albinus to Plotinus we are greatly handicapped by the fragmentary state of our material. It should be stressed, however, that this is not the only reason for the uncertainties and even contradictions in the diverse theories; the intrinsic philosophical causes for such wavering must not be overlooked. For although, as is often said (at times even with some exaggeration), Platonism tended more and more to dogmatism and had no interest in any form of scepticism, it is the theological problem itself which is causing the uncertainty. It is quite understandable that a solution was not found overnight, but that different attempts were necessary. Moreover, to my opinion, the problem is fundamentally insoluble. But a digression on this question would be out of order now.

With this background in mind, *viz.*, the use made of *Timaeus* 41 d *sqq.* at the start of the *tractatus* and the theological problem just sketched, we shall now proceed to an examination of the important details of the present paragraphs.

DIVINAM LEGEM SEQUENTES Our (Platonic) attitude towards fate is entirely different from the Stoic ideas. According to their own system the Stoics have formed their opinions under compulsion

(*haec et talia opinari fato prouenerit*, 204.2). We, however, are developing our doctrine in free and pious obedience to the divine law, which is fate. AB EXORDIO Perhaps with deliberate ambiguity. In the first place these words express that Calcidius in his recapitulation of the doctrine of fate wants to start 'right at the beginning'. But he may also have in mind another meaning: we shall now go back right to the metaphysical origin of fate. PRINCIPALITER This again may be meant ambiguously. It can have its usual meaning 'chiefly', 'in the first place', as in other passages of Calcidius, e.g. 59.18/19 and 77.15. But a more special sense is also possible, as is shown in ch. 268, where matter is said to be *subiecta corpori principaliter* (273.17). Van Winden remarks about these words: "These words, too, strike us as Aristotelian; *Phys.* 192 a 31: λέγω γὰρ ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ἐκάστῳ. Elsewhere Calcidius says: *materiam principalem et corporis primam subiectionem* (340, 13-14)".¹ In other paragraphs *principaliter* is used as contrary to *ex accidenti*.² This proves that *principaliter* can indeed have a special meaning. For the present context I venture another guess. Possibly Calcidius wants to say that the highest God rules the universe 'in a way fitting for him as First Principle'. That the highest God is indeed principle and origin of all else is stated explicitly in ch. 188: *originem quidem rerum, ex qua ceteris omnibus quae sunt substantia ministratur, esse summum et ineffabilem deum* (212.22-23). This concept is very important. As far as I know, it is not stated explicitly before Plotinus, e.g. *Enn.* III 8, 9: Δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ εἶναι πρὸ πάντων, V 5, 10: ἀπλοῦν γὰρ καὶ πρῶτον, ὅτι ἀρχή, V 2, 1: ἀρχὴ πάντων.³ Of course we must beware of any quick conclusions, but anyhow it seems to me that Waszink's remark *Non igitur est, cur Plotinum uel Porphyrium hic a Calcidio adhibitos esse sumamus* (p. 205) is somewhat too apodictic. Besides, there are other reasons for some doubt, as we shall presently see. OMNEM SVBSTANTIAM OMNEMQVE NATVRAM About this expression cf. Waszink's note *ad loc.* concerning Calcidius' love of *locutiones bimembres* and also van Winden's remarks on ch. 344.⁴ Three meanings of *substantia* are given by van Winden: (1) *substantia* = *essentia* = *natura* (οὐσία), (2) *sub-*

¹ Van Winden, *o.c.* 31 (340, 13-14 = 312.20-313.1 in Waszink's edition).

² Cf. Index C in Waszink's edition p. 419.

³ Cf. RE XXI¹ col. 562 (Schwyzer).

⁴ *O.c.* 221.

stantia = existence (ὑπόστασις) and (3) *substantia* = *substratum* (ὑποκείμενον). The first of these fits the present context. AESTIMATIONE INTELLECTVQVE In this case Calcidius' doublet is very helpful. If he had only written *intellectu melior*, three explanations would have been possible: (1) above νοῦς (the second hypostasis), (2) above *intellectus* in an active sense: higher than thinking, which is an unsuitable activity for the highest God, as in Plotinus: 'Ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ὄντι καὶ < τὸ > τοῦ νοεῖν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι (*Enn.* V 6, 6), (3) *intellectus* taken passively: unthinkable for the human brain. In view of the addition of *aestimatione*, it seems to me impossible to choose the first or second meaning. Besides, the idea that God cannot be known or at least is difficult to know, is quite common already in Middle-Platonism. Ultimate authority for this view was found in Plato's famous words τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν (*Tim.* 28 c 3-5). However, we should not discard the possibility that actually the first or second sense was meant in Calcidius' source and that Calcidius has misrepresented this by his love of double expressions. In that case there would be a remarkable agreement with the words which Waszink quotes from Plotinus' essay Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων (*Enn.* V 1). In the context of the description τάχαθὼν καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας (V 1, 8) the word νοῦς refers to the second hypostasis.¹ The following descriptions of the *summus deus* are all quite normal, as can be seen in Waszink's notes. This also seems to be the case for the expression NVLLIVS SOCIETATIS INDIGVVS. It is easy to understand that God in his perfection is not in need of anything. He is ἀπροσδεής. But the addition of the word *societatis* is intriguing. It somehow reminds one of μοναχός, a predicate which Plotinus confers upon τὸ ἓν (*Enn.* VI 8, 7). Indeed, as Waszink notes, τὸ ἓν is never directly mentioned by Calcidius. But it is quite possible, that *nullius societatis indiguus* at least comes quite near to that title (cf. also page 131, note 1). QVEM NOYN This is a very difficult, though most interesting, statement. In addition to the identification of νοῦς and *providentia*, the discussion of which we shall postpone for a moment, the most remarkable aspect of this relative clause is the evident implication that only the second hypostasis is called νοῦς and that the highest principle has to be

¹ For this description of the highest God cf. J. Whittaker, 'Ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας, *Vig. Christ.* 23 (1969) p. 91-104.

raised even above this stage. In Albinus' *Epitome* we find such an idea tentatively suggested at the start of ch. 10, 2: 'Ἐπεὶ δὲ ψυχῆς νοῦς ἀμείνων, νοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἐν δυνάμει ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν πάντα νοῶν καὶ ἅμα καὶ αἰεὶ, τούτου δὲ καλλίων ὁ αἷτιος τούτου καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτων ὑφέστηκεν, οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος θεός, αἷτιος ὑπάρχων τοῦ αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖν τῷ νῷ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ. As can be seen, Albinus is not speaking with strong resolution. And although there is no uniformity in Numenius' thought—and neither in its interpretation by scholars—in any case it is clear that he, too, is not forcing a breakthrough. He still calls the first God νοῦς, albeit placed on a higher level than the second hypostasis, as is shown by fr. 26: ὧ ἄνθρωποι, ὃν τοπάζετε ὑμεῖς νοῦν, οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτος, ἀλλ' ἕτερος πρὸ τούτου νοῦς πρεσβύτερος καὶ θεϊότερος.

The first time νοῦς is mentioned as the second hypostasis only is in Plotinus,¹ whose name is thus again linked with a definite characteristic of the present chapter.

But all this is in sharp contrast to the main statement of this sentence, *viz.*, the identification of νοῦς and providence. These were certainly not identified by Plotinus.² In fact this rather seems an indication of Numenian influence. In his translation of the *Timaeus* Calcidius renders τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα (47 e 4) by *quae providae mentis intellectus instituit* (45. 9/10).

Commenting on this particular phrase in ch. 268 he explains the quoted expression by saying *quae provida mens dei contulerit* (273.11) and in the next chapters he speaks about *consulta providae mentis* (274.10). In his comments on ch. 269 van Winden³ points to the resemblance with the 'Numenian' passage 295-299. Indeed *e.g.* in ch. 298 we find *providentiae consultis salubribus* (300.14). According to van Winden the conception of providence in the treatise *De silva* has to be linked with ch. 176 and 188,⁴ the passages

¹ "Calcidius . . . speaks of the second God as νοῦς and thus seems to favour Plotinus, who beyond the νοῦς postulates a higher supranoeitic God". Van Winden, *o.c.* III.

² For Plotinus' opinion cf. *Enn.* III 2 and 3 and the explanation of Bréhier in his *Notice* to III 2 and 3, vol. III of his edition, p. 17-23.

³ *o.c.* 34.

⁴ "Whenever Calcidius speaks of *mens dei* or *mens provida dei*, his concept of Providence should be borne in mind. It is generally known that the concept of Providence was fully elaborated by the Stoics. There is, however, no need to think of a direct influence of the Stoa on Calcidius; from what follows it will be evident that one should think rather of Numenius. Numenius, like Calcidius, distinguished three phases in the Godhead". *o.c.* 30. The last remark is not very convincing.

we are considering. Moreover, Numenius being responsible for the conception of providence in *De silua*, the conclusion for the present chapter is ready to hand.

I shall not deny that all this is quite possible and reasonable. Yet I am not entirely convinced. In the first place *providentia* in *De silua* is continually used in opposition to *necessitas* etc. Further, providence in *De silua* is not clearly distinguished from the highest God. In a highly pregnant phrase at the end of ch. 297 (i.e. right in the middle of the Numenian passage) we even find: *Porro ex deo et silua factus est iste mundus* (300.3). My third objection is inherent in a different view on the whole problem, which I shall try to defend a little further on.

AEMVLAE The idea that the second God emulates the first was no doubt held by Numenius. Apart from passages where it is said implicitly, it is stated very clearly in fr. 25: ὁ μὲν πρῶτος θεὸς αὐτοάγαθον· ὁ δὲ τούτου μιμητὴς δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός. But in a different way Plotinus, too, has this idea: ὧν ὁλον ἐκεῖνος τὰ ὅμοια ποιεῖ (*Enn.* V 2,1). CONVERSIONEM Undoubtedly this word stands for ἐπιστροφή, which notion is quite characteristic of Plotinus. In the domain of the hypostases e.g.: πῶς οὖν νοῦν γεννᾷ (τὸ ἐν); Ἡ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐώρα· ἡ δὲ θρασις αὕτη νοῦς. (*Enn.* V 1, 7)¹ and τὸ δὲ γενόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς οὕτως. (V 2, 1) Albinus has a comparable idea; about the highest God he says: τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἐπεγείρας καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέψας (*Epit.* 10.3). But, as can be seen, in his case the 'turning towards' emanates from the supreme principle with a lower entity as its object. HAVSTVS This clearly refers to the theory of emanation, so well-known from the system of Plotinus. But it seems to belong to Numenius' theory too: 'Il secondo *emana* dal primo, senza però che il primo depauperi se stesso, e senza essere *altro* dal primo. È, in una parola, l'attività emanante dal primo. *Emanatismo*, dunque, proprio nel senso plotiniano del termine: il secondo dio—come in Plotino l'Intelletto—emana dall' uno, così come dal fuoco emana un'altra attività che è il calore'.² Indeed fr. 29 says about the Demiurge: πέφονται ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸς μετουσίᾳ τοῦ πρώτου τε καὶ μόνου. Another interesting fragment is 23, where Numenius says: τὰ δὲ θεῖα ἐστίν, οἷα μεταδο-

¹ For the meaning of this text cf. H. R. Schwyzer, *Nachlese zur indirekten Überlieferung des Plotin-Textes* in *Mus. Helv.* 26 (1969) p. 260.

² G. Martano, *Numenio d'Apamea*, Naples 1960, p. 39.

θέντα, ἐνθένδ' ἐκεῖθι γεγενημένα, ἐνθένδε τε οὐκ ἀπελήλυθε. καὶ κεῖθι γεγόμενα τὸν μὲν ὤνησε, τὸν δ' οὐκ ἐβλάψε, καὶ προσώνησε τῇ περὶ ὧν ἡπίστατο ἀναμνήσει. Commenting on this text Dodds speaks about 'the principle of "undiminished giving", which implies non-reciprocating causal relations, so that the cause is never dissipated among its effects—τὰ δὲ θεῖα . . . οὐκ ἀπελήλυθε (f. 23). This is cardinal for Plotinus, who like Numenius uses the illustration of communicated knowledge'.¹ A full discussion of this problem is out of place here, but we can in any case conclude that emanation finds its place in Numenius' system too. The next words QVO TAM IPSA ORNATVR QVAM CETERA QVAE IPSO AVCTORE HONESTANTVR, however, have a much more Plotinian ring. Indeed the possibility of a Numenian background is not to be ruled out. Albinus has a comparable idea, as Waszink's notes show. But one is reminded rather strongly of Plotinus, by whom νοῦς is called ἀγαλμα τὸ πρῶτον ἐκφανέν (*Enn.* V 1, 6). Another predicate given to νοῦς is ἀγαθοειδής (V 6, 4)². The goodness which is reflected in the νοῦς, is passed on to lower entities: ὃ τι οὖν ἐγέννα, ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ δυνάμεως ἦν καὶ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀγαθοειδῶν, ἀγαθὸν ποικίλον (*Enn.* VI 7, 15).

IPSO AVCTORE If this is right *ipso* can only refer to the highest God. Now *auctor* may well be the Latin rendering of αἰτίας: Calcidius translates ὁ δ' ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων (29 a 6) by *ille auctor maximus* (21.21/22). If this is so, the words in Albinus' *Epitome* 10.3, quoted by Waszink, would have even greater resemblance to Calcidius. It is not likely that *ipso* should refer to *providentia*. The grammatical difficulty involved could perhaps be ascribed to a blunder by Calcidius, but there does not seem to be any other argument. For it is impossible to illustrate this point of view by referring to *praestantissimum quidem animal id esse quod ceteris caelestibus animalibus substantiam ex se largiatur* (214.24-25). In a highly interesting paper Calcidius' *Erklärung von Tim.* 41 e 2-42 a 4 (*Mus. Helv.* 26, p. 271-280) Waszink has shown that by *praestantissimum animal* Calcidius means the World-Soul and not Providence. Besides, a much clearer parallel to *cetera quae ipso auctore*

¹ Dodds in his article *Numenius and Ammonius*, *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique* Tome V, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 23.

² It should be noted that the expression τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαλαί, which Waszink quotes from Numenius fr. 11, is used about the highest Being, not the second god.

honestantur can be found in ch. 188: *originem quidem rerum, ex qua ceteris omnibus quae sunt substantia ministratur* (212.22-23).

HANC IGITUR DEI VOLVNTATEM The introduction of this fresh notion is rather sudden, but Calcidius evidently sees no problems here. To him this new idea is closely linked with the foregoing statements, as the words *hanc igitur* show. God's goodness, which was hinted at just now (*hanc*) because of its blessings (*igitur*) is called providence. But this does not alter the fact that the introduction of God's will still poses its problems to us. In his notes Waszink refers to some statements in ch. 9 of pseudo-Plutarch's *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*, to which the first part of *De fato* provided so many parallels. In that chapter the author exposes his curious doctrine of three providences, which in a somewhat different form is also found in Apuleius' *De Platone* and Nemeseus.

The three providences form a hierarchy, in which *εἰμαρμένη* also finds its place. But there is a being which is even higher than this hierarchy, as is said in ps.-Plutarch 573 b: ἡ δὲ ἀνωτάτω πρόνοια πρεσβύτατον ἀπάντων, πλὴν οὐπὲρ ἐστὶν εἴτε βούλησις εἴτε νόησις εἴτε καὶ ἐκάτερον. So from the text of *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* we can build the following hierarchical order: (1) πρῶτος θεός (2) πρώτη πρόνοια (3) δευτέρα πρόνοια (of the δεύτεροι θεοί) and εἰμαρμένη (4) τρίτη πρόνοια (δαίμονες). Calcidius' order is as follows: (1) *summus deus*, (2) *secundus deus*: νοῦς or *providentia*, (3) *fatum* and *secunda mens* or World-Soul, (4) (among others) the *daemones* (ch. 188, 213.4). The similarity is striking. The greatest difference lies in the third grade, where *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* puts the second gods and Calcidius the World-Soul. In my comments on ch. 146 and 147 (above, p. 19) I have pointed out that in Calcidius' system the World-Soul takes the place of the younger gods of the *Timaeus*. This seems to account for this dissimilarity. The other big difference is of course the fact that Calcidius does not speak about *three* providences. For him there is only one providence, which comes second in the order. This difference is made smaller by pseudo-Plutarch's statement, that the πρόνοια of the highest God deserves that name in the most exact and proper sense: τριττῆς τοίνυν τῆς προνοίας θεωρουμένης, κυριώτατα δὲ καὶ μάλιστα τῆς πρώτης λεγομένης (573 a). These considerations induce me to put forward the following hypothesis: In the *tractatus de fato* Calcidius (or his source) adheres to some fundamental views, which can be found in pseudo-Plutarch's *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*. But when it comes to placing *fatum* in a

hierarchical order he disagrees with *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*, because he wants to harmonize his doctrine with another hierarchy, which greatly resembles Plotinus. The 'original' hierarchy leaves its traces however, e.g. when Calcidius calls providence God's will.

VOLUNTATEM For the problem of God's will cf. E. Benz, *Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der Abendländischen Willensmetaphysik*, Stuttgart 1932. Benz compares the intellectualistic theology of the Greek world with the voluntaristic speculation by Latin authors. In the chapter devoted to Calcidius¹ he speaks with some enthusiasm about Calcidius' views: "Die genannten Beispiele aus Chalcidius zeigen, dass sich durch die ganze Übersetzung des Timaeus hindurch die Tendenz einer voluntaristischen Deutung und Umformung des intellektualistischen Gottesgedankens bemerkbar macht". Benz' arguments are not too strong, however, and this becomes very manifest when we examine a text to which he himself attaches great value: "Wohl die auffälligste Umbiegung der platonischen Schöpfungsidee ist aber folgende. Bei Plato steht: "ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ συνιστάντι πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ἐγεγένητο, μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ἐτεταλνέτο καὶ μέσον μέση συναγαγὼν προσήρμοσεν". Wieder ist es also das intelligible, nicht das voluntaristische Prinzip, das hier nach Plato am Anfang der Schöpfung steht. Chalcidius übersetzt hier glattweg: "*igitur cum pro voluntate patris cuncta rationabilis animae nasceretur, aliquanto post omne corporeum intra conseptum eius effinxit mediumque adplicans mediae modulamine apto iugabat*".

Er führt also den Ursprung der Weltseele unmittelbar auf einen Willensakt Gottes zurück, die hier ausserdem, wozu ebenfalls im griechischen Text kein Anlass vorliegt, als "Vater" erscheint. In dieser Ersetzung des platonischen Nus durch die *voluntas patris* ist die Absicht des Chalcidius—in welchem Masse sie ihm selbst bewusst war, ist schwer zu entscheiden—die Absicht einer Verbindung des griechischen und des orientalischen Gottesgedankens klar zum Ausdruck gebracht". As can be seen, Benz makes a great point of Calcidius' *pro uoluntate* for κατὰ νοῦν. But undoubtedly the latter expression merely means 'to his liking', for which *pro uoluntate* is normal Latin usage.² **SAPIENTEM TVTELAM** Cf. Apuleius, *De Platone* I 12: *ita enim definit: providentiam esse diuinam sen-*

¹ Benz, *o.c.* 343-350.

² A. E. Taylor in his commentary *ad loc.* translates κατὰ νοῦν by 'to his mind', 'as he intended'.

tentiam, conseruatricem prosperitatis eius, cuius causa tale suscipit officium. In a wholly different context in ch. 54 the word *tutela* is used to describe one of the tasks of the World-Soul: *mundi anima, quae . . . tutelam praebet inferioribus* (102.9-10). RERV OMNIVM This is not in accordance with ch. 145: *Et diuina quidem atque intelligibilia quaeque his proxima sunt secundum providentiam solam* (183.18-20). There is a striking resemblance to Nemesius, who, as Waszink's quotation shows, also spoke about πάντα τὰ ὄντα. SED QVIA Calcidius' explanation is very obscure. Within a few lines we find no less than three conceptions of providence: 1. *sapiens tutela*; this is after the manner of Apuleius, pseudo-Plutarch and Nemesius. 2. starting from the etymology of the *Latin* word: providence *foresees* future events. 3. starting from the *Greek* word: providence is thinking. The last idea seems to be final, but Calcidius makes a mess of it. Waszink's suggestion that *proprius* explains *pro-* must certainly be right. It can of course only be used as an explanation in Latin. In Greek one needs a different etymology, if πρόνοια is to be regarded as God's thinking. Such an explanation can be found in Plotinus' treatise Περὶ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ ἑνός (*Enn.* VI 8), ch. 17: "Ὡστε τὴν οὕτω διάθεσιν εἴ τις ὀνομάζοι πρόνοιαν, οὕτω νοεῖτω, ὅτι ἐστὶ πρὸ τοῦδε νοῦς τοῦ παντός ἐστώς, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ καθ' ὃν τὸ πᾶν τόδε. Εἰ μὲν οὖν νοῦς πρὸ πάντων . . . I do not suggest that Calcidius was acquainted with Plotinus' etymology, but he certainly must have found something similar, which he could not use in Latin for the simple reason that the preposition *pro* in Latin has no temporal sense. He would have been obliged to use *ante*, thus destroying the clarity of the etymology. SEQVITVR Calcidius has stressed the subordination of fate to providence right at the beginning of the *tractatus*. To him it is fundamental. LEX DIVINA cf. *diuina lex est mundi animae insinuata, salubre rerum omnium regimen* (185.1/2). OBSEQVITVR cf. *cui parent secundi dei* (184.13) and my comments on that phrase (above p. 18-19). SECVNDA MENS As we have seen, Numenius spoke about a δεύτερος νοῦς. So did the *Oracula Chaldaica*:

πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσσε πατήρ καὶ νῶ παρέδωκε
 δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον κληίζετε πᾶν γένος ἀνδρῶν (Kroll 14).

But, in the first place, both in the *Oracula Chaldaica* and in Numenius this second intellect is the second hypostasis and not the third, as in Calcidius, although it must be admitted, that in the

Oracula there is some variation, as Lewy¹ has pointed out. Sometimes the Highest Being, πατήρ, seems to be raised even above the paternal Intellect, whereas in other texts there is no such separation. Lewy also refers to Arnobius, *Adu. Nat.* II 25: *haecine est anima docta illa quam dicitis, immortalis perfecta diuina, post deum principem rerum et post mentes geminas locum optinens quartum et afluens ex crateribus uiuis?* and Apuleius, *De Platone* I 6: *primum deum esse et mentem formasque rerum et animam*. But in both these cases the World-Soul takes the fourth place and not the third. In the second place I must confess that, *pace* Theiler², I cannot find any specific influence of the *Oracula Chaldaica*. Another explication might be to assume a Plotinian influence. There are enough indications that for Plotinus the soul, at least partly, belongs to the intellectual sphere. Soul is an οὐσία νοητή (*Enn.* III 6, 6), νοητή φύσις (IV 2, 1), λόγος ἑσχατος τῶν νοητῶν (IV 6, 3), εἰκὼν τῆς νοῦ (V 1, 3). "Soul is, of Plotinus' three hypostases, the most wide-ranging and various in its activities. At the top of its range it lives on the highest level, in the world of Intellect, and with Intellect can rise in selftranscendence to union with the One . . . Its proper and most characteristic activity is discursive thinking, reasoning from premises to conclusions".³ Plotinus however never calls the Soul a second Intellect.

Perhaps the following explication, which is the simplest of all, is right. As we have seen, in the hierarchy of *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* the third place was taken by the δεύτερα πρόνοια. But in ch. 176 Calcidius has stated that providence = νοῦς or, as he says in the last

¹ H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy*, Cairo 1956, p. 321.

² Theiler, *o.c.* 259 (in his paper *Die chaldäischen Orakel und die Hymnen des Synesios*): "Der höhere νοῦς, der νοῦς πατρικός, . . . ist eine bekannte chaldäische Grösze. Er steht hier mit Gott verbunden einem niedrigeren Geist (dem νοῦς der zweiten plotinischen Hypostase) gegenüber, worauf die Seele folgt. So kann Arnobius *adv. nat.* 2, 25, nach bestimmter Orakelinterpretation, bemerken *anima . . . post deum principem rerum et post mentes geminas locum obtinens quartum*. Die Orakelworte bei Proklos *Tim.* II 61, 24 u.a. μετὰ δὴ πατρικός διανοίας ψυχὴ ἐγὼ νᾶλω und bei Proklos *Parm.* 895, 12 ἔννοιαι πατρός mochten diese Deutung stützen. Ein entsprechendes Schema ist bei Calcidius 212, 23 ff. benutzt. Es folgen sich *summus et ineffabilis deus—providentia eius secundus deus—secunda mens intellectusque—animae*". Evidently Theiler misunderstands the words *rationabiles animas* (213.3), for there cannot be any doubt that these are the *human* souls, who form no part whatsoever of the hierarchy of hypostases.

³ A. H. Armstrong, *Plotinus*, Part III of the *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 1967, p. 250.

part of that chapter, *mens*. If the conclusion is not too bold, the expression *secunda mens* could be another trace of the original hierarchy, which Calcidius has replaced by another gradation. The addition *id est anima mundi tripertita* covers this explanation quite well. It could very well be a parallel to the descriptive addition in the case of the second hypostasis: *providentia, quem Graeci noyn uocant*.

Possibly Calcidius has linked two hierarchies: 1. Highest Being—(first?) providence—*secunda mens* (=second providence?) and 2. Highest Being—νοῦς—World-Soul.

LEGVM LATORIS Waszink refers to ch. 188, where the second god is called *latores legis utriusque uitae, tam aeternae quam temporariae* (212.24-213.1). The title *lator legis* reminds of Numenius fr. 22, where the Demiurge, Numenius' second god, is called νομοθέτης. This same epitheton is awarded by Plotinus to νοῦς: οἶον νομοθέτης πρῶτος, μᾶλλον δὲ νόμος αὐτὸς τοῦ εἶναι (*Enn.* V 9, 5). In both cases the use of this title is different from Calcidius' words, in which the ultimate origin of the idea is easy to see. For the addition *tam aeternae quam temporariae* must in the end go back to the νόμους τοὺς εἰμαρμένους given by the Demiurge to the souls. These laws indeed cover both lives, as the explication given in 41 e-42 d can show. After that sketch the paragraph is summed up by διαθεσμοθετήσας δὲ πάντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα. So the Demiurge acts as a lawgiver. Perhaps Numenius fr. 22 also refers to these passages. There are some indications for this, but as a whole the fragment is rather obscure.¹

In any case Calcidius' use of *lator legis* does not prove much. Both Numenius and Plotinus use the word νομοθέτης when speaking about the second god. Although the former's use of the title is nearer to Calcidius, this is no proof. Calcidius' additional explanation

¹ fr. 22 runs as follows: "Ὡςπερ δὲ πάλιν λόγος ἐστὶ γεωργῶ πρὸς τὸν φυτεύοντα ἀναφερόμενος, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μάλιστα ἐστὶν ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς πρὸς τὸν δημιουργόν. Ὁ μὲν γε ὢν σπέρμα πάσης ψυχῆς σπείρει εἰς τὰ μεταλαγχάνοντα αὐτοῦ χρήματα σύμπαντα· ὁ νομοθέτης δὲ φυτεύει καὶ διανέμει καὶ μεταφυτεύει εἰς ἡμᾶς ἑκάστους τὰ ἐκεῖθεν προκαταβεβλημένα. Is σπέρμα predicate of ὢν or, much more likely, direct object of σπείρει? In the latter case the Highest God would shortly be titled ὁ ὢν. A. J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, Tome III, *Les doctrines de l'âme*, Paris 1953, p. 44, note 2 and 3, thinks that ὁ ὢν has a background in the Holy Scripture and in Philo. In view of this he considers the use of νομοθέτης 'un trait biblique'. Festugière refers to *James* 4, 12: εἰς ἐστὶν νομοθέτης καὶ κριτής. But the difference in context and atmosphere strikes one as rather obvious.

is based upon the paragraph of the *Timaeus*, which is the basic text for the whole *tractatus de fato*, and thus is quite natural in the context.

To sum up: In studying Calcidius' paragraphs about the meta-physical hierarchy one is especially reminded of such authors as Apuleius, Albinus, pseudo-Plutarch, Numenius and, not in the last place, Plotinus. The hierarchy of *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* seems to be revised in a way which bears a striking resemblance to the doctrine of Plotinus.

When we finally ask who can have been Calcidius' authority for these tenets, the name of Porphyry comes first to the mind. For he indeed meets all the requirements. His acquaintance with Middle-Platonism and Numenius was thorough and, as a pupil of Plotinus, he must have been very partial to the latter's theories. That he adhered to Plotinus' doctrine of the three hypostases, is obvious from his booklet *Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά*.

So Porphyry may very well have been Calcidius' direct source in these matters. This involves an awkward problem however. For in that case it does not seem possible that he also was the authority for the corresponding paragraphs in *Nemesius' Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου*, because *Nemesius* still has the doctrine of three providences. It is easy to see the importance of this problem when we consider two facts: 1. Throughout the *tractatus* there are some very remarkable resemblances to *Nemesius*. 2. It is a priori likely that Porphyry was an important authority for *Nemesius*. And indeed Dörrie¹ has proved that *Nemesius* made use of Porphyry's *Σύμμικτα ζητήματα* for the doctrine concerning the soul. Thus the difficulty which we have sketched seems insoluble.

2. FATE RULES ALL THINGS IN A DIFFERENT WAY

a) *Frequent events*

[177 b] According to this law, *i.e.* fate, all things are ruled, each according to its own nature: all heavenly phenomena, by a blessed necessity and an unchangeable perseverance, because they are near neighbours of Providence, natural phenomena by a certain frequency, because of the coming to be and passing away of all that has its origin by the law of nature. At the same time, because art and science imitate nature, the products of the arts are also frequent and are often brought forth.

¹ H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' Symmiktá Zetēmata*, Munich 1959.

What is ruled by this law, is ruled by reason and order, without violence, for everything lacking reason and order is violent; as such, it does not persist for long, because it is torn to pieces against its nature.

SECUNDVM PROPRIAM QVAEQVE NATVRAM As in the case of divine knowledge (*Quod deus sciat quidem omnia, sed unumquidque pro natura sua ipsorum sciat*, 195.2-3), this axiom is the fundamental restriction, which, as will become clear in ch. 179, also warrants human freedom.

FREQVENTER Calcidius returns to the distinctions which he has made in ch. 156. In the notes to that chapter the predominantly Aristotelian colour of this and similar tenets has already been indicated. The present statements about the domain of the *frequentia* surpass ch. 156 in clarity. Calcidius' information is brief, but adequate. It fully agrees with normal Peripatetic doctrine: Περὶ μὲν τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐνδεχόμενον ἔχουσι δύο τινὰ αἷτια, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ἡ τέχνη (Ammonius in *Arist. de Interpr.* 9, 142.5-6 Busse), οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν φυσικῶν τι, λέγω δὲ τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ, οὔτε τῶν τεχνητῶν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (Philoponus in *Anal. Priora* I 13, 152.17-18 Wallies) IMITATVR NATVRAM ARS μιμεῖται ἡ τέχνη τὴν φύσιν (Arist. *Meteor.* IV 3, 381 b 6). VIOLENTVM Both Waszink (in his note *ad loc.*) and van Winden (*o.c.* p. 36) refer to a phrase in ch. 270: *omne porro uiolentum non diu subiectum conseruat, sed facile perdit* (274.18-19). Unfortunately, van Winden in his commentary does not provide us with any further information as to the intention of this reference. Waszink suggests a Numenian influence. I fail to be impressed by the resemblance between these two texts, which is after all rather slight. In ch. 270 two types of sovereignty are distinguished, of which one is violent and tyrannical. The other kind, on the contrary, wields its power in a reasonable way. Now in such a way the intellect dominates matter. This domination is the subject of ch. 270. In the present paragraph, however, violence is set over against nature in accordance with Aristotle's adage τὸ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ταῦτόν. (*De caelo* Γ 2, 300 a 23). In view of this we have to assume that *uiolentus* has a *passive* connotation here, whereas in ch. 270 this word is used to denote an *activity*. RATIONE ORDINE AC SINE VI Although the present paragraph has a predominantly Aristotelian character, a curious Platonic parallel for this combination can be drawn: . . .

βίᾳ δὲ ἐφέροντο καὶ ἔφερον, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ὅλον κινεῖσθαι ζῶον, ἀτάκ-
τως μὲν ὅπη τύχοι προιέναι καὶ ἀλόγως . . . (*Tim.* 43 a 7-b 2). CON-
TRA NATVRAM SVAM This conclusion with its counterpart *secundum*
propriam naturam at the start gives the paragraph a fine cohesion.

b) *Digression*

[178] Thus all things separately follow their own god and, as Plato says, “the king and emperor of heaven, the head of the procession and the lofty leader, who in his winged chariot regulates and guides all things, is followed by legions of heavenly and angelic powers, distributed into eleven parts”. “For”, as he says, “only Vesta stays in her abode”, Vesta, who evidently as the World-Soul and the mind of that Soul guides the reins of starry heaven according to a law ordained by Providence. This law, which ordains by a kind of chain of consequences and successions, is, as we have often said, fate. By the winged chariot of the emperor we have to understand the sphere of the fixed stars, because it is the first in order and moving more swiftly than all other motions, as has been demonstrated, and Plato enumerates eleven parts of the army up to this point: first the sphere of the fixed stars, next the seven spheres of the planets, the ninth is the seat of aether, which is inhabited by the aethereal daemons, the tenth is airy, the eleventh has a moist nature, the twelfth is the earth, which stays immovable outside of the revolution of the cosmos.

However, this may be outside the subject, although it is in accordance with the argument which we have started, because fate is executed without violence and without any inevitable constraint in a healthy and orderly way.

This chapter poses a problem as to its intention. As Waszink notes, we should now hear something about the *peraeque dubia* or the rarities of chance and fortune. But these are postponed and the argument is interrupted. I think that the only solution of this problem can be to take the author’s own word, that it is a digression (*extra propositum*, 207.10), caused by association (*quamuis instituto sermoni concinat*, 207.10). The argument about the orderly and non-violent reign of fate has deflected Calcidius’ thoughts to the beauty of the Cosmic system, from which all violence is absent. After all, this is not too far *extra propositum*,

for the first category of things ruled by fate, which Calcidius mentioned, were *cuncta caelestia*. ANGELICARVM For this rendering of δαιμόνων cf. *angelicae naturae, quos daemones uocat* (165.1) and the exposition in ch. 132. VESTAM SCILICET For the view that Vesta has an important role in the system of our universe cf. Roscher's paragraph "Hestia in der Spekulation" in his *Ausführliches Lexikon der Griechischen und Römischen Mythologie* I² p. 2643-2646. The explanation of the quoted text from *Phaedrus*, in the sense that Vesta is the mythological name for the earth, can be found in Macrobius, *Sat.* 1.23.8: *quod autem addit μένει δὲ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνῃ significat quia haec sola, quam terram esse accipimus, manet immobilis intra domum deorum, id est intra mundum*, and also in Calcidius ch. 122: *Quare uel sic intellegendum uel aliquanto uerisimilius medietati mundi adhaerentem quiescere propterea et a Platone et a multis aliis Uestam cognominari. Denique in Phaedro idem ait: Manet enim Uesta in diuino domicilio sola* (166. 10-14). Here, however, we find the curious idea, that Vesta is the World-Soul, ruling the starry heaven. For this I have found no parallels. There is only a superficial resemblance to τὴν ἄλλην ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν, ἣν δὴ Ἑστίαν καὶ Δήμητραν ἐπονομάζουσιν ἄνθρωποι (Plotinus, *Enn.* IV 4.27), because of the wholly different context of these words.¹ IVXTA LEGEM For the World-Soul obeys the law of fate (*Huic obsequitur etc.*, 206.2 sqq.) PRIMAM APLANEM cf. Apuleius, *De dogmate Platonis* I 11: *Et esse ἀπλανέσι primum ordinem, secundum Saturno datum, Ioui tertium, Martem quartum tenere, quintum Mercurio dari, sextum Veneris esse, septimum Solis itineribus incendi, octauum metiri Lunam. Exinde elementis omnia ac principiis occupari. Ignem ante alia superiorem esse, mox aeris locum, hinc aquae proximum et tunc globum terrae in medio situm aequalem loco ac figura immobilem stare*. There is only one difference with Calcidius, who puts aether where Apuleius has fire. There are various reasons for this. Apuleius has eleven spheres, stars and planets belonging to the sphere of fire (*quattuor species . . . quarum una est ex natura ignis eiusmodi, qualem solem ac lunam uidemus ceterasque siderum stellas*). But Calcidius needs twelve spheres, because he has chosen the passage from the *Phaedrus*

¹ Cf. also Ovid *Fasti* VI 267: *Vesta eadem, quae terra* and Augustine *De civitate dei* VII 16: *Vestam quoque ipsam propterea dearum maximam putauerunt, quod ipsa sit terra*.

as his starting-point.¹ In the second place there are Calcidius' own statements in ch. 129: *Quinque regiones uel locos idem Plato esse dicit in mundo capaces animalium habentes aliquam inter se differentiam positionum ob differentiam corporum quae inhabitent eosdem locos. Summum enim esse locum ait ignis sereni, huic proximum aethereum, cuius corpus esse ignem aequae, sed aliquanto crassiorem quam est altior ille caelestis, dehinc aeris, post humectae substantiae, quam Graeci hygran usian appellant, quae humecta substantia aer est crassior, ut sit aer iste quem homines spirant, imus uero atque ultimus locus terrae* (171.21-172.7). As can be seen from Waszink's notes and quotations ad loc., the passage just quoted is inspired by the *Epinomis*, which forms such an important background for the exposition in that part of the *Commentarius*. This, besides the quotation from the *Phaedrus* at the start, emphasizes the Platonic character of the present chapter. This is illustrated by another fact. Although he does not say so explicitly, Calcidius would without doubt have agreed with Apuleius, that the stars and planets are of a fiery nature. That is the Platonic view: τοῦ μὲν οὖν θείου τὴν πλείστην ἰδέαν ἐκ πυρός ἀπηργάζετο (*Tim.* 40 a 2-3). Aristotle's view is different: *sidera autem aetherium locum obtinent* (*Fragmenta Selecta* ed. Ross p. 90).

c) Rare events and human free choice

[179] An outcome from this arrangement of affairs are the things of rare occurrence, which are partly ruled by fortune, partly happen unexpectedly and spontaneously and are said to be commanded by chance. Such things are indeed 'fatal', for they are comprised by the ordinances of fate, yet they are not by necessity violent, just as the things which are done by us; for these acts are comprised by our laws, yet they do not happen according to the laws which we use. For instance the law ordains that a traitor should be killed. Now what does this mean? Because the law *calls* the person who is penalized a traitor, is it necessary that the law *makes* him a traitor? The answer, to my

¹ Hackforth takes exception to Calcidius' interpretation: Plato's *Phaedrus* translated, with introduction and commentary by R. Hackforth, Cambridge 1952 p. 74; cf. also p. 73: "It has been too readily assumed, both in ancient and modern times, that the relation of Hestia to the rest necessarily implies some astronomical scheme or planetary system into which the number eleven (or twelve) can be fitted. To my mind there is no such necessity".

opinion, is: no, for the traitor by his own wicked mind, or rather by his insanity, bursts forth into crime, but he is punished according to the law. On the other hand there is a law that he, who has fought bravely, is to be rewarded; this the law ordains, yet the law does not make victor or victory, and still the law gives a reward. And therefore the law commands in general, to all people, what has to be done, and withholds all people from unsuitable actions; but not all people obey nor do all people perform what is commanded. This fact proves that men have a liberty to choose, though not all men have the same liberty; the consequences however, *viz.* the things fixed by law, such as punishments or rewards, are ratified by law.

[180 a] Such, to my opinion, is also the character of that heavenly law which is called fate, ordaining virtuous deeds to men and forbidding their opposites. To follow is our task, free from the yoke of fate, but praise of good actions is both according to law and to common sense and the same holds true of the opposites: lying and leading a wicked life is contained by law and it is in man's power as the precedent cause; but arranging one's life in a wicked way is man's own responsibility and therefore to be punished is completely in accordance with the necessity of fate, because that is a consequence of the law.

RARI EXEMPLI . . . FORTVNA . . . CASVS This summarizes very briefly the contents of ch. 158 and 159, *rari exempli* being the equivalent of τὸ ἐπ' ἑλαττον. NECESSITATE VIOLENTA It is not certain, whether we have to read *uiolentā* or *uiolentā*. In the first case there would be a parallel to *beata necessitate* (206.6), but that is no sufficient proof and besides, it is likely that *uiolenta* refers to ch. 177 (206.12), where *uiolentus* has a passive connotation (see above p. 99). In view of this *uiolenta* should rather be taken as a *nom.pl.neut.* At any rate there can be no doubt about the purport of the words; in both cases the author says that the domains of fortune and chance, just as (*perinde ut*) the domain of our free actions, are ruled by fate without any violent compulsion by necessity. PERINDE VT Waszink in his note ad 207.13-15 suggests: *auctorem suum non plane intellexisse uidetur Calcidius*, as he thinks that Calcidius is confusing the *peraeque dubia* of human free will and τὸ ἐπ' ἑλαττον. This suggestion to me seems too strong; *perinde ut* shows that it is rather a case of abbreviation than of

misunderstanding of the source. By *perinde ut* the two classes are certainly distinguished: the one is ruled by fate in the same way as the other. The transition is indeed somewhat quick, but this is not abnormal in Calcidius, especially when his beloved topic of human freedom comes in sight.

LEGIBVS NOSTRIS The laws of the state clearly demonstrate man's freedom. When the provisions of the law speak about a traitor, this does not mean that the law forces anyone to be a traitor. Men become traitors by their own fault, and afterwards the law punishes them according to its provisions. These provisions have a general character; man is free either to be law-abiding or to be disobedient. The same holds true for the law of fate. We have to be obedient to this law. If we obey, we are praised, if not, we are punished. This passage is largely reminiscent of ch. 4 and 5 of *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*. However, the purport of the argument is wholly different. Pseudo-Plutarch uses the νόμος πολιτικός as an illustrative parallel in order to explain some essential characteristics of εἰμαρμένη. In ch. 4 he deals with such notions as ἀκολούθως, καθόλου and ἐξ ὑποθέσεως and ch. 5, from which Waszink quotes, is concerned with the problem *πῇ μὲν ἀληθές, πῇ δὲ ψεῦδος τὸ "πάντα καθ' εἰμαρμένην"* (570 b). The law of the state has only come up for discussion in a theoretical way, in order to elucidate the ἐνέργεια of fate. Calcidius, on the other hand, is fully interested in the law itself, or rather in human freedom, which is proved and guaranteed by the law. There are a few traces of the 'original' argument, *e.g. generaliter* (9), *sequuntur* (12) and indeed the parallel drawn in the first sentence of ch. 180: *Talis est, opinor, etiam lex illa caelestis, quae fatum uocatur* (208.14). AMENTIA cf. my note on *malitiam ex dementia* (202.7-8). TALIS The parallel drawn by Calcidius differs widely from the one in *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*. In ch. 4 of that treatise the author says about εἰμαρμένη: ἔστι τοίνυν, ὥς ἂν τις εἰκάσαι, οἷος ὁ πολιτικός νόμος, <ὃς> πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πλεῖστα, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως προστάττει, ἔπειτα μὴν καθόλου τὰ πόλει προσήκοντα εἰς δύναμιν περιλαμβάνει (569 d). The similarity is seen in the fact that both the law of the state and fate are operative καθόλου and ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. As we have found in ch. 150, Calcidius adheres to this view, which he illustrates in that chapter with the example of geometric law. In the present paragraph, however, Calcidius introduces a very different parallel. Just as in the case of the law of the state, man's obedience is remunerated and his

transgression is punished. This is the same state of affairs as was implied at the start of ch. 151: *fatum uero, quod et parendi sibi obsequium et non parendi contumaciam uelut edicto complectitur* (187.1-3). This point of view is certainly out of harmony with the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-doctrine, as we find it expounded in Περὶ εἰμαρμένης. Discussing this in the notes to ch. 151 I suggested that the discrepancy was due to the circumstance that the special characteristics of any example tend to intrude into the description of the thing which is illustrated by that example. There are, however, other possibilities, which should at least be stated. In reading this paragraph one is somehow reminded of the Stoic demand of ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν. Especially remarkable are the following words from SVF III 4: διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν . . . οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. If this Stoic tenet has indeed exerted an influence on Calcidius' argument, this would be another example of the use of a transformed Stoic element in a Platonic context.

There is also the very different possibility of a parallel with the fifth-century Alexandrian Platonist Hierocles, extracts from whose work Περὶ προνοίας have been preserved by Photius *cod.* 214 and 251. His system seems rather out of date in the fifth century, for, as Praechter says: "Im ganzen führt Hierokles kaum über den vorplotinischen Platonismus hinaus".¹ There is no trace of Plotinus' system of hypostases and *a fortiori* not of the more intricate patterns of later Neo-Platonism. In fact, there is much that rather reminds one of Middle-Platonism, not in the last place his doctrine of εἰμαρμένη, not without an important modification however. Again I quote Praechter: "Dabei verliert aber die Heimarmene in den Ausführungen des Hierokles den Charakter einer starren, sozusagen mechanisch wirkenden Notwendigkeit".² In Hierocles' system fate receives the character of retributive justice. Fate is κρίσις θεῖα οὓσα ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν ἀμοιβὴν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν (Phot. *cod.* 251, Migne PG 104, 93) and τῶν ἐκβαίνοντων κατὰ τὸν τῆς προνοίας θεσμὸν δικαστικῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπάρχει ἐνέργεια (Phot. *cod.* 214, p. 127 ed. R. Henry). Retribution is necessary: οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως ἔσται δικαία ἢ ἄνισος διανομή, μὴ ὑπόθεσιν λαβοῦσα τὸ ἡμέτερον αὐτεξούσιον (Phot. *cod.* 251, Migne PG 104, 93). Such ideas are not very far from Calcidius, but there are also clear distinctions, of which

¹ Ueberweg-Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Allertums*, Berlin 1926¹² p. 641.

² *o.c.* p. 642.

perhaps the fundamental one is the fact that in Hierocles' doctrine of fate an essential part is played by προβιοτή: ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ κρίσει δικαστῶν δαιμόνων πρὸς τὴν τῶν προβεβιωμένων ἡμῖν ἄξιαν λαγχάνομεν ἕκαστος βίον, ἐν ᾧ πάντα συνείληπται. (Phot. *cod.* 251, Migne PG 104, 93). According to Theiler Hierocles is the final stage in the evolution of a second branch of the Platonic doctrine of fate besides the system of Gaius and his adherents.¹

So with regard to the paragraph under discussion our conclusion could be that Calcidius, while predominantly subscribing to the views of the school of Gaius, here shows traces of a different, but cognate idea, although without a most important characteristic of the latter, *viz.*, the retribution of προβιοτή.

3. FREEDOM HAS ITS SEAT IN THE λογιστικόν OF THE SOUL

a) *Short statement of the axiom*

[180 b] All these actions have their seat in the souls of men, and this soul is free and acts according to its own authority. Now the best part of the soul is that which Plato has described as having a double virtue, one in the understanding of divine things, which is wisdom, the other in the arrangement of human affairs, which is called sagacity.

ANIMIS . . . ANIMA ANIMAE At the start of this new part of his *tractatus* Calcidius straightaway emphasizes the fact that human freedom has its seat in the soul, which transcends the body by a long way. At least this is true of the highest part: OPTIMA PARS τὸ λογιστικόν.

SAPIENTIA . . . PRUDENTIA cf. Apuleius, *De Platone* II 6: *illam uirtutem, quae ratione sit nixa et est spectatrix diiudicatrixque omnium rerum, prudentiam dicit atque sapientiam: quarum sapientiam disciplinam uult uideri diuinarum humanarumque rerum, prudentiam uero scientiam esse intellegendorum bonorum et malorum, eorum etiam, quae media dicuntur.* There is certainly some resemblance, in both descriptions intellectual virtue is divided into two parts. But the definitions themselves are quite different. Apuleius' statements have a Stoic background, which is especially evident in his definition of *sapientia*, cf. *SVF* II 35: τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην. His definition of *prudentia* is also inspired by the Stoa, though perhaps to a lesser degree, cf.

¹ Theiler, *o.c.* p. 88 *sqq.*

SVF III 262: φρόνησιν δ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων.¹ It is quite obvious that Calcidius has elucidated the terms in question in a different way and that he does not owe his definitions to the Stoa. These definitions are fully consistent with his own statement in ch. 137: *rationabilem partem animae duplici uirtute praeditam docens: alteram quae contemplatur eandem semper immutabilemque naturam, ex qua intentione mentis conualescit sapientia, alteram item quae mutabilium generatorumque opinatrix est, cui prudentiae uocabulum congruit* (177.14-18). Now it seems quite possible to assume, that, whereas Apuleius owed his description to the Stoa, Calcidius leans more strongly upon Aristotle. Bonitz in his *Index* p. 688 says about σοφία: *sed etiam non addito adiectivo* πρώτη *ipsum nomen σοφία significat τὴν πρώτην φιλοσοφίαν, i.e. τὴν τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν θεωρητικὴν*. On p. 831 concerning φρόνησις he remarks: *sed plerumque angustiore sensu φρόνησις refertur ad τὰ πρακτικά*. These remarks of Bonitz are confirmed by book ζ of the *Ethica Nicomachea*, which deals with intellectual virtue. There σοφία and φρόνησις are distinguished as theoretical and practical wisdom respectively, e.g. ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει (EN 1141 b 2-3) and ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐστὶ βουλευέσασθαι (EN 1141 b 8-9). If it is right to connect Aristotelian doctrine with Calcidius' statements here, it should perhaps be added, that this does not at all imply a direct borrowing from Aristotle.² In fact the definitions have been adjusted to Platonic doctrine, as can be seen in the text just quoted from ch. 137 and especially in the following words of ch. 213: *duplex uirtus, altera intellegens, opinatrix altera, iuxta quas sapientia cum disciplina et item prudentia cum rectis opinionibus conualescunt* (228.18-20). The terms *intellegens* and *opinatrix* are clearly reminiscent of the Platonic contrast between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα.

b) Relation between body and soul

[181] But if someone in view of the fluids in the body and the way in which birth has united them holds the opinion, that not

¹ Cf. Albinus, *Epit.* 29.2: 'Ἡ μὲν δὲ φρόνησις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων.

² Cf. S. Lilla, *Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism and Jewish-Alexandrine Philosophy in the Terminology of Clement of Alexandria's Ethics* in *Archivio Italiano per la Storia della Pietà* III (1962) p. 10-14.

without fate many people are extravagant, others moderate, and that the extravagant suffer from the disharmonious mixture of the fluids, whereas the moderate are supported by a happy amalgamation, and that all this takes place by fate, his idea is true—for the contribution of nature is such, that the feeble race of men are either suffering from an unfortunate amalgamation or are being helped by a moderate one in acquiring respectability—and therefore against imperfections of this kind the law of Providence places the healthfulness of reason and deliberation, for greediness, passion, cruelty and other such plagues do not represent anything great in childhood, but become harmful, when people grow older, at the same time, I think, when also the healthfulness of deliberation is strengthened, which receives help from the glory of honourable endeavour, benefit from the censure of well-wishers, healing from punishment; on the other hand a perverse mind is dulled by misfortunes and becomes impudent.

[182] Therefore, because they partake in corporeality, there is between men and beasts and other things lacking life, a fellowship and participation in bodily phenomena, as men have birth, nourishment and growth in common with the others, whereas sense-experience and desire are the common quality only of men and animals lacking speech and reason.

Now cupidity and irascibility, in the case of animals, whether wild or tame, are irrational, in the case of man, however, whose characteristic it is to devote his mind to reason, rational. The desire to reason and to understand and to know the truth is proper to man, who is at the greatest distance from cupidity and irascibility; for the last-mentioned qualities can also be seen in mute animals, even to a much sharper degree; however, the perfection of reason and intellect is proper to man and god alone.

SI QVIS The Stoic opposition has still not been fully silenced. In the first chapter the argument mentioned in ch. 167: *Maxima uero uitiorum excitatio est in corporis humorum concretione, quorum abundantia uel indigentia propensiores ad libidinem aut iracundiam sumus.* (198.11-13) is elaborated both on a larger scale and within the framework of the present discussion. CORPORA Note the strong antithesis to *animis* and *anima* (208.21) in the preceding paragraph. As regards this Stoic objection, we have to bear in

mind the Stoa's materialistic conception of the soul and the emphasis laid on the similarity of mental and bodily diseases.

But it is more important that the Stoic opponent is represented by Calcidius as basing himself on the medical theory about the mixture of fluids in the body. *HVMORES . . . CONCRETIONEM* The theory of the body-fluids had been thoroughly developed by Galenus, the great physician of the second century A.D. According to him the mixture of the fluids has a strong influence not only on the bodily condition, but also on the soul. In fact he wrote a treatise, entitled "Ὅτι ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κράσεσιν αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἔπονται (ed. I. Müller, *Galenī Scripta minora* II p. 32-79, Leipzig 1891). In this book he cites as his authorities Hippocrates, Aristotle and Plato, e.g. ch. 6: "Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων αὐτὸς οἶδε βλαπτομένην τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπὶ τῇ κακοχυμίᾳ τοῦ σώματος, ἥ ἐξῆς ῥῆσις ἤδη δηλώσει (followed by a quotation of Tim. 86 e 5-87 a 7).

Indeed to add weight to the present objection the Stoa could have claimed a strong ally in Plato himself, whose point of view may be summarized in the following words: τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν (νοσήματα) διὰ σώματος ἔξιν (*Tim.* 86 b 2). So it is not surprising that Calcidius feels no need to contradict his Stoic opponent: *vera sentit* (209.7). But, as he hastens to add, exactly this state of affairs calls for all those activities and interventions, which orthodox Stoic doctrine would have to consider useless: *IDEOQVE* cf. ch. 168: *Opus est ergo* (198.17) and my remarks concerning *ergo* (see above p. 66).

The start of ch. 182 is again Aristotelian in origin, as Waszink notes somewhat cautiously. In fact there cannot be much doubt, as we shall presently see. *IDEOQVE* The meaning of *ideo* is not clear at first sight, especially as the addition of *-que* shows that *ideo* has to be linked with the preceding chapter. In my opinion the explanation is as follows: "Because of the state of affairs elucidated in ch. 181 man, although sharing his corporality with the animals, has reason as his special privilege". *NVTRIRI . . . SENTIRE . . . APPETERE* cf. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. (Aristoteles, *De anima* B 3, 414 a 32-b 1). *APPETITVS* Certainly this word refers to *appetere* (1.19) and so we can see how an Aristotelian concept is developed in a Platonic sense. Aristotle's ὀρεκτικόν is taken to refer to the two lowest parts of the soul in Plato's theory. This use of *appetitus* is not confined to the present

text. Concerning this term Waszink remarks in index C: *frequenter ad ambas animae irrationalis partes pertinens*. A good example is provided by ch. 201: *appetitum, qui diuiditur in iracundiam et cupiditatem* (221.2-3). CVPIDITAS τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν IRACVNDIA τὸ θυμοειδές INRATIONABILIS . . . RATIONABILIS At first sight this looks Platonic too. Desire and spirit have to obey the commands of reason, e.g. οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόω εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου; (*Politeia* 441 e 4-6). On account of this, man's desire and passion could well be termed 'reasonable'. Strictly speaking, however, the use of the word *rationabilis* implies a much stronger unity in the soul than is possible in Plato's trichotomy. In the latter case there are three clearly distinguished *parts* and Plato has great difficulty to construct a unity out of these parts. Now the unity of the soul is basic for Aristotle's theory: λέγουσι δὴ τινες μεριστὴν αὐτήν, καὶ ἄλλῳ μὲν νοεῖν, ἄλλῳ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν. τί οὖν δὴ ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχὴν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; . . . εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἓν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἓν; (*De anima* 411 b 5-12). Accordingly Aristotle did not speak about *parts* of the soul, but of *δυνάμεις*. This idea was introduced into Platonism. "Die Frage nach "Teilen" der Seele war im Platonismus nicht drängend; längst hatte man stillschweigend die Korrektur durch Aristoteles, de an. Γ 9, 432 a 13 f. und 433 b 2-6, angenommen und gelernt, die Seelen "Teile" Platons als *δυνάμεις* zu verstehen, und sah daraufhin die Seele als eine—vorwiegend metaphysisch bestimmte—Einheit an".¹ For Porphyry, too, the unity of the soul was very important. To the problem he devoted his study *Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων*, excerpts of which have been preserved by Stobaios vol. I p. 347-354 Wachsmuth.²

Possibly the use of the expressions we are discussing hints at a doctrine in which the unity of the soul receives great emphasis. It would only be a hint, for in ch. 187 *ira* and *cupiditas* are called

¹ H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' "Symmiktá Zetemata"*, p. 105.

² Cf. Beutler's remark about this study: "Und so vermag Porphyrios die *δυνάμεις* des Aristoteles in die dichterische und aus seiner besonderen praktischen Absicht zu erklärenden Redeweise Platons einzudeuten und einzubauen". RE XXII¹ col. 289. Important is also Dörrie's answer to a question of Waszink in the discussion about Dörrie's paper *Die Lehre von der Seele*, *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* XII, Geneva 1965, p. 190. More information is provided by Waszink in his commentary on Tertullian's *De anima*, Amsterdam 1947 p. 215.

partes animi (212.10). RATIONIS...INTELLECTVS cf. ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικὸν τε καὶ νοῦς, ὅλον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τιμιώτερον (Arist. *De anima* 414 b 18-19, a text quoted by Waszink in his notes to 238.9-10).

It is perhaps useful to give a short summary of Calcidius' argument in ch. 182: "Corporeality is common to plants, animals and men, desire and passion are qualities of animals and men, but only in men these are rational, reason finally is reserved to man".

c) *Disagreement within the soul*

α) *Dispute of the lower parts with the λογιστικὸν*

[183] And even among men < this perfection is > not equally <divided>, for when men become excited, cupidity and irascibility and reason too are fighting one another and in turn they gain victories over each other, reason for instance in Homer, when Laertes' son 'having beaten his breast harshly reproves his mind: "Be patient, my heart. For you have supported heavier blows". ' Indeed in his mind reason then subjugated irascibility. In Euripides on the other hand in the mind of Medea the wild irascibility had extinguished the light of reason, for she says: 'It is not concealed from me, what bloody thoughts I hold, but anger conquers the sanity of my heart', so thoroughly had her indignation, because Iason had taken a concubine, closed the way for healthy deliberation.

The conflict between the λογιστικὸν and the θυμοειδές, which is the subject of this chapter, indeed, as Waszink notes, reminds of Albinus, *Epit.* 24. But there is an important distinction. Albinus in his argument, which ultimately derives from Plato's analysis in the fourth book of the *Politeia* (434 d-441 c), wants to prove the tripartition of the soul and the fact that its three parts each have a different abode, Calcidius on the other hand is mainly interested in human freedom. As in the case of God's prescience, Calcidius does not deal with the subject as such, but rather with the implications for the autonomy of man's free will. PECTORE PVLSATO This text is also quoted by Plato, *Politeia* 441 b 6. MEDEAE Euripides' verses are quoted quite often, e.g. Albinus, *Epit.* 24.3, Plut. *De uirt. mor.* 446 a, Clemens, *Strom.* II 15.63.¹ Calcidius omits examples of the conflict between reason and desire,

¹ Cf. Lilla o.c. p. 22 sqq.

because such cases are exactly parallel to the instances given in the present chapter. That such a conflict is certainly implied, is shown by the plural *vitiosis partibus* at the start of ch. 184.

β) *Dispute of the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the θυμοειδές*

[184 a] So in the mind of a moderate man deliberation always has the upper hand, whereas the weakness of the immoderate man supports the defective parts of his mind against reason. Often also these defects themselves fight one another, for instance in the case of the young man in Terence's play (Terentius, *Eunuchus* 46-49), who in his resistance against the violent flames of love relies upon honourable irascibility, when he says that he will not go to see his mistress, who spontaneously invites him, so that having shamefully shut him out she calls him back by enticement and the charms of a harlot.

γ) *These disputes prove our freedom*

[184 b] Now these things, which we debate in the hidden provinces of our heart, considering whether we have to do them or not, and about which we finally take a decision as if by vote, to what extent are they not our own? Unless perhaps, because excited or perverted by passion, we are not capable of judgment, since a fair decision has to lack the prejudices both of hatred and of favour and mercy.

ERGO HAEC This clearly indicates the purpose of the preceding paragraphs, *viz.*, the proof of human freedom, which is safely harboured in the soul. DISCEPTARE The imagery seems to be taken from the legal sphere, considering the last part of the paragraph (*aequum iudicium etc.*). In the case which comes up before the court of our free mind, we have to be just and impartial judges, passing judgment without respect of any motives. NISI FORTE IDEO When we are overcome by passions and emotions, our judgment is perverted. In so far our liberty seems to be impaired. A similar statement has been made at the end of ch. 156; cf. my notes *ad loc.* (above, p. 40).

δ) *Divination and astrology never concern the λογιστικόν*

[185] "But", they (= the Stoics) say, "the prediction of future events testifies that all things have been arranged and regulated long before; now this arrangement and regulation

is called fate". On the contrary, this very prediction in every respect denies the dominance of fatal necessity, because prediction is the rational appraisal of a future condition and this appraisal does not prevail in things which are certain and bound by necessity, but in things which are uncertain and doubtful. For who would consult a prophet about a new-born baby, whether it is to be mortal or immortal? But usually rather that is asked, which is doubtful, *e.g.* the length of the periods of life allotted to him and whether he is to be rich or poor and whether he is to hold a lofty or a low and humble post. All these things are concluded through observation and science and also by skilful ingenuity: for it is either through the flight of birds or through the internal organs or through oracles that men are forewarned by the prediction of some kind daemon, who has knowledge of all things which follow successively, exactly as if a doctor according to his medical learning would predict either death or recovery, or if, to take another example, a helmsman not unacquainted with the conditions of the sky on account of some little cloud foretells a future storm; all these things are not comprised by fate, but understood by skilful reasoning, practice and experience.

[186] In the same way, when a prediction is made from the constellation of the stars, the constellations are usually observed and the rising and setting of the stars and the formations, brought into a rational system, according to which fertility or sterility come forth; and the whole system of this kind is nothing else but a conjectural inference about those things which concern the body or the things proper to the body or the soul, in so far as it is behaving as a slave of the body. That is why to my opinion Plato says that the Demiurge presided over the construction of the souls, but that the duty and task to join on the other things, which are added to the souls, has been enjoined to the lower divine powers, so that the pure and clean souls, which thrive and flourish through reason, are made by God, but as the authors of the defective parts of the souls those powers are regarded to which such a task has been enjoined by the Demiurge.

PRAEDICTIO At first sight it looks as if the discussion of ch. 169 *sqq.* is started all over again. But that is only partly the case. At present Calcidius' first and foremost concern is with the maxim

that freedom of will belongs to the soul and not to the body. It must be admitted, however, that owing to the lack of clarity in his argument this only becomes perfectly clear at the end of ch. 186. **SIQVIDEM** The reason given here differs widely from the discussion of oracles in ch. 170 and 171. In those paragraphs the oracles were considered as pieces of advice from the gods, cf. *suadet* (200.6) and *consilium* (200.14). The present chapter does not mention such a form of validity. Here prognostication is viewed not so much from its purpose as from its technique. **RATIONABILIS** This is an important word, which foreshadows the terms used a few lines further down, e.g. *scientia* (14), *rationibus* (20). **CERTIS . . . AMBIGVIS** This resembles ch. 169, cf. the notes on that chapter p. 70). **RECENS NATO** One is tempted to regard this as a reference to the practice of *γενεθλιαλογία*, so vehemently attacked by opponents of fatalism.¹ However, the question of astrology, of which *γενεθλιαλογία* is a branch, is only broached in the following chapter. Still, in view of all the virulent attacks made on divination and astrology it is somewhat surprising to read Calcidius' positive appreciation of these practices. This is only possible, because he stresses the scientific side of prognostication. **QVAE CVNCTA** The Stoa made an important distinction within *diuination*: *duo sunt enim diuinandi genera, alterum artis est, alterum naturae* (Cicero, *De diuinatione* I 11) and *Duo enim genera diuinandi esse dicebas, unum artificiosum, alterum naturale; artificiosum constare partim ex coniectura, partim ex obseruatione diuturna* (*Id.* II 26). The second half of the last quotation reminds one quite strongly of Calcidius, both in content and in wording. This impression can be corroborated by some other quotations from Cicero's treatise, which is the main source of information in this field: *Quae uero aut coniectura explicantur aut euentis animaduersa ac notata sunt, ea genera diuinandi, ut supra dixi, non naturalia, sed artificiosa dicuntur; in quo haruspices, augures, coniectoresque numerantur* (I 72), *res futuras quas . . . aut ratio aut coniectura praesentit* (I 128). *Est enim ars in iis, qui nouas res coniectura persequuntur, ueteres obseruatione didicerunt* (I 34).

MEDICVS . . . GVBERNATOR These comparisons are traditional. The objection raised in *De diuinatione* I 24 *At non numquam ea*

¹ Firm foundations for this criticism were laid by Carneades; cf. Amand, *o.c.* p. 49 sqq.

quae praedicta sunt minus eueniunt. is met by the following answer: *Quae tandem id ars non habet? earum dico artium quae coniectura continentur et sunt opinabiles.* Then four examples are given, *viz.*, physician, pilot, general and statesman.¹ Very similar, perhaps even closer to Calcidius are the following words from Maximus Tyrius' essay Εἰ μαντικῆς οὐσης, ἔστιν τι ἐφ' ἡμῖν: καὶ γὰρ κυβερνήτης ναῦν ἔχων, καὶ εἰδὼς τὰ ὄργανα, καὶ τὴν θάλατταν ὁρῶν καὶ αἰσθανόμενος τῶν πνευμάτων, οἶδεν τὸ ἀποβησόμενον. καὶ στρατηγὸς . . . καὶ ἱατρὸς τὸν κάμνοντα ἰδὼν, καὶ τῆς νόσου ξυνεὶς, καὶ τῆς τέχνης αἰσθανόμενος, οἶδεν τὸ ἀποβησόμενον (XIII 4).² Finally I quote the following from Origen's *Contra Celsum* IV 96: καὶ ἱατροὶ γοῦν ἀπὸ ἱατρικῆς προγινώσκουσι τινα . . . οὕτω δὲ καὶ κυβερνῆται . . . προγινώσκουσιν ἐπισημασίας καὶ ἀνέμων σφοδρότητας καὶ τροπὰς περὶ τὸ περιέχον ἕκτινος πείρας καὶ τηρήσεως. All these texts prove that the material used by Calcidius for his argument is conventional in this field.

COMPREHENDVNTVR Note the pun. Things are not in the *grasp* of fate, but they can be *grasped* by us by means of prognostication.

SIDERV M PRAEDICTIO The purport of ch. 186, which is closely linked with the preceding chapter, concerns ἀστρονομία rather than ἀστρολογία. The former notion is defined as follows by Sextus Empiricus: τήρησις ἐστὶν ἐπὶ φαινομένοις ὡς γεωργία καὶ κυβερνητική, ἀφ' ἧς ἔστιν αὐχμούς τε καὶ ἐπομβρίας . . . προθεσπίζειν (*Adv. Math.* V 2). OBSERVARI . . . RATIONEM cf. the use of these same terms in ch. 185 and the parallels quoted from Cicero's *De divinatione*. This also applies to CONIECTVRA: about this word there is an interesting note in the *Thesaurus*. After a long article on the general meaning of this word a fresh subdivision is started, under the heading *speciatim de divinatione* (*TLL* IV 316). CORPVS . . . CORPORIS Although Calcidius' appreciation of all kinds of divination is positive, there are two important restrictions. The first is the tacit rejection of all weird and superstitious varieties. Divination is an *ars* and as such it is rational. The second way in which Calcidius sets bounds to the possibilities of prognostication is even more momentous in the context: divination is only concerned with the body. So the maxim at the start of the present argument *anima libera est et agit ex arbitrio suo* (208.21-22) remains unimpaired. However, not the whole of the soul has a right to this freedom.

¹ Cf. also Pease's note in his commentary *ad loc.* (p. 125).

² Cf. G. Soury, *Aperçus de Philosophie religieuse chez Maxime de Tyr*, Paris 1942 p. 46 sqq.

This is the privilege only of the *optima pars* (208.22). The rest of the soul is the slave of the body (*corpori seruientem*) and as such it can very well be the object of divination.

VNDE When we realize this state of affairs, our eyes will be opened to the essential meaning of the division of tasks between the Demiurge and the lower gods described in the *Timaeus*. Of course we must bear in mind the fact that the *aliae diuinae potestates*, the *παῖδες* of the *Timaeus*, are the stars. Man is subject, at least partly, to the influence of the stars, because for a part he springs from their creative work. As Plotinus says in *Enn.* II 3, the treatise which has been referred to in the notes on ch. 174: 'Ὁ δὲ Τιμαίω θεὸς μὲν ὁ ποιήσας τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς δίδωσιν, οἱ δὲ φερόμενοι θεοὶ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα πάθη, θυμοὺς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας αὖ, καὶ ψυχῆς ἄλλο εἶδος, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ παθήματα ταυτί. Οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι συνδέουσιν ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἀστροῖς παρ' αὐτῶν ψυχὴν κομιζομένους καὶ ὑποτάττουσι τῇ ἀνάγκῃ ἐνταῦθα ἰόντας (*Enn.* II 3.9) Plotinus' point of view is excellently summed up by Schwyzer: "Platons Lehren im 'Staat' und im 'Timaios' dürfen nicht so gedeutet werden, als ob wir bloss unter dem Zwang der Sterne stünden. Nur die Seele, die in diese Welt gestürzt ist, ist den Schicksalen ausgeliefert"¹. Calcidius' line of thought in the last part of the present chapter is quite similar.

SVBTEXVNTVR cf. ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες (*Tim.* 41 d 1) in the Demiurge's instruction. In his translation of the *Timaeus* Calcidius has rendered this rather pompously by *ita ut immortalem caelestemque naturam mortali textu extrinsecus ambiatis* (36.10-11). But in his comments on that passage he simply uses the verb *attexere* (180.1), of which *subtexere* is a variation. As Waszink says in his note on 180.1-2, what is stated here is the normal interpretation of *Tim.* 41 d 1, e.g. Albinus *Epit.* 23, 1, where the author, as he does so often, is paraphrasing the text of the *Timaeus*: ψυχὴν γὰρ παραλαβόντες ἀνθρωπίνην ἀθάνατον οὖσαν, ὥς δεῖξομεν, παρὰ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ οἱ τὰ θνητὰ γένη δημιουργοῦντες θεοὶ δύο αὐτῇ προσέθεσαν μέρη θνητά. In fact this fully agrees with Plato's own statement in *Tim.* 69 c 7-8: ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσωκόδομον τὸ θνητόν.²

¹ H. R. Schwyzer in RE XXI¹ col. 546.

² Note the parallel between *προσυφαίνειν* (41 d 1) and *προσοικοδομεῖν* (69 c 8). The same idea is expressed by two different metaphors, one taken from weaving, the other from building.

e) *Appendix*

[187] Now the defective parts which are joined on to the soul are anger and cupidity, quite adequate instruments to lead our life. Many indeed are the things which by means of a manly emotion of the soul happen properly in this life and can be defended, as often as rightful irascibility shows itself a helpful companion of reason, many too the things which result from honest or moderate desire beyond the squalour of passion. So just as to the pure World-Soul is granted the sovereignty in the perpetual movement of the world, the souls inspiring men needed reason mixed with¹ irascibility and cupidity, in order that, whenever the whole living being had turned to reason, it would concern itself about celestial things and contemplate these; whenever, however, it would look down to earthly things, this looking down might equally not be useless, but from the same inclination care for the earthly affairs might result.

The purpose of this chapter is to take the sting out of the disapproving term *vitiosus*. The lower parts of the soul are indeed defective, but at the same time they are quite useful: SATIS IDONEA INSTRUMENTA. This positive appreciation is somewhat surprising after the negative way of speaking in ch. 186. The background of this change will become clear at the end of this chapter. COMITEM ET AUXILIATRICEM cf. *Politeia* 441 a 2-3: ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπικουρον δὲ τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει. SICVT . . . ITA Although Calcidius does not make his intentions very clear, to all probability he wants to stress the similarity in the intermediate position of both the World-Soul and the human soul. This similarity is indeed based upon the Timaeus. As Cornford says, "... the World-Soul and all individual souls belong to both worlds and partake both of being and of becoming".² This intermediate position is made possible by the composition of the World-Soul and the individual souls. In *Tim.* 35 a it is explained that the former is composed of a special mixture of ἀμείριστον, μεριστόν and

¹ Strictly speaking, 'mixed' is not the full rendering of *interpolata*. The general definition of *interpolare* given in the Thesaurus is *i.q. sive novando (mutando) sive inserendo afficere* (TLL VII¹ col. 2244). The present text is referred to in subdivision C under the heading *respicitur magis intermixtio* (id. col. 2245). In parentheses is added: (*ad transl.* p. 42 A mixtam, *gr.* μεμειγμένον). I fail to understand this addition.

² Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London 1956) p. 63.

οὐσία. For the construction of the latter the Demiurge uses τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑπόλοιπα (41 d 5).¹ But now Calcidius has a great surprise in store. The parallel between World-Soul and human soul is not due to the same mixture of ἀμέριστον, μεριστόν and οὐσία, but the intermediate position of the human soul is said to be produced by its *uitiosae partes*. This important alteration has been introduced in the commentary on the passage 41 d 4 sqq., as can be seen in the following quotation from ch. 140: *Miscebat autem, inquit, eodem propemodum genere nec tamen eadem exoriebatur puritas serenitasque prouentuum. Merito, quoniam in his animis, quae uiuificant morti obnoxia genera animalium, non pura ratio intellectusue sincerus sed aliquantum tam iracundiae quam libidinis inuenitur* (180.11-15). The explication warrants the way in which the parallel is drawn in the present chapter. To my opinion such interpretations are the result of the contradictions in Plato's own doctrine about the soul. On the one hand the real function of the soul is theoretical reason, on the other hand the soul is the source of life. In the trichotomy of the soul the three parts are fully separated from one another, yet Plato introduces a harmony between them, based on a unity which in fact is excluded by the same trichotomy. PVRAE cf. ἀκήρατα (*Tim.* 41 d 6) and Calcidius' *puritas serenitasque* (36.16-17).

CVRA RERV M TERRESTRIVM cf. the adage ψυχὴ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου (*Phaedr.* 246 b 6). A short summary of the chapter is perhaps useful: the two lower parts of the soul are bad (*uitiosae*), yet the human soul needs them (*opus fuit*) to attain the same intermediate position as the World-Soul. I have not been able to find a parallel for this curious doctrine.

4. SUMMARY

a) *Fate's relation to the metaphysical hierarchy*

[188] So to summarize briefly: we have to imagine the following arrangement of this subject: (1) the origin of things, from which existence is provided to all other beings, is the highest and unutterable God; (2) after Him His Providence is the

¹ As Taylor says in his notes to *Tim.* 41 d 4-7, ὑπόλοιπα does not mean "remains of the former mixture", but remains of ἀμέριστον, μεριστόν, οὐσία. The souls are "just as directly the 'creation' of the Supreme God as the cosmic soul is". So Taylor would not have approved of Calcidius' translation *reliquias prioris concretionis* (36.14).

second god, the legislator of both lives, the eternal as well as the temporary; (3) the third being is the so-called second mind and intellect, a kind of preserver of the eternal law; (4) subjected to these are the rational souls obeying the law and, as attendant powers, nature, fortune, chance and the daemons, who inspect and investigate merits. So the highest God commands, the second arranges, the third makes known; the souls, however, act according to the law.

BREVI MVLTIA COMPLECTAR Indeed this short summary comprises much that has been said in the treatise. As in ch. 176 the metaphysical hierarchy is described not because of the importance of this structure itself, but to indicate the place fate takes in the world-order. This time fate is viewed explicitly under its aspect of law, that is to say taken κατ' ἐνέργειαν, or, to put it in Calcidius' own words, *quod in munere atque actu positum est* (185.3).

The relation of the respective entities to this law is the subject of the present chapter. ORIGINEM cf. my notes on *principaliter* (204.6), above p. 88. The idea is much akin to Macrobius' description of the highest God: *deus qui prima causa et est et uocatur, unus omnium quaeque sunt quaeque videntur esse princeps et origo est* (*Comm.* I 14.6). Without doubt Macrobius found this idea in the works of his two Neo-Platonic authorities, Plotinus and Porphyry. SVBSTANTIA MINISTRATVR It is not clear, whether this expression only refers to the creation and birth of all things, or also to their permanent safety and health. The former seems the more likely in view of the term *origo*. INEFFABILEM This opinion is widely spread in Platonic philosophy. It is ultimately derived from two fundamental texts of Plato himself, *viz.*, *Tim.* 28 c and *Epist.* VII 341 c. The words ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶν in the latter passage are considered as a theological statement, e.g. μηδαμῶς εἶναι ῥητὸν τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας ἐγγιγνόμενον καὶ ἐξαίφνης οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδῆσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (*Celsus in Origen, Contra Cels.* VI 3).¹ The other basic text used to prove God's ineffability is *Tim.* 28 c 3-5: τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν. LATOREM LEGIS This function of the second God has

¹ Cf. Justin, *Dial.* 4.1: οὔτε ῥητὸν οὔτε ἀγορευτὸν, ἀλλὰ μόνον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἐξαίφνης ταῖς εὐ πεφυκυῖαις ψυχαῖς ἐγγιγνόμενον.

been discussed in the notes on ch. 177 (above p. 97). Here I only add a quotation from Hierocles: καὶ ταύτην τὴν πατρονομικὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ πρόνοιαν εἶναι τὴν ἐκάστω γένει τὰ προσήκοντα νομοθετοῦσαν (Hierocles apud Photius *cod.* 251, Migne PG 104, 80 B). *CVSTOS LEGIS* In ch. 177 the second mind was said to obey the law of fate. Although keeping guard is not the same as obeying, there does not seem to be a contradiction. Moreover, this time the obedience of the human soul (*rationabiles animas*) is emphasized, so that there is no reason to wonder that another duty is assigned to the third god. *RATIONABILES ANIMAE* The adjective is certainly not superfluous. The whole argument of ch. 180 b and following chapters aims at the proof of the superiority of the rational part of the soul, indeed of its isolation from the irrational parts. Only the former is free and can be said to obey fate's ordinances. This again is not unlike Hierocles, in whose opinion the ἄλογα are outside the influence of providence and fate. *NATVRAM FORTVNAM CASVM* These notions have been dealt with in ch. 156, 158, 159, 177 and 179. Nature belongs to the *frequentia* (τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ), fortune and chance are *rari exempli* (τὸ ἐπ' ἑλαττον), whereas human freedom falls into the domain of τὸ ἐπ' ἴσης.

DAEMONES Calcidius' daemonology can be found in ch. 127-136 of the *Commentarius*. An exhaustive enquiry into this subject would be out of place here. We shall only pay attention to the special function of the daemons mentioned in this context. In Περὶ εἰμαρμένης 573 a the author speaks about the providential care τῶν ὅσοι περὶ γῆν δαίμονες τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πράξεων φύλακές τε καὶ ἐπίσκοποι εἰσι. In his note *ad loc.* Valgiglio points out that the idea of the daemons as guardians of men can be found as early as Hesiod *Op.* 122/3:

τοὶ μὲν δαίμονες εἰσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλάς
ἐσθλοί, ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

But naturally the great authority for later Platonism is Plato himself. At the end of the great myth which concludes the *Politeia* the souls, having chosen their lives, appear before the fatal sisters. First they go to Lachesis: ἐκείνην δ' ἐκάστω δὲν εἴλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα συμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἰρεθέντων (620 d 8-e 1). Both Porphyry and Hierocles make use of this text: Τὴν γὰρ Λάχεσιν, ἥτις τῆς Ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ θυγάτηρ, τῷ λαχόντι καὶ ἐλομένῳ τινὰ βίον συμπέμπειν φύλακά τε τοῦ βίου καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἀποπληρωτὴν

τοῦ αἰρεθέντος (Porph. Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν apud Stob. vol. II 164, 8-11 Wachsmuth), καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων φύλαξ καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴς ὁ εἰληχῶς δαίμων ἔστηκεν (Hierocles apud Photius *cod.* 251, Migne PG 104, 96). The same idea can be found in Apuleius' important treatise on daemonology *De deo Socratis: ex hac igitur sublimiore daemonum copia Plato autumat singulis hominibus in uita agenda testes et custodes additos* (*De deo Soc.* XVI) and *hic, quem dico, prius custos, singularis praefectus, domesticus speculator . . .* (*id.* XVI). Calcidius himself also mentions this field of activity in his paragraphs on the daemons: *idemque speculatores et executores* (174.1).

Our conclusion can be that, although the function of the daemons has not come up for discussion in the *tractatus de fato*, it is not surprising to find it mentioned in the present synopsis, because the idea is consistent with normal Platonic doctrine, in which the daemons are closely linked with fate and human choice and behaviour.

IVBET . . . ORDINAT . . . INTIMAT Beutler in a study on the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix refers to *Oct.* XVIII 7: (*deum*) *qui uniuersa, quaecumque sunt, uerbo iubet, ratione dispensat, uirtute consummat*.¹ According to Beutler, this is reminiscent of Plato *Leg.* 715 e ὁ μὲν δὲ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων. Next Beutler quotes the passage under discussion, adding: "Die einzelnen Funktionen sind ähnlich denen bei Minucius Felix bis auf die letzte". A second parallel drawn by Beutler is the text in Proclus' commentary on the *Timaeus*, quoted in Waszink's notes. These similarities are too slight to be convincing as the context is hardly taken into account by Beutler. Minucius Felix is speaking about one God whose power should not be divided, Amelius elucidates a curious doctrine of three δημιουργοί and Calcidius gives a short summary of the activities of his three gods. Beutler's remark: "Das Wichtigste ist aber die Tatsache der Dreiteilung überhaupt", seems rather uncritical to me. There is another reason not to trust Beutler's parallels, for above all it is necessary to take the present context into account. As stated in the first note on the present chapter, its main purpose is to sketch the relation of fate, viewed as law, to gods and men. The author pays attention not so much to the nature

¹ R. Beutler, *Philosophie und Apologie bei Minucius Felix*, Weida i. Thür. 1936, p. 45.

of the gods as such or to their activities towards the world as a whole, but to their position with regard to fate. This also applies to the recapitulation at the end of the chapter. Without doubt Waszink is right in supplementing *legem* as the absent object to the three verbs.¹ So against fate are set on the one side the three gods with their authority, which varies in proportion to their position in the hierarchy, on the other side the human souls in their quality of law-abiding subjects (cf. *subiectas*, 213.2).

b) *Fate rewards human choice*

[189 a] The law is fate itself, as we have often said. He who obeys this law and follows the venerable footsteps of the first God, always leads a happy life according to the decree of the permanent law, *i.e.*, according to fate; those souls, however, which have neglected God's escort, lead their lives according to fate just as well, albeit in a kind of different and contrary way, until they repent of their offences and return to the ranks of the immortal God and the eternal divine powers, and that very inflexibility of the law allows a transition from a meaner condition to a happy one, which surely would be impossible if all things were bound by a kind of uniform, inflexible and unalterable necessity.

CVI LEGI The first part of this chapter is reminiscent of the θεσμός Ἀδραστέας, mentioned in *Phaedr.* 248 c. As we have seen at the beginning of the *tractatus de fato*, this law is one of the pillars on which the whole structure of the Middle-Platonic doctrine about fate is built. In ch. 152 Calcidius translates the first part of the law: *Quae se comitem deo fecerit anima eorumque aliquid uiderit quae uere sunt, usque ad alterius circuitus tempus erit incolumis, ac si semper hoc faciet, semper incolumis manebit* (187.20-188.3). Then he adds his interpretation: *Est igitur totum hoc lex et edictum quod fatum proprie uocatur, secutum uero Socratem legis edictum deo se comitem praeuisse proprium Socratis opus; porro, quod, cum ita uiueret Socrates, anima eius usque ad alterius circuitus tempus incolumis perseuerat, iuxta fatale decretum prouenit ac si semper hoc faciat, quod est in Socrate, semper incolumis erit iuxta fatum* (188.3-8). In my notes *ad loc.* I pointed out, how by the words *cum ita uiueret*

¹ In Index C of his edition s.u. *intimare* Waszink gives the following explanation: *i.q. enuntio: . . . summus deus iubet, secundus ordinat, tertius -at (sc. legem aeternam)* 213.5.

Socrates the whole scene is literally brought down from heaven to earth. *Socrates'* way of life meant that he followed god, thus meeting the requirements of *Adrasteia's* θεσμός. Now the present text is a kind of free adaptation of that law. It certainly is reminiscent of ch. 152, but the two passages are not entirely similar. The most crucial problem is posed by the word *semper*, which is certainly caused by αἰ in καὶν αἰ τοῦτο δύνηται ποιεῖν, αἰ ἀβλαβῇ εἶναι. It is not possible, however, that *semper* has the same meaning as αἰ in the Greek text, viz., "to all eternity", for in that case *Calcidius* would be speaking about the soul in heaven. To all probability, however, exactly as in the case of *Socrates* in ch. 152, he is speaking about earthly life.¹ But neither does the meaning "always", i.e. "at each incarnation", which *semper* takes in ch. 152 (*si semper hoc faciat . . . semper incolumis erit*, 188.7), seem quite suitable here. Perhaps *semper* here stands for "continually", "during the whole span of a person's life"; but then *semper* would have an altogether unusual meaning. Possibly we have to conclude that *Calcidius* has thoughtlessly taken over this notion, forgetting that in his argument it is redundant. IVXTA FATVM As in the case of *Socrates* this stresses the fact that happiness is a prize awarded in accordance with the law of fate. AT VERO Unfortunately for this opposite case we lack a parallel like ch. 152. But it is quite plausible that here, too, the θεσμός Ἀδραστέας is the origin of the idea. The whole expression *rursum et ipsae alio quodam contrarioque genere secundum fatum* may be a grandiloquent elaboration of Plato's simple τότε νόμος (248 c 8). DONEC . . . REVERTANTVR This somehow summarizes *Phaedr.* 248 d-249 b. But we are also reminded of the other basic texts for the doctrine of fate, viz., the Λαχέσεως λόγος (*Politeia* 617 d 6) and the νόμοι οἱ εἰμαρμένοι (*Tim.* 41 e 2). For example, the idea of a return to a blissful existence can be found in *Tim.* 42 d 2: εἰς τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἶδος ἔξω, by which is meant the happy and congenial life in the consort star. The expiation of crimes comes into prominence in the description of the *Politeia*, e.g. ἵνα δεκαπλάσιον τὸ ἔκτεισμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοιεν (615 b 1-2). But in this last case as well the idea is transferred to the sphere of earthly life. There is no hint that the penance is paid in the hereafter, nor of any transmigration

¹ This cannot be proved by referring to the expression *vitam agit*, for it seems rather likely that *beatam vitam agit* is a reminiscence of βλοῦν εὐδαίμονα ἔχει (*Tim.* 42 b): the life of the soul in its cognate star.

of the souls. The latter idea can certainly be found in Calcidius, e.g. ch. 196, where he is commenting on *Tim.* 42 a 7-c 4, but in the present chapter it is absent, at least not consciously present. **LEGIS RIGOR** This expression would rather suit the doctrine of Calcidius' Stoic opponents. It is used either ironically ("that so-called inflexibility") or, as we have seen more often, in a corrected sense: the law of fate is indeed inflexible, but as a result of its ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-character it allows changes and transformations.

c) *Fate and Providence*

[189 b] From this it is clear that providence holds all things in her grasp, indeed all things that according to her will are guided rightly; fate, however, is the decree of providence; it contains that which is within our power as precedent causes, it also holds room for merits. Next come punishment and approbation, which are 'fatal' and all those events which take place through chance and fortune.

This paragraph can be compared with the short survey of Platonic doctrine in ch. 145. In a nutshell some fundamental notions, discussed in the treatise, are repeated here.

PROVIDENTIAM . . . FATVM Evidently this repeats the adage which was so strongly defended at the start of the *tractatus de fato*, viz., *praecedit providentia, sequitur fatum* (181.20). **OMNIA** This is somewhat surprising in view of the contents of ch. 145: *neque omnia ex providentia fore* (183.15) and *Et diuina quidem atque intelligibilia quaeque his proxima sunt secundum providentiam solam* (183.18-20). But possibly the author only wants to stress the primacy of providence and, besides, he immediately qualifies his statement by adding the explanatory words *quippe omnia etc.* (213.17). **RECTE** cf. Apuleius, *De Platone* I 12: *Sed omnia, quae naturaliter et propterea recte feruntur, providentiae custodia gubernantur*. But mark the absence of *naturaliter* in Calcidius. The addition of that word would come dangerously near to a Stoic identification of φύσις and πρόνοια. Besides, in ch. 145 Calcidius said: *naturalia et corporea iuxta fatum* (183.20). **CONTINET . . . COLLOCATIONEM . . . ANIMADVERSIO** cf. the passages to which Waszink refers, e.g. *Animaduersiones porro uel praemia exoriuntur secundum collocati meriti praecessionem* (187.3-4).

EPILOGUE

[190] Now what was the purport of this treatise, which has grown to such a great length? Because many people, not caring to know the truth, but rather wishing to resist true reasoning, both deceive themselves and entangle others in the hazards of unavoidable error: looking to one particular part of the direction of the cosmos, they make pronouncements as it were about the management of the entire universe and they assert that what they have found in one part, is also true for all other parts of the cosmos. And therefore, when they say something true, their views are held to be likely, although they make conflicting statements; when, however, in their opinion about a part they act just as if they were having an opinion about the universe as a whole, they refute each other.

For it is true that some things happen by fate, just as the truth has also been shown of the fact that other things are in our power. Therefore those who say that everything happens by fate, are rightly censured by those who prove that there is something within our power; finally those who put everything in our power, without leaving anything to fate, are revealed to be mistaken; for who would not know that there is something belonging to fate and outside our competence? So only that is true reason, fixed and stable opinion, which teaches that some things happen by fate, other originate from human will and authority.

PROLIXITAS The *perfunctorius tractatus* (181.15) which Calcidius promised at the start in ch. 142, has imperceptibly rather grown in size. This is understandable, because the author found that he had to pay much attention to all sorts of subjects related to fate. In this closing chapter he now returns to the main problem posed at the start of the treatise, *viz.*, the relation between fate and human freedom. QVARE QVI Theiler¹ refers to a rather unexpected parallel, *viz.*, the doctrine about fate which Flavius Josephus attributes to the three Jewish sects of his age: οἱ μὲν οὖν Φαρισαῖοι τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἰμαρμένης εἶναι λέγουσιν ἔργον, τινὰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνειν τε καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑσσηνῶν

¹ Theiler, *o.c.* p. 50.

γένος πάντων τὴν εἰμαρμένην κυρίαν ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ μηδὲν ὁ μὴ κατ' ἐκείνης ψῆφον ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντᾷ. Σαδδουκαῖοι δὲ τὴν μὲν εἰμαρμένην ἀναιροῦσιν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτην ἀξιοῦντες, οὐδὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν, ἅπαντα δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κεῖσθαι, ὥς καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς γιγνομένους καὶ τὰ χεῖρω παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀβουλίαν λαμβάνοντας (*Antiqu.* 13.172-173). OMNIA ALIQUID cf. Apuleius, *De Platone* I 12: *Nec sane omnia referenda ad vim fati putat, sed esse aliquid in nobis.* SOLA IGITUR The last possibility suggested in ch. 142 was: *alia esse quae fato nihiloque minus alia esse quae uoluntate fiant* (181.18-19) and, as so often happens in arguments, the last possibility is proved to be the right one.

CONCLUSION

A survey of the *tractatus de fato* as a whole shows the notable fact of its fundamental unity. Indeed there are many obscurities and mistakes and, moreover, the materials for the argument are brought in from different quarters, but this does not alter the fact that fundamentally the line of thought is quite clear.

In the first of the three main parts of the treatise an outline of Platonic doctrine is given, at times with great verbal resemblance to the anonymous treatise *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*. The second part is devoted to a refutation of the main opponents of Platonism in this department of philosophy, *viz.*, the Stoics, whereas the last part, after the refutation of Stoicism, gives a renewed exposition of Platonic doctrine, enriched by two very important elements, which will presently be discussed. The unity of the treatise is apparent especially from two facts. In the first place it must be noted, that both in the first and third parts there is a good deal of polemics, albeit often tacit, against the Stoa, whereas in the second part, which is intentionally polemical, Platonic doctrine is often explicitly elucidated. Secondly the fact must be stressed, that in the second and third parts of his treatise Calcidius sticks to the exposition given in the first part. There are no obvious discrepancies and, besides, in the course of his argument in the second and third parts the author makes a definite use of some of the elements in the first part.

Now the third part is perhaps the most interesting, because of two remarkable elements, which may also provide a clue regarding Calcidius' source. These elements are: 1. The inclusion of fate and Providence in a Neo-Platonic hierarchy of metaphysical entities in ch. 176, 177 and 188; 2. Freedom of choice finding its place in the *λογιστικόν* of the soul. Man's free will is very important to Calcidius. In ch. 142, which is the introduction to the treatise, the relation of fate to free will is said to be the subject of the whole investigation. Moreover, the importance Calcidius attaches to the subject is clearly shown by the references made to it throughout the *tractatus*. It is obvious that the author is interested in the structure of fate and its place in the cosmos mainly, or at least for a great part, because of what it implies for human freedom. These

reflections underline the importance of this second remarkable element in the third part of the treatise, *viz.* the tenet that human freedom has its seat in the λογιστικόν of the soul.

Bearing in mind the unity of the treatise and the two topics of the third part we shall now try to identify Calcidius' source. It is of course necessary to distinguish the direct source from influences within that source. In the *praefatio* of his edition (p. LVIII-LXIII) Waszink has given some suggestions for both these backgrounds. On page LIX he writes: *Dubitari non potest quin tota haec de fato doctrina ex schola Platonica media prouenerit. Sed nostro iudicio paulo longius progredi licet et Numenium huius doctrinae auctorem uel saltem astipulatorem asserere.* To my opinion the first sentence of this quotation does not do full justice to the third part of the treatise and I disagree with the contents of the second sentence, because I can find few traces of Numenian influence in the treatise. But let us first consider Waszink's exposition. He puts forward three arguments: (1) *Exordium capiendum est a re minore quidem, sed prorsus certa. In c. 174 (ergo intra huius de fato disputationis limites) oppugnatur doctrina Stoica iuxta quam mala ex stellarum motu proueniant: Unde ergo mala? Motum stellarum causantur (sc. Stoici). Hoc plane simile est iis quae in relatione Pythagorici de silua dogmatis, ex ipso Numenii textu ad uerbum sine dubio expressa, leguntur (c. 298): Qua ratione intellegi datur Stoicos frustra causari nescio quam peruersitatem, cum quae proueniunt ex motu stellarum prouenire dicant. Hinc sumere licebit totam huius Stoici dogmatis refutationem quam artissime sibi cohaerentem (cc. 174-175) una cum dissertatione perquam simili quae in capitis 172 parte posteriore inueniatur ex Numenio originem trahere.* For this argument I refer to my notes on ch. 174 (above p. 77), where I showed that there is no special resemblance between that chapter and ch. 298. (2) According to Waszink the contents of ch. 176 show a distinct Numenian influence. However, in my notes on ch. 176 I pointed out that one is rather, or at least just as much, reminded of Plotinus. (3) The additional proof from the Old Testament in ch. 171 is wholly after the manner of Numenius. This argument I shall leave for the moment.

On p. LXII Waszink concludes *totam hanc de fato doctrinam scholae Platonicae mediae deberi, et quidem, nisi omnia fallunt, ipsi Numenio.* He suggests that possibly Numenius treated the subject in his work Περὶ τῶν ἀθανάτων. Waszink adds that Calcidius probably

did not use that book directly, but rather with Porphyry as an intermediary. Later Waszink has changed his opinion considerably. In his *Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius* he says (p. 22 n. 2), that he now adheres to the view of Theiler. As we have seen, Theiler considers the doctrine expounded in the first part of the treatise and showing such a considerable resemblance to pseudo-Plutarch's *περὶ εἰμαρμένης* as belonging to the school of Gaius. Waszink is still convinced that both in the second and third parts there are some important traces of Numenian influence.¹ In my opinion Theiler's argument that in *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* and in the parallel passages of Calcidius' *De fato* we have the contents of Gaius' teaching is very plausible. But it is also evident that in Calcidius' *tractatus* this doctrine is not merely repeated, but incorporated into a fuller investigation. Most interesting is the insistence on the metaphysical priority of Providence to fate, to which the chapters 143a, 146 and 147 are devoted. For the second part of the treatise, *viz.*, the refutation of Stoic attacks, Calcidius' direct source may itself go back to a treatise belonging to the same sphere as *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*. In the final chapter of the last-mentioned treatise the author gives a rapid survey of the subjects which he has expounded, then he briefly glances at some arguments brought forward by the *ἐναντίος λόγος* (the Stoics) and finally he says: *τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα τούτων ἐσαυθις μέτιμεν* (574 f). Perhaps the author fulfilled his promise and perhaps Calcidius' source had that sequel to *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* at his disposal. However, this is highly hypothetical. The most we can say is that it is not *a priori* unlikely that Calcidius' source made use of a refutation of the Stoic doctrine of fate composed in the same school as *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*. Indeed, as we have seen, Calcidius more than once reverts to the ideas exposed in the first part, where the resemblance to *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* is strong. In any case I do not see a special reason to assume that Numenius was the *auctor intellectualis* for the whole or for important elements of the second part of the treatise.

¹ Cf. especially the following words: "das Wichtigste ist die Übereinstimmung zwischen Kap. 174 und dem zu dem Referat der Lehre des Numenios gehörenden Kap. 298". At the end of his note Waszink briefly recapitulates his changed opinion: "Das wahrscheinlichste ist, dass Calcidius, wie ich schon in der Praefatio ausgeführt habe (S. LXIII), die ganze Abhandlung aus Porphyrios geschöpft hat, der sowohl Gaios wie Numenius und Alexander von Aphrodisias herangezogen hat".

Let us now turn to the third part of the treatise and examine the possibilities of a clue regarding the source used by Calcidius. It is obvious that the doctrine about the metaphysical hierarchy in ch. 176, 177 and 188 lends itself admirably for the purpose of our examination. In Tome XII of the *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique*, which is devoted to the study of Porphyry, both Waszink and Theiler pay attention to the chapters in question. Waszink in his paper *Porphyrios und Numenios* writes that there are "verschiedene Einzelheiten, die in die Richtung des Numenios weisen, und die entweder direct oder durch Vermittlung der chaldäischen Orakel zu Porphyrios gelangt sein mögen".¹

The ideas he puts forward are in full agreement with the notes in the exegetical apparatus of his edition. So, according to Waszink, ch. 176, 177 and 188 show considerable Numenian influence. Theiler's paper is called *Ammonios und Porphyrios*. Theiler formerly thought that it was impossible to reconstruct the doctrine of Ammonius, the teacher of both Plotinus and Origen who, like Socrates, did not write anything himself. Subsequently, however, he changed his opinion that Ammonius was a "grosser Schatten". Indeed, both in his contribution to the *Entretiens* and especially in the essay *Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes* in his collection *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus*, he has tried to reconstruct many elements of Ammonius' doctrine. For this he bases himself especially on the tenets of Hierocles, the fifth-century Neo-Platonic philosopher from Alexandria, and on the writings of the church-father Origen. So it is not surprising, that in his discussion of Calcidius' description of the hierarchy he remarks: "Porphyrios, zu dem ohne Zweifel Calcidius hier gegriffen hat, referiert also z.T. im Sinne des Ammonios, für den die Übereinstimmung zwischen Plotin und Origenes spricht. Auch sonst lässt sich einiges Ammonische im Referaten des Porphyrios bei Calcidius feststellen".² This is wholly consistent with one of the conclusions in his essay *Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes*: "Porphyrios näherte sich in dem Masse dem Ammonios, wie sich Plotin von ihm entfernte".³ Of course it is out of place here to discuss Theiler's views fully. His expositions are very impressive, yet one should not overlook their highly hypothetical

¹ *Entretiens* XII p. 65.

² *Entretiens* XII p. 99-100.

³ *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* p. 40.

character. On the other hand it must be admitted that there is at least the possibility that some elements in Calcidius' exposition of the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως-doctrine agree with Hierocles (see above p. 105) and it should not be forgotten that the latter held Ammonius in high respect, even calling him θεοδιδάκτος. So perhaps there are traces of Ammonius' doctrine in Calcidius. However, I do not believe in any thorough influence of this doctrine in the chapters which we are discussing now. In fact, as I have pointed out in the notes on these chapters, I think it more likely that Plotinus' theory of the three hypostases has greatly influenced the Calcidian paragraphs on the metaphysical hierarchy. To my opinion especially the description of the highest God, who is above all existence (*ultra omnem substantiam omnemque naturam*, 204.7) and the source of all things (*originem rerum*, 212.22), points into this direction. I also think that this explanation is in closer harmony with the view of both Waszink and Theiler, that Calcidius' direct source in these chapters is Porphyry. Certainly Porphyry accepted the hypostases taught by his master, as can be seen in his 'Αφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά. Perhaps an even closer parallel to Calcidius' description can be found in some fragments of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*. In fr. 15, 16 and 17 we find some remains of Porphyry's report on Plato's doctrine of the three gods. Now it is remarkable that, although that doctrine in Porphyry's rendering has a definitely Neo-Platonic character, the highest God, just as in Calcidius, is not called τὸ ἓν, whereas otherwise the description would be quite appropriate to Plotinus' τὸ ἓν, cf. ὁ θεὸς ὁ πρῶτος καὶ μόνος αἰεὶ, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γένηται τὰ πάντα (fr. 17, p. 15. 9/10 Nauck) and Calcidius' *nullius societatis indiguus* (204.8-9).¹ I think it justified to stick to the conclusion that Porphyry has revised the Middle-Platonic doctrine of three πρόνοιαι and tried to bring it into harmony as

¹ For this expression Theiler, *Ammonios und Porphyrios, Entretiens XII* p. 98 refers to the term ἀκοινώνητος in Numenius fr. 34: ὁ δὲ Νοῦμῆνιος ἀκοινώνητον αὐτὸν (i.e. the Jewish God) καὶ πατέρα πάντων τῶν θεῶν εἶναι λέγει, ἀπαξιοῦντα κοινωνεῖν αὐτῷ τῆς τιμῆς τινα. This fragment is taken from Lydus *De mensibus* 110.1-4 Wünsch. Certainly the second part of this quotation (ἀπαξιοῦντα κτλ.) explains the word ἀκοινώνητος, which according to this explanation must mean 'not wanting that anyone should share his honour with him'. Quite rightly Leemans in his note ad loc. refers to *Exodus* 20.5, where the Lord in the second commandment says: "I the Lord thy God am a jealous God". Cf. also *Wisdom of Solomon* 14.21, where at the end of a pericope on the origins of idolatry it is said: "And this proved an ambush for man's life, because men in bondage to misfortune or royal authority

well as he could with Plotinus' doctrine ¹ of the three hypostases (see above p. 98).²

If it is right to consider Porphyry as the direct source for such an important part of Calcidius' *tractatus*, the question arises, whether other indications can be added in support of his authorship. Put more directly the question is as follows: is it possible to accept Porphyry as the *auctor intellectualis* of the other notable characteristic of the *tractatus*, viz., the great emphasis laid on human freedom, culminating in the argument of ch. 180 *sqq.*, where this freedom is located in the rational part of the soul? Now there is no doubt that Porphyry, at least in the later stages of his career, strongly defended man's responsibility. In his letter to his wife Marcella he wrote κακῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς θεὸς αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ ἐλόμενος (ch. 24, 289.13-14 Nauck = 28.5-6 Pötscher). Earlier, in his letter to Anebo, he had showed anxiety that of "Chaere-mon's friends" οἱ πλείους καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀστέρων ἀνῆψαν κινήσεως (2.13 a, p. 25 Sodano). More important is the fact that he explicitly tackled the problem of free will in his essay Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, in which he dealt with the myth of Er in Plato's *Politeia*. Fragments of this essay, from which I have already quoted in the notes on ch. 152 (see above p. 32), can be found in Stobaeus *Eclogae* II 8, 39-42 (Wachsmuth vol. II p. 163-173). Porphyry's interest in human freedom is fully congruent with his general attitude as a philosopher. Most scholars who have studied Por-

clothed stick and stones with the Name that cannot be shared with others". (transl. E. J. Goodspeed). The last sentence of this quotation in the Septuagint text runs as follows: τὸ ἀκοινώνητον ὄνομα λίθοις καὶ ξύλοις περιέθεσαν. So in this case ἀκοινώνητος has a passive, but comparable meaning. Theiler's reference can only be justified, if the explanatory words (ἀπαξιοῦντα κτλ.) are not ascribed to Numenius himself, but to Lydus and if Lydus has made a mistake.

¹ This conclusion is also in harmony with Beutler's adage: "Alles, was Porphyrios seit seiner Kenntnis Plotins geschrieben hat, steht im Dienste dieser Philosophie oder wird von ihren Grundgedanken getragen". (Beutler, Art. *Porphyrios* in RE XXII¹ col. 285). Steinheimer, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen des Calcidius*, Aschaffenburg 1912, p. 31 has also suggested Plotinus' name, but his argument is rather superficial and disappointing. There is also a very curious passage in Porphyry's *Letter to Marcella*, which might preserve a trace of the hierarchy: ψυχὴ οὖν πονηρὰ φεύγει μὲν θεόν, πρόνοϊαν δὲ θεοῦ εἶναι οὐ βούλεται, νόμου τε θεοῦ τοῦ πᾶν τὸ φαῦλον κολάζοντος ἀποστατοῖ πάντως. (*Ad Marc.* 16, 285. 4-7 Nauck = 22.6-8 Pötscher). The trio θεός . . . πρόνοια θεοῦ . . . νόμος θεῖος is somehow reminiscent of Calcidius.

² However, the problem concerning Nemesis, mentioned above on p. 98, remains unsolved.

phyry's doctrine and writings, hold the opinion that he was before all interested in the moral consequences and implications of philosophy. As Beutler says, the philosopher according to Porphyry should be a *Seelenarzt*. Bidez calls Porphyry a "vrai moraliste". Perhaps it is best expressed in Porphyry's own words: κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος ὅφ' οὐ μὴδὲν πάθος ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται (*Ad Marc.* 31, 294. 7-8 Nauck = 34.10-11 Pötscher).

Certainly Calcidius' emphasis on human freedom corresponds quite well with Porphyry's general attitude in the same matter.¹ Now in Calcidius' treatise human choice is said to reside in the rational part of the human soul. For this I have not been able to find definite parallels.² The argument shows high esteem for this rational part, which is not at all surprising in ancient philosophy. Further we have seen that elements both from Platonism and from the Peripatos were used in the doctrine about the soul, which is at the background of the line of thought in ch. 180 b-187. Basically, however, that doctrine is Platonic, the introduction of Peripatetic thoughts having become quite normal in Platonic psychology, as indeed in other departments of philosophy. But is it also possible to detect typical Porphyrian elements in the chapters in question? The best introduction to Porphyry's psychology can be found in Dörrie's contribution to the collection of essays on Porphyry mentioned above. Unfortunately that paper, entitled *Die Lehre von der Seele*, does not provide us with any details which specially refer to the doctrine in ch. 180 a-187. On the other hand, these chapters do not contain anything that goes counter to Porphyry's psychology, and the curious argument of ch. 187, demonstrating the usefulness of the two lower parts of the soul for the care of worldly affairs, has something in common with Porphyry's idea that the soul is a μέση οὐσία.³

¹ The interest which Porphyry takes in human freedom and responsibility could serve as an argument for Theiler's hypothesis, that Porphyry often reverts to the ideas of Ammonius. Both Hierocles and Origen, from whose works Theiler wants to reconstruct Ammonius' doctrine, strongly defend human responsibility. Origen has explicitly treated the problem in book III of his *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*.

² There are, of course, many parallels for the ideas in individual chapters and for smaller details. For these parallel texts I refer to Waszink's exegetical apparatus and my notes to these chapters. Plotinus explicitly refers free will to the intellect: . . . εἰς ἀρχὴν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν καλλίστην ἀνάγοντες τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν . . . (*Enn.* VI 8.3).

³ Beutler, *o.c.* col. 306.

Two arguments can be added to make it more plausible that Porphyry is the source of Calcidius' *tractatus*.

(1) There is a notable similarity in the views held by Calcidius and Porphyry on God's knowledge of contingent things (see my notes on ch. 163, above p. 56).

(2) There are many *Aristotelica* throughout the *tractatus*. Switalski¹ and Waszink (notes *ad loc.*) often refer to the *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* of the great Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. However, the texts they have quoted mainly concern details and nowhere prove Calcidius' use of greater *Abschnitte*. Indeed, Calcidius' line of thought sometimes differs widely from Alexander's, even if some details are greatly similar. This is not surprising, for Calcidius holds the Platonic view, whereas Alexander is a Peripatetic to the core.² Now I do not deny that Porphyry, if indeed he may be called Calcidius' source, may have studied Alexander's *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*. On the contrary, this is even likely. Porphyry himself tells that, during Plotinus' lectures, among other things the *ὑπομνήματα* of Alexander and other Peripatetic philosophers were studied.³ It is quite reasonable to suppose that in preparing his own *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* he studied Alexander's fine and important treatise.

But apart from any resemblances to Alexander's *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* there are many more *Aristotelica*. Without doubt the process of introducing Aristotelic thoughts into Platonism had long since begun; this is shown clearly in Albinus' *Epitome* and indeed in pseudo-Plutarch's *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*. So in itself this fact does not prove much, but on the other hand it certainly suits the hypothesis of a Porphyrian authorship. For it is a well-known fact that Porphyry, who was a very prolific writer, also wrote commentaries on some works of Aristotle.⁴ Now we have sometimes illustrated Calcidius' statements with quotations from such late Neo-Platonic commentators on Aristotle's works as Ammonius and Philoponus. It seems quite possible that these commentators found their material in Porphyry's works. The resemblance of the texts quoted from their commentaries to Calcidius could then be explained by the

¹ B. W. Switalski, *Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato's Timaeus*, Münster 1902, p. 94 sqq.

² Cf. my note to the sentence *series uero illa causarum ineuitabilis unde accipiet exordium* (203.7-8, see above p. 82).

³ Porphyrius, *Vita Plotini* c. 14.

⁴ Cf. J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre*, Ghent 1913, p. 58 sqq. and the list of commentaries on p. 65* and 66* and Beutler *o.c.* col. 282.

fact that both Calcidius and the Neo-Platonic commentators are following Porphyry. In any case the *Aristotelica* in Calcidius are in harmony with the hypothesis that his direct source is Porphyry.

Finally we turn to the *Hebraei*, who at times are quoted by Calcidius to provide an additional illustration for an argument which has already been proved by other means. In the *tractatus de fato* there are two examples of this (ch. 171, see above p. 71 and ch. 154, see above p. 36). There are different explanations given for this mannerism.

(1) Sodano thinks that Calcidius, who as a Christian must have had an adequate knowledge of the Old Testament, has independently added these texts.¹ This suggestion has been disproved by Waszink: "Diese Lösung der Frage scheint mir aber aus dem Grunde ausgeschlossen zu sein, dass an verschiedenen dieser Stellen das Bibelzitat mit einer unverkennbar philosophischen Ausdeutung verbunden ist, die unmöglich dem Calcidius selbst zugeschrieben werden kann".²

(2) Waszink I, in the *Praefatio* of his edition: *Deinde, ut p. XLIII, adn. 2 obseruauimus, credi non potest Porphyrium, ut Calcidium, tam frequenter Hebraeorum sapientiam ut suae doctrinae confirmationem aduocauisse; iis igitur locis ipsum Numenium secutum esse Calcidium ueri multo similis est* (p. CV).

(3) Waszink II: After some critical remarks by van Winden in the *Supplementary Notes to the Photographic Reprint* of his book *Calcidius on Matter* (p. 253 sqq.) Waszink changed his opinion. In his paper *Porphyrus und Numenius* he says: "Das alles führt zu der Annahme, dass die Kapitel, in denen Calcidius die *Hebraica philosophia* anführt, nicht direkt, sondern durch Vermittlung des Porphyrios auf Numenius zurückgehen" (o.c. p. 62).

In my opinion the problem has not yet been conclusively solved. For this reason I venture to suggest a fourth possibility. In his remarks on ch. 276-278 van Winden (o.c. p. 53-66) says that the contents of these chapters may very well have been derived from Origen's now lost *Commentary on Genesis*. Waszink too in the *Praefatio* refers to this commentary, saying: *Probabile uidetur eum... Origenis in Genesin commentarium praesto habuisse* (p. CVI). Origen's commentary must have been a very learned work.

¹ A. R. Sodano, *Sul Commento di Calcidio al "Timeo" di Platone*. *Giornale Italiano di filologia* XVI (1963) p. 343 sqq.

² *Entretiens* XII p. 59.

In no less than 13 books he commented on the first four chapters of *Genesis*.¹ This is confirmed by the few fragments, which have been preserved.² In my notes on ch. 174 I have already referred to Origen's essay on the words in *Genesis* 1, 14 "let them (the stars) be signs". This essay, which formed part of the third book of the *Commentary*, has been preserved by Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* VI ch. 11. In this thorough study³ Origen treats such questions as human freedom, God's foreknowledge etc. The other fragments also prove the fact that Origen did not restrict himself to a simple exegesis. Now it is remarkable that most of the *Hebraica* quoted by Calcidius are indeed highly philosophical and also for the greater part are confined to texts from the first four chapters of *Genesis*, the only chapters treated by Origen in his commentary.⁴ So I should like to contribute the following suggestion to the discussion on the source of the *Hebraica*: These *Hebraica* are derived from Origen's *Commentary on Genesis*. They are either introduced by Calcidius himself or by the *auctor* whom he followed; in our opinion this is Porphyry. Although I have a slight preference for the first possibility, I do not rule out the alternative. Indeed Porphyry wrote a polemical work *κατὰ Χριστιανῶν*, which displayed much hostility against the Christian doctrine. But on the other hand in this work he showed great familiarity with the Christian doctrine and indeed with the contents of the Bible. It does not at all seem impossible that Porphyry studied a commentary on such an important book as *Genesis* by such a prominent scholar as Origen. He certainly knew the latter quite well, as is apparent from Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* VI 19, 5-8.⁵

Our final conclusion is, that in his *tractatus de fato* Calcidius has adapted a treatise of Porphyry on fate, which in all probability belonged to his *ὑπομνήματα* on Plato's *Timaeus*. Sodano was justi-

¹ Cf. R. Devreesse, *Les anciens Commentateurs grecs de l'Octateuque et des Rois, Studi et Testi* 201, Vatican City 1959, p. 26 sqq.

² Texts in Lommatzsch' edition of Origen's works, Vol. VIII p. 5-47.

³ In Mras' edition of the *Praeparatio Evangelica* it comprises no less than 17 pages.

⁴ The full list, apart from ch. 276-278 (280.1 sqq.), is as follows: ch. 55, 103.2 sqq.: *Genesis* 1.26 and 2.7; ch. 130, 172.23 sqq.: *Genesis* 1.14-16; ch. 132, 173.22: no special text mentioned; ch. 154, 189.8 sqq.: *Genesis* 2.17; ch. 171, 200.14 sqq.: *Isaiah* 1.19-20?; ch. 219, 231.24 sqq.: *Genesis* 4.10, 9.4; ch. 300, 302.11 sqq.: *Genesis* 1.24, 2.7, 3.1.

⁵ Cf. especially par. 8: τὸν μεταληπτικὸν τῶν παρ' Ἑλλήσι μυστηρίων γνούς τρόπον ταῖς Ἰουδαϊαῖς προσῆψεν γραφαῖς.

fied in including Calcidius' *De Fato* among the *fragmenta incerta* of his edition of the fragments of Porphyry's commentary on the *Timaeus*.¹ This conclusion is not new. It has already been drawn by Waszink in his *Praefatio: suspicari licebit hanc de fato doctrinam . . . a Calcidio apud auctorem Numenio et Alexandro posteriorem, et quidem apud Porphyrium . . . inuentam esse* (p. LXIII).

¹ *Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum Fragmenta* collegit et disposuit A. R. Sodano, Naples 1964.

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SAMENVATTING

In c. 142 van zijn commentaar op de *Timaëus* kondigt Calcidius aan, dat hij naar aanleiding van de woorden νόμους τε τοὺς εἰμαρμένους (41 e 2) een globaal overzicht zal geven van de Platoonse fatumleer. Dit overzicht beslaat de capita 143-190 en het kan in drie hoofdonderdelen worden verdeeld:

- A. De fundamenteën van de Platoonse fatumleer (c. 143-159),
- B. Bestrijding van Stoïcijnse aanvallen op deze leer (c. 160-175),
- C. Nieuwe uiteenzetting van de Platoonse leer (c. 176-190).

In het eerste hoofdonderdeel (A) zet de auteur uiteen, dat aan de Voorzienigheid een hogere rang moet worden toegekend dan aan het fatum. Enkele teksten uit de *Timaëus* worden als bewijs hiervan geciteerd. Het grote belang van dit principiële punt zal eerst in onderdeel C ten volle duidelijk worden.

Het fatum nu bezit twee aspecten: men kan het beschouwen naar zijn wezen en naar zijn actualiteit. In het eerste geval is het fatum de Wereldziel, in het andere geval is het een wet, zoals b.v. aan het licht treedt in *Phaedrus* 248 c 2, waar gesproken wordt van een 'wet van Adrasteia'. De wet van het fatum heeft een hypothetisch karakter, zij verbindt oorzaken en gevolgen. De oorzaken, die het vertrekpunt vormen van een reeks gevolgen, worden niet door het fatum bepaald, maar o.a. door de vrije wil van de mens. De wet van het fatum stelt algemene regels, waarvan het grondpatroon luidt: *si hoc erit, sequetur illud*. Calcidius' beschouwingen zijn hier sterk verwant aan de geschriften van enkele Griekse auteurs. Vooral met het ten onrechte aan Plutarchus toegeschreven tractaat Περὶ εἰμαρμένης bestaat grote overeenkomst. De auteur van dit geschrift moet gelocaliseerd worden in een Midden-Platoonse school, zeer waarschijnlijk die van Gaius. Enkele voorbeelden lichten het karakter van de wet van het fatum, die, zoals het in de Griekse vertogen heet, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως functioneert, nog nader toe.

De laatste hoofdstukken van het eerste hoofdonderdeel zijn gewijd aan de plaats, die enkele andere zaken ten opzichte van het fatum innemen, zoals het contingente, de voorspellingskunst, geluk en toeval.

Het tweede hoofdonderdeel (B) gaat in op een aantal Stoïcijnse tegenwerpingen: Gods voorkennis van alle gebeuren, aldus de Stoa,

voert onherroepelijk tot de conclusie, dat alles van te voren is vastgesteld. Dit is volgens Calcidius allerm minst het geval. Stellig weet God alles, maar dan toch elk ding naar zijn eigen aard, het contingente als contingente. Men mag dus alleen concluderen, dat ten aanzien van het contingente onwrikbaar vaststaat, dat het contingent is. Ook de menselijke vrijheid, die voor Calcidius van primair belang is, is volledig gehandhaafd. Deze vrijheid wordt intussen danig bedreigd door de slechte invloed van het milieu, waarin de mens van kindsbeen vertoeft. Deze διαστροφή of *peruersio* ondermijnt volgens de Stoa het principe van de vrije wil. Dit argument vermag Calcidius niet te imponeren; hij concludeert uit deze stand van zaken veeleer tot de noodzaak van goede opvoeding en goddelijke bescherming.

Ook in de voorspellingskunst, waaraan de Stoïcijnse fatumleer zulk een voorname plaats toekent, is geen bewijs gelegen voor de onwrikbare voorbeschikking van alle gebeuren. Orakels zijn immers of dubbelzinnig, zoals in het geval van Croesus, of hebben het karakter van een advies. In beide gevallen is de vrije verantwoordelijkheid van de mens verondersteld.

Hierna besteedt de auteur nog enkele bladzijden aan het probleem van het kwaad; hiervoor kunnen noch het fatum noch de sterren noch de Logos verantwoordelijk worden gesteld. Calcidius' antwoord aan de Stoa wordt besloten met een aantal heftige verwijten jegens de aanhangers van deze filosofie, die zijns inziens goddeloosheid en laksheid bevordert.

In caput 176 hervat de auteur de bespreking van de Platoonse fatumleer. Deze hernieuwde bespreking, die het derde hoofdonderdeel (C) omvat, is het meest interessante stuk van de *tractatus de fato*. Twee zaken hebben de volle aandacht: a. het fatum wordt ingepast in een metaphysische hiërarchie, b. de menselijke vrijheid wordt verankerd in het redelijke deel van de ziel.

Het onder a genoemde komt aan de orde in de capita 176 en 188. Hier wordt een hiërarchie geschetst van een hoogste God, Zijn Voorzienigheid, die ook νοῦς wordt genoemd en de Wereldziel of het tweede intellect. Deze laatste hypostase gehoorzaamt aan de wet van het fatum, dat in de rangorde na de Voorzienigheid komt, zoals in hoofdonderdeel A een- en andermaal was bewezen.

Een aantal gedachten in de capita 176 en 188 doen denken aan Numenius, andere ideeën herinneren sterk aan Plotinus. Het lijkt het meest plausibel, dat Porphyrius in deze capita Calcidius' bron is geweest.

In de capita 180-187 wordt uiteengezet, dat de menselijke vrijheid haar steunpunt heeft in het λογιστικόν van de ziel. Deze vrijheid wordt daarom niet wezenlijk aangetast door een minder gunstige lichamelijke conditie en evenmin door de lagere zieleleden. Ook de voorspellingskunst en de astrologie vormen geen bewijs voor het tegendeel. Beide werken immers op rationele basis en betreffen bovendien niet het redelijk zieledeel, doch uitsluitend het lichaam en de lagere zieleleden.

Nadat nog enkele in de *tractatus* behandelde kwesties kort zijn samengevat, besluit de auteur zijn betoog in caput 190. Van dit hoofdstuk luidt de slotconclusie, dat sommige dingen geschieden door het fatum, andere hun oorsprong vinden in de vrije wil van de mens.

Uit welke bron(nen) heeft Calcidius nu de stof voor zijn verhandeling geput? Zoals zoëven reeds werd opgemerkt, lijkt de inhoud van de zeer belangrijke capita 176 en 188 ontleend aan Porphyrius. Nu zijn deze capita stellig niet als vreemd element aan het betoog toegevoegd, integendeel ze zijn volkomen in het geheel geïntegreerd, zodat toewijzing van de stof van de beide capita aan Porphyrius belangrijke implicaties heeft.

Er zijn evenwel meer argumenten, die ervoor pleiten Porphyrius aan te merken als Calcidius' belangrijkste bron. Zo past de grote nadruk, die gelegd wordt op de menselijke vrijheid, geheel bij de opvattingen, die Porphyrius in de latere fazen van zijn wijsgerige carrière huldigde. Ook de talrijke *Aristotelica* in Calcidius' betoog kunnen een aanwijzing vormen. Porphyrius schreef immers verscheidene commentaren op werken van Aristoteles, terwijl bovendien bij de door hem bijgewoonde colleges van Plotinus werken van Peripatetische denkers werden bestudeerd, onder meer van Alexander van Aphrodisias, in wiens *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* vele gedachten te vinden zijn, die ook bij Calcidius een plaats krijgen. Wellicht mag men voorts aannemen, dat het beroep op teksten uit het Oude Testament door Porphyrius is overgenomen van Origines.

Ten aanzien van het bronnenvraagstuk luidt de conclusie, dat Calcidius in zijn *tractatus de fato* een betoog van Porphyrius heeft bewerkt, dat behoorde tot diens ὑπομνήματα op Plato's *Timaeus* en waarin onder meer gebruik gemaakt is van door het Midden-Platonisme geboden materiaal.